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Preface 
 
Studying initiatives for change tends to make one sadder but wiser. Be-
yond a certain point, however, a change in perspective sets in; both the 
opportunities and the pitfalls are seen more clearly. The purpose of this 
book is to give you, the reader, a shortcut to the latter more informed 
position. 
In the field of organization, fads come and go out of fashion ever 
so often. However, you will find the subject covered in this book to be 
relatively timeless. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On the surface, Europe seems to adopt its organization of work entirely 
from other parts of the world: first by deepening the division between 
thinking and doing according to the principles of classical Taylorism, later 
by embracing neo-Tayloristic trends like lean production from Japan and 
McDonaldization from the U.S.  
There is, however, a countermovement. In some organizations, 
innovative managers, staff personnel and union groups are pursuing anti-
Tayloristic1 strategies. They receive support from researchers who, 
combining consultancy and research, accumulate expertise on changing 
working life and feed this back into organizations. National unions have 
supplemented their bread-and-butter activities with involvement in the 
organization of work. So did politicians, who, in several countries, 
pressed for working life legislation that covers work organization as much 
as health and safety. And in Scandinavia and Germany, there are state-
sponsored research and development programs that explore alternatives to 
Taylorism. These programs include efforts to develop technologies that do 
not have a Taylorist bias and that could support change in organizations. 
This book addresses the following questions: 
· What types of initiatives does this countermovement consist of?  
· To what extent can these types of initiatives be successful in bringing 
about durable change at the shop floor level? 
· How can differences in the effectiveness between these types of ini-
tiatives be explained? 
There are several reasons why these questions are interesting: 
Reason #1: The existence and the continuing emergence of jobs that 
are at odds with the ideals of self-realization, freedom and democracy 
have been branded as a social problem. There are many studies that 
explore this social problem by tracing the development of the labor 
process in terms of: 
· the possibilities for workers to exercise and develop their skills, 
sometimes called the "complexity of work", or the extent to which the 
work is interesting or challenging; 
· autonomy; 
· influence on the work process beyond the immediate personal work 
environment. 
These studies have shown, that at least a substantial part of the jobs 
exhibit less of these three qualities than technological and economic 
development would allow. This prompts some of the authors to recom-
mend policies that imply a belief in a certain malleability of the quality of 
working life. Kern and Schumann (1984: 323-327), for example, 
recommend a policy of modernization that promotes professionalization in 
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industry.2 Also policy-oriented reports (e.g. by the OECD: Delors et al. 
1975: 14-15) have called for job enrichment, for greater worker 
participation in decision-making and for the development of humanized 
technology.  
The answers to the research questions posed in the present study 
will indicate how realistic these recommendations are. 
Reason #2: To get a sense of the level of realism of anti-Tayloristic 
policy, one would like to see comprehensive policy reviews. Such reviews 
exist (e.g. Den Hertog and Schröder 1989, Auer, Tergeist and Penth 1983), 
but generally they do not provide information about actual resulting 
change on the shop floor level. In other words, it is not clear whether the 
policies are just theoretical change or entail real change. 
Reason #3: There are studies that do provide information about the 
actual resulting change on the shop floor level. However, these are 
generally (and understandably) restricted to a limited context, like a 
particular development program such as the German Humanization of 
Working Life Program, a particular type of working arrangement like 
teamworking, a particular design approach (like integral sociotechnical 
design) or a particular type of actor (e. g. unions). Without attempts to 
compare between different policies and between cases in different con-
texts, it will be hard to find out what works best and why. 
Reason #4: When browsing through the literature, one finds widely 
divergent sweeping statements on the general character of anti-Tayloristic 
policy. For example, Auer, Tergeist and Penth (1983: 12) describe 
humanization of working life (a term widely used in Germany) as: "New 
forms of work organization, designing jobs and work environments that 
do justice to humans, social cushioning of technical innovation and 
cooperation of dependent employees in the changes that affect them". On 
the other hand, Doorewaard (1989: 52) sees humanization of working life, 
job redesign and work structuring as "control strategies". In contrast with 
this view, McGregor (1970: 315) sees it as a mode of organizing in which 
management makes it possible for workers to develop their intrinsic 
motivation, capacity for development, capacity for assuming responsibility 
and readiness to direct behavior towards organizational goals. Kelly 
(1982), on the other hand, sees job redesign primarily as adaptation of the 
organization of work to turbulence in product markets while intensifying 
work. He emphasizes extrinsic motivation as a factor that leads to higher 
productivity after job redesign. Braverman (1974: 39) views work reform 
as "a style of management rather than a genuine change in the position of 
the worker", while Ramsay (1985: 59) analyses the phenomenon as 
concessions that managers make in times when their legitimacy is 
threatened. 
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These are just a few examples. The sheer variety of interpretations 
suggests that their is room for further clarification of the nature of anti-
Tayloristic policy. 
Reason #5: Many writers have expressed the opinion that Taylorism 
is obsolete, that there are ways to organize work differently 
("organizational choice"), and that managers should depart from the 
Taylorist way. However, broad based empirical studies to determine the 
depth and breadth of the expected transformation  (e.g. Child and 
Loveridge 1990, Schumann et al. 1994, Huys, Sels and Van Hootegem 
1995) have shown that this vision has not become a widespread reality. 
(The first chapter covers this persistency of Taylorism in some depth.) 
Studying the ups and downs of those organizations that did take the 
plunge to depart from Taylorism might help explain why the transfor-
mation did not materialize to the extent that many had hoped for. No 
discussion of work is complete without an attempt to answer the question 
whether the reality described is the only possible reality; social reality 
reveals itself best when one tries to change it. 
The main part of the study consists of an analysis of attempts within 
organizations in Germany, The Netherlands, the U.K., Sweden and 
Norway to break with Taylorism. The reason for choosing Sweden was 
the high level of activity in this area. Internationally, Sweden seemed an 
exception with respect to worker influence on the introduction of new 
technology (Levie and Moore 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, Levie 1985). A good 
sign for worker influence in Sweden is that more than 90 per cent of the 
workforce is organized in unions. In the 1980's, many working life 
researchers in Western Europe and in the U.S. saw Scandinavia as an 
Eldorado for worker influence on job design (Buitelaar and Vreeman 
1985: 582-586, Howard 1986: 208-209, Gill 1985: 140-160). Germany 
seemed interesting because of the massive (generally around 100 million 
DM a year) state involvement through the programs "Humanization of 
Working Life" and "Work and Technology". I included Norway when it 
became clear that both government sponsored development programs and 
legislation with an anti-Tayloristic content originated there. The U.K. is 
important for historic reasons, having been the scene for pioneering 
change projects; the U.K. also offers contemporary technological 
developments that are relevant for this study. And in The Netherlands, 
high-profile events are far and few between, but in several firms, 
managers and unions in their own way and aided by consultants, are 
quietly trying to move away from Taylorism. 
The analysis does not stop at the company level. Instead, the 
various activities designed for promoting change in organizations were the 
object of study as well.  
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Box 0.1  The principles of Taylorism 
"Taylorism" (after Frederick Winslow Taylor, management expert, 1856 - 
1915) has become a catchword for management strategies that lead to 
impoverished jobs. (Impoverished in the sense that skill content and 
autonomy are going down and that workers are allowed less influence on 
the work process at large.) 
The central feature of Taylorism is the separation of conception from 
execution. Managers achieve this by applying three principles. The first 
principle of "scientific management" as Taylor called it, is the decoupling 
of the labor process from the skills of the workers: "The managers assume 
[..] the burden of gathering together all of the traditional knowledge which 
in the past has been possessed by the workmen and then of classifying, 
tabulating, and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws, and formulae" (in 
Braverman 1974: 112). 
The second principle is: "All possible brain work should be removed from 
the shop and centered in the planning or laying-out department" (in 
Braverman 1974: 113). 
The third principle is, that management should not leave it to the workers 
to decide how they go about their tasks. Instead, management should 
prescribe exactly how, and how fast, the tasks must be performed. The 
main reason for doing this is to prevent workers from holding their output 
down.  
Taylorism is a refinement of the management strategy of detailed division 
of labor. It is important to draw a sharp distinction between detailed 
division of labor and specialization. Through specialization, people can 
develop themselves further in their crafts or professions; whereas detailed 
division of labor reduces people to performers of routine tasks. Detailed 
division of labor entails analyzing a production process and breaking it 
down into a multitude of tasks performed by different workers. In this 
way, a craft-based labor process, that was once controlled by the workers 
themselves, falls to pieces. Then, managers put the pieces together to 
create a process that is under managements' control. The financial 
advantage of is this strategy is that it becomes possible to hire less well-
paid workers. This principle was already clearly stated by Charles 
Babbage in 1832, the same Charles Babbage who devised the first 
computer architecture. (Braverman 1974: 188). Taylorism tends to carry 
the detailed division of labor to new extremes, where work cycles are 
measured in seconds.3 
Taylorism implies low-trust relations between employer and employees. 
Therefore direct control is needed to ensure that labor power bought is 
turned into labor performed. This control question urges managers to find 
ways of imposing on workers what they should do, in what way, within 
which limits and at what pace, and to evaluate work performance and 
apply sanctions. Taylor's prescriptions amounted to reliance on a raft of 
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supervisors, but the Ford Motor Company proved that a mechanically 
paced assembly line is a more efficient control system. The assembly line 
functions as a system of technical control, which means that the entire 
production process or large segments of it are based on a technology 
which regulates the working pace and controls the labor process (Edwards 
1979: 112-113). The assembly line supplants the direct conflict between 
worker and foreman. 
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CHAPTER ONE  TAYLORISM AND ANTI-TAYLORISM 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A possible reaction to anti-Tayloristic policy is skepticism about its 
relevance, based on a feeling that Taylorism is on the way out anyhow. 
(An example of an influential publication that leans heavily in this di-
rection is: Womack, Jones and Roos 1990.) The first part of this chapter 
will show that, on the contrary, Taylorism exhibits considerable per-
sistence. 
The last part of this chapter is an overview of the study as a whole. 
This overview, at the same time, introduces the basic structure of anti-
Tayloristic policy. 
 
1.2 The persistence of Taylorism 
Scientific management, as an explicit method, became unfashionable after 
the 1930's. Its principles, however, continued to have an impact on the 
design of jobs, up to this day (Braverman 1974: 119, De Sitter 1981: 21, 
Schumann et al. 1989: 67). Examples are: 
· In banks and insurance companies there is a tendency to permanently 
analyze and standardize the work. The routine tasks are relegated to a 
category of workers who are only engaged in "bulk" work, and who 
have to work according to strictly specified rules. An elite group 
handles the more complicated, incidental cases. The work of this elite 
group is permanently analyzed to see if parts can be formalized and 
transferred to the bulk group (Doorewaard 1986). 
· Planned automation can be an impetus for routinization and stan-
dardization of work, as an intermediate step towards automation.  
· Even the organization of software development itself now shows a 
Tayloristic pattern, with its division of labor between, on the one hand, 
analysts and designers, and on the other hand, programmers (Philip 
Kraft 1979: 10-12). 
· In the early 1990's, a labor shortage in the Dutch health care sector 
prompted managers to tap the reservoir of people with little formal 
education.4 To create special jobs for this category of workers, they 
split-off simple tasks from nurses' jobs. Subsequently, a Labor Party 
committee took this as a model solution for the problem of creating 
jobs for the disadvantaged.5 
 Taylorism and anti-Taylorism 13  
· Finally, the rise of the McDonals-type firm ("McDonaldization") (Ritzer 
1993), saturated by predictability and controllability, testifies to the 
vitality of the Tayloristic organization concepts.  
Some, for example Blauner (1964) and Woodward (1958) saw automation 
and information technology as factors that tend to upgrade work and to 
put workers back into control of the labor process. However, it is easy to 
identify several ways in which automation and information technology 
can deepen Taylorist patterns. 
Depending on how it is used, information technology facilitates 
Taylorist division of labor. An example of an application that can 
strengthen the separation of conception from execution is Numerical 
Control (NC). 
 
Box 1.1 Numerical Control 
An important technology in the discussion about Taylorism is Numerical 
Control (NC). A changeover from hand control to numerical control fa-
cilitates a division between, on the one hand, planning and programming, 
and, on the other hand, unskilled operator work (Braverman 1974: 197-
206, Noble 1983). NC is an example of the way in which Tayloristic views 
can influence the development of technologies, that in turn influence the 
organization of work. In his study on the coming into existence of the NC 
technology, Noble (1983: 86) emphasizes that technology has a social 
history. The design process involves choice, the selection or discarding of 
alternatives. Social relations affect these choices. This is not a clear-cut 
process; the outcome of technological development is characterized by a 
large proportion of unintended consequences.  
Originally, two competing principles guided the development of automatic 
machine tools: 
a) The "record playback" principle, i.e. that a skilled worker uses hand 
control to produce a first piece of work, which is then automatically 
copied to produce the required number of products. This technology de-
pends upon the skilled worker. 
b) The NC principle in which the instructions for the machine are 
delivered on tape. This system makes a division of labor between pro-
gramming and operating possible. 
The NC principle prevailed, to a large extent, because of financial support 
from the defense sector. The military wanted to avoid the presence on the 
shop floor of blueprints of military equipment. 
NC makes the division of labor between programming and operating the 
most likely work organization. However, there is no complete determi-
nation: apart from programming in a separate department, programming 
on the shop floor itself is possible. 
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Further development brought the CNC (Computer Numerically Con-
trolled) machine. CNC technology makes shop floor programming easier 
to realize (Gill 1985: 77, Sorge et al. 1983). 
The next step in the development is the DNC (Directly Numerically 
Controlled) machine. In DNC, there is a direct connection between the 
CAD (Computer Aided Design) system and the machine tools. This im-
plies the disappearance of programming, and with it, the opportunity for 
shop floor programming.  
 
The creation of data-entry work is a current example of detailed division 
of labor, leading to dead-end jobs, particularly for women. Information 
technology makes this kind of division of labor more feasible, because 
transporting information becomes easier. This enables firms to tap the 
labor markets of home workers and the labor markets in low-wage 
countries. 
Through automatic data collection and feedback loops, the intro-
duction of computer technology widens the possibilities for technical 
control systems. Management does not actually have to use the computer-
collected information to control the workforce, but it reserves the power 
to do so. This is the "panoptical" principle: all subjects know that they can 
be observed from a central point, but they have no way of knowing 
whether, at a given moment, actual surveillance takes place (Foucault 
1975: 197-229). A study by the U.S. Office for Technology Assessment 
uncovered a system connected to a set of CNC machines that registered 
production data. These data were used against the "banking" of work, 
which workers did to maximize bonuses (Gill 1985: 85). Automatic 
registration of work performance occurs in the financial and 
telecommunications sectors. Figures for the number of Americans who 
work under some form of computer surveillance range from seven to 
fifteen million.6 In the early 1990's, software products that allow managers 
to see exactly what users are doing at their PC's or terminals became 
widely available. 
Logistic information systems can issue instructions to workers and 
then check whether the instructions are executed within the specified time. 
In the supermarket company Albert Heijn, warehouse workers use 
magnetic cards to signal the production control system after the com-
pletion of each task.7 Some companies practice paperless order picking: 
 
"In this method each worker is assigned to a section of an aisle. 
You enter the order you are going to pick. For the rest, the 
computer takes care of everything. You pick up a box and all you 
have to do is to look for the nearest red signal light. You walk 
towards that shelf. On a tiny display you can see how many 
products you have to pick. Are you ready, then press a button next 
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to the display. At the next product, a signal lamp lights up." 
(Kooistra and Tom 1992: 18) 
 
Kooistra and Tom (1992: 19) report a trend that information systems 
determine storage locations, thereby robbing workers of the opportunity 
to create efficient storage schemes. They just have to do what the in-
formation system tells them to do. 
Continuously increasing are the possibilities for the incorporation 
of skills and decision-making into automatic machinery and information 
systems, and thus for the removal of brain work from the shop floor - a 
key element of Taylorism. In a classic study, R. Bright distinguishes four 
main levels of mechanization in industry: 
1) "Hand control"; 
2) "Mechanical control"; 
3) "Variable control, signal response" (i.e. the machine provides infor-
mation about the progress of the production process); 
4) "Variable control, action response" (the machine is capable of self-
correcting actions). 
Bright notes, especially in the fourth group, a degradation of the level of 
skill needed to operate the machines (Braverman 1974: 218). Wilkinson 
(1982: 42-44) describes how the use of automatic machines for the 
production of lenses for glasses led to a change from highly skilled 
craftsmen to semi-skilled machine operators. Other examples of machines 
that embody skills are blood analyzing machines and automatic photo-
developing machines.  
Information systems tend to enforce a fixed way of entering in-
formation. Decision rules can be incorporated in the system as well. In a 
case study on automation in the insurance industry, Rolfe (1986: 42) 
observes: 
 
"Task variety is small, and the range of tasks has reduced, par-
ticularly since information is immediately accessible and premiums 
calculated automatically. Much of the clerk's working day is spent 
in routine processing and dealing with enquiries. The 
administration manager considered it 'flattering' to call the clerks 
underwriters, stating that 'zombies' could do much of the work and 
that underwriting is now a 'process'." 
 
Box 1.2  Expert Systems 
A subdiscipline of computer science, Artificial Intelligence, is partly 
devoted to enabling computers to take over skilled tasks. In contrast with 
traditional automation, AI deals with problems for which no algorithmic 
solutions are known (i.e. that not all steps leading to the solution are 
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known). One of the most flourishing areas is that of expert systems. An 
expert system is a program for solving decision or judgement problems, 
on the basis of built-in expertise that was gained from human experts. The 
principle is that a "knowledge engineer" interviews experts and tries to 
make their expertise as explicit as possible. This process of "elicitation" is 
difficult because, to a large extent, expertise consists of intangible rules of 
thumb and heuristics; reluctance of experts to give away valuable 
knowledge may be a complicating factor. 
One way to represent knowledge in an expert system is to use "production 
rules", rules with an IF .. THEN structure. The expert system includes a 
knowledge base of production rules and an inference engine that selects 
rules and takes appropriate action. Possible actions could be: asking the 
user - who is consulting the system - for information, performing 
calculations, looking up information in a database, etc. 
The yardstick for success is whether or not the expert system matches or 
improves upon the accuracy of human experts. This line of development 
in computer science is more oriented towards competing with humans, 
than with supporting them. 
An example of a successful expert system is Digital Equipment Corpo-
ration's XCON. XCON's purpose is to configure the VAX line of com-
puters. Each VAX is an often unique combination of thousands of parts. 
A first abortive attempt was to automate parts of this process in a tradi-
tional way. A big handicap was that the project meant "aiming at a moving 
target", because of the constant introduction of new parts and options 
(Scown 1985: 114). An expert system, growing to around 4200 production 
rules, proved accurate in ca. 95 percent of the cases. 
An addition to XCON was XSEL, an expert system designed for assisting 
salespeople in making quotations. The possible threat to salespeople was 
well recognized by one of DEC's managers: "Naturally, salespeople could 
be very threatened by this type of expert system. Imagine the plight of a 
computer-systems salesperson with ten or twelve years experience, who 
could go to a customer or prospect and using his or her wealth of 
accumulated knowledge, prepare the framework of a quotation with only 
minimal reference to technical documentation. Now, all of a sudden, a 
portable terminal and a remote computer are part of the salesperson's 
toolkit. The salesperson is now, potentially, portrayed as having to rely on 
the computer and expert system, thus appearing less self-sufficient." 
(Arnold Kraft 1984: 46) 
 
In 1984, the book "Das Ende der Arbeitsteilung?" ("The End of the Di-
vision of Labor?") by Kern and Schumann initiated a discussion about a 
possible end to the detailed division of labor. A similar proposition was 
made by Piore and Sabel (1984), who claimed that flexible technology and 
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fragmentation of markets would usher in an era of "flexible spe-
cialization". 
Kern and Schumann (1984: 19) proclaimed a rise of "new pro-
duction concepts" in the core sectors of German industry, the automobile, 
machine tools and chemical industries. These new production concepts 
revolve around greater respect for skill and worker involvement. This 
means that in the core sectors, the polarization between elite and routine 
workers is coming to an end. Product quality, flexibility and enabling 
technology are given as reasons for this change. But Kern and Schumann 
specifically state that this change is restricted to the core sectors. For 
example, in the food industry, they could trace no such development. In a 
follow-up study (Schumann et al. 1989), the change process in the car 
industry proved slower than expected. Even in 1983 and 1989, two new, 
traditionally organized car assembly plants were put into service.  
An important point in the theory of new production concepts is the 
appearance on the scene of a new category of workers, the "system 
regulators". System regulators monitor the actions of automated ma-
chinery and intervene when they deviate from their programmed course. 
But even in an almost completely (99 per cent) automated production 
phase, like spot welding in body construction,  it turned out that few of 
the workers had risen to system regulator. 95 per cent of them were still 
engaged in manual welding and correcting faulty weldings. Only five 
percent of the workers in the spot welding phase were working as system 
regulators (Schumann et al. 1989). A survey of Dutch case studies from 
the 1980's detracts from the new production concepts thesis as well. It 
showed that polarization (between a relatively small number of complex 
jobs and a large number of simple jobs) was the main trend.8  
A large-scale study on information technology in the European 
service sector (Child and Loveridge 1990: 360) concluded that banks 
rarely exploited the new possibilities of broader access to pooled infor-
mation and knowledge and that "modifications to existing hierarchies are 
modest". Huys, Sels and Van Hootegem (1995) found that Belgian car 
plants did acquire the capability for flexible adaption, but not through 
discussions among workers. On the contrary, it was sophisticated 
planning in advance that produced flexibility. Furthermore, management 
was pushing towards enhanced predictability and uniformity of actions. 
The researchers could classify only two per cent of the jobs as system 
regulator jobs. Finally, a mammoth trend study on rationalization in the 
German car, chemical and machine tool industries (Schumann et al. 1994: 
659) concluded that the division between conception and execution 
proved stronger than expected in "Das Ende der Arbeitsteilung". 
Professionalization was not a sufficient condition for emancipation. 
Moreover, the study found that a substantial gap remained between direct 
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and indirect sectors, between "new production specialists and specialized 
specialists". 
1990 saw the publication of the book "The Machine that Changed the 
World" by Womack, Jones and Roos. This study compared productivity 
in seventy automobile assembly plants around the globe, while controlling 
for various factors like the complexity of the car being made. One of the 
findings was that the "best" Japanese plant needed 13.2 hours to assemble 
a car, whereas the "best" European plant needed 22.8 hours for this. The 
differences between high-productive and low-productive plants prompted 
one of the researchers to coin the term "lean production". Lean production 
means producing, in comparison with traditional mass production, a larger 
variety of products, with less than half the working effort, with less than 
half the investment in machines, tools and floor space, with less than half 
of the inventories, and with less defects (Womack, Roos and Jones 1990: 
13). 
The study sent a shock wave through the automobile industry. In all 
four automobile firms that I visited in the course of my research - 
Mercedes-Benz, Volvo, DAF Trucks and ZF Friedrichshafen (supplier of 
gearboxes and steering gear) - I was assured that moving towards lean 
production was their paramount goal. 
But what is lean production in relation to Taylorism? From "The 
Machine that changed the World", it is apparent that in lean plants, like in 
traditional mass production plants, assembly lines are used and that work 
cycles are around one minute (Womack, Roos and Jones 1990: 101). This 
means that lean production - in its practical implications for the design of 
jobs - is not dramatically different from Taylorism. But what about the 
ideas behind lean production? 
The book states clearly that the Toyota Motor Company is the origin 
of lean production. Secondly, that the Toyota Takaoka plant is the most 
productive plant in the survey. Therefore it seems that we can safely 
equate the Toyota Production System to lean production. 
Three readily available sources offer insight into the Toyota Pro-
duction System: 
· An account by Taiichi Ohno (1988), who played an important part in 
the development of the Toyota Production System after 1945. 
· A diary by Satoshi Kamata, who recorded half a year of experience as a 
Toyota worker in "Japan on the passing lane". 
· A paper by Paul Adler (1992), who studied "New United Motor 
Manufacturing, inc" (NUMMI), a U.S. joint venture of Toyota and 
General Motors. This was formerly a GM plant, which was closed 
down two years before its reopening as NUMMI. According to "The 
Machine that changed the World", NUMMI represents an exact copy of 
the Toyota Production System (Womack, Roos and Jones 1990: 83). 
 Taylorism and anti-Taylorism 19  
Ohno explains that a goal of the Toyota Production System is: cost 
reduction independent of economies of scale. This implies a constant 
search for ways to decrease the number of hours worked per product, 
independently from volume: "In business, we are always concerned with 
how to produce more with fewer workers" (Ohno 1988: 67). The way in 
which Ohno looks at workers boils down to distinguishing "work" from 
"waste". His ideal is that the movements of the workers consist for a 
hundred per cent of work that adds value to the product. The forms of 
waste that should be eliminated are waste through waiting, through 
production of parts that are not needed or not directly needed, through the 
production of defective parts, through keeping stores and through 
unnecessary transport. The tight coupling of activities, caused by the 
elimination of buffers and enhanced by the kanban system (section x 
signals section y directly when x needs a product from y), reduces 
autonomy to a minimum. Adler (1992: 42) confirms that autonomy at 
NUMMI was less than it had previously been under GM. Pushing back 
buffer inventories turns the whole factory into a disciplinary machine, 
because it instantly exposes anyone who steps out of the preordained 
clockwork rhythm. 
The Toyota Production System requires a "standard work sheet" for 
each task that specifies the allotted cycle time, the order of operations and 
the standard inventory that is inherent in the task. 
Ohno (1988: 67) states that machinery must be "fool proof" and that 
it should be possible to learn how to operate it in three days. On his first 
day at Toyota, Satoshi Kamata (1982: 22) found that complexity was not 
the problem, but that the sheer speed of the line was the difficult part:  
 
"Somehow, I learn the order of work motions, but I'm totally 
unable to keep up with the speed of the line. My work gloves 
make it difficult to grab as many tiny bolts as I need, and how 
many precious seconds do I waste doing just that? I do my best, 
but I can barely finish one gear box out of three within the fixed 
length of time." 
 
Kamata (1982: 87) describes his work and that of his colleagues as: "a 
kind of lobotomy." 
One might argue, as Womack, Roos and Jones do, that automation 
will do away with routine tasks: 
 
"Thus by the end of the century we expect that lean-assembly 
plants will be populated almost entirely by highly skilled problem-
solvers whose task will be to think continually of ways to make 
the system run more smoothly and productively." (Womack, Roos 
and Jones 1990: 102) 
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However, from their own study, one can glean that the most productive 
plant in the survey is at the same time the least automated of the Japanese 
plants (Womack, Roos and Jones 1990: 94). If one concentrates on the 
substantial information in "The Machine that Changed the World" (the use 
of assembly lines, job cycles of around one minute, the equation of Lean 
Production to the Toyota Production System) rather than on the vague 
assertions about highly skilled problem solving, the conclusion must be 
that lean production is neo-Taylorism. If, on the other hand, one is willing 
to accept the assertions about problem solving, the conclusion that there is 
at least a Tayloristic side to lean production is still hard to escape 
Lean production is to anti-Taylorism what carbon-monoxide is to 
oxygen. Its strong claim of efficiency (it is hard to argue about Toyota's 
economic success) makes the lean production concept attractive to ma-
nagers. It even takes care of the quality of working life, albeit only by 
asserting that it is all right. The assumption seems to be that when effi-
ciency is good, the quality of working life must automatically be good as 
well.9 
 
1.3 Conclusions on Taylorism 
Taylorism (i.e. management strategies based on the separation of con-
ception from execution) is far from dying. To this day, it continues to be 
widespread.  There are developments that, on the surface, might represent 
a break with Taylorism like the far-reaching application of information 
technology and the appearance of "new production concepts" and "lean 
production", but these do not constitute its death spell. Although 
Taylorism has become unfashionable, new Tayloristic impulses like 
"McDonaldization" are in evidence. 
 
1.4 Anti-Tayloristic policy - brief overview 
For years, the obvious waste of human resources and the liberating po-
tential of information technology fostered hopes that the days of Tay-
lorism were numbered.  However, as we have seen, massive delivery on 
this promise did not happen. All along the period studied, there has been a 
gap between the vision of organizational choice, specifically the idea that 
non-Tayloristic development is possible, and organizational reality which 
remained dominated by Taylorism. Bridging this gap were a variety of 
activities, that, to various extents, attempt to curtail Taylorism or to 
produce change in the opposite direction. These activities vary in several 
respects: 
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· Scale, ranging from small-scale experiment involving a few workers to 
the design of entire plants. 
· Ambition (limited or far-reaching change). 
· Motivation (value driven or driven by business requirements). 
· Type of work process (flow line, continuous production, office work 
etc.). 
· Sector of the economy (most sectors where Tayloristic patterns exist: 
industry, retail, finance, insurance, health care, government bureau-
cracy). 
· Directness vis a vis the labor process: whether the change agents are 
working inside their own organizations, whether they are trying to in-
fluence organizational developments from the outside or whether they 
are active in (inter)national policy arenas. 
· Type of change agent: managers, workers, researchers, government 
policy makers. 
· Type of change process (social movement like processes or planned 
change). 
· Type of theoretical frame of reference (for example: various flavors of 
sociotechnical systems design). 
In order to make anti-Tayloristic policy researchable, we need to capture 
its structure in a conceptual framework. This conceptual framework is 
depicted in Fig 1.1. 
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Fig. 1. 1 Conceptual model 
 
This model depicts a (simplified) causal representation of the policy 
problem. The dependent variable is the level of de-Taylorization of jobs, 
the intended outcome of anti-Tayloristic policies. The independent 
variables are three distinct anti-Tayloristic policies. 
Within the countermovement to Taylorism, there are three streams 
of initiatives. One of these streams concerns the variable chain: 
 
enlightenment ® consensual alternatives ® de-Taylorization 
 
Central in this chain is the development of consensual alternatives, i.e. the 
creation by managers and organization experts of alternative ways of 
working within their own organizations. They do this primarily because of 
economic dysfunctions of Taylorism and/or because of moral concerns. 
The idea that underlies these alternatives is that humanization (i.e. 
departing from Taylorism) and boosting efficiency are nowadays two 
sides of the same coin. This implies that, as far as the organization of 
work is concerned, there is no fundamental conflict of interests between 
managers and workers. This explains the consensus aspect. 
The variable enlightenment refers to policies originating from out-
side the organizations to be changed to promote and support the imple-
mentation of consensual alternatives. 
Specifically, the implementation of consensual alternatives is an 
intervening variable (i.e. an intermediate outcome between the inde-
pendent and the dependent variable). The implementation of consensual 
alternatives is an intervening variable of a specific kind, a bridging 
variable. A bridging variable is an "attitude or behavior necessary to 
attaining the policy objective but beyond the policy maker's direct control" 
(Mayer and Greenwood 1980: 126). The implementation of consensual 
alternatives is beyond the policy makers' direct control because managers 
act as gatekeepers. External policy makers can try to create optimal 
conditions for managers to develop the desire to depart from Taylorism. 
However, they have no control over this. 
Chapter Two deals with the dysfunctions and concerns that prompt 
the implementation of consensual alternatives. Chapter three offers an 
insight into consensual alternatives. Chapter Four delineates the various 
enlightenment policies and attempts to trace their effect on the 
implementation of consensual alternatives. Chapter Five operationalizes 
the variable de-Taylorization of jobs and presents the achievements of 62 
cases of consensual alternatives in terms of job design which is the final 
touchstone for determining to what extent de-Taylorization can be 
successful. 
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There are also constraint variables in the model. A constraint 
variable is "a factor influencing the policy process over which the policy 
maker has no control" (Mayer and Greenwood 1980: 127). An entire 
strand in the sociology of labor concentrates on management power. 
Therefore it seemed necessary to include the maintenance of management 
power, or more specifically, the extent to which the maintenance of power 
is an end in itself, as a constraint variable. This is examined in Chapter 
Six. 
This brings us to the second type of anti-Tayloristic policy, worker 
mobilization. Worker mobilization, or in other words, independent union 
action, might counteract the constraints imposed by the maintenance of 
management power. At the same time, worker mobilization would be a 
policy that bypasses the bridging variable "implementation of consensual 
alternatives". This is dealt with in Chapter Seven. 
A second constraint variable is the relative efficiency of Taylorist 
solutions (Chapter Eight). This variable is included to take into account 
the possibility that the central assumption on which both enlightenment 
and worker mobilization rest (the assumption that departing from Tay-
lorism nowadays necessarily boosts efficiency), is flawed. Suggestions to 
this effect come from a culturally pessimistic strand in social theory, that is 
rooted in an integral critique of contemporary society.10 The third type of 
anti-Tayloristic policy, state enforced standards, can be seen as an 
independent variable that might offset the effect of the constraint variable 
relative efficiency of Taylorist solutions. This is dealt with in Chapter 
Nine. By imposing standards on work organization, that hit all competitors 
evenly, governments could push humanization of work beyond the 
bounds of efficiency. Like worker mobilization, this policy seeks to 
bypass the bridging variable implementation of consensual alternatives. 
Finally, throughout the text, some attention will be paid to latent 
consequences or unintended side effects of the realization of the policy 
objective.  
Box 1.3 The various types of anti-Tayloristic policies correspond to 
paradigmatic differences in working life research 
In his penetrating analysis of the underlying assumptions in working life 
research, Alvesson (1987b) distinguishes three paradigms: consensus 
(acceptance of present-day society; humanization and efficiency go to-
gether), control (class struggle) and critique (total rejection of one-di-
mensional society). The consensus paradigm maps to consensus oriented 
policies (consensual alternatives propelled by enlightenment efforts). 
The control and critique paradigms do not map to any form of anti-
Tayloristic policy, therefore they are irrelevant for the present study. 
However, Alvesson also distinguishes two approaches that are mix-
products of paradigms: 
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The consensus-control approach entails "explaining the problematical 
conditions in working life by the leaders' efforts to maintain control 
without acknowledging any basic conflicts between different classes" 
(Alvesson 1987b: 49). The consensus-control paradigm corresponds to 
worker mobilization-based policies. 
In the consensus-critique approach, efficiency and humanization do not 
coincide, therefore the quality of working life must be introduced as a 
value in itself. To this end, state intervention is necessary. This approach 
maps to government enforced standards. 
 
1.5 Data collection 
The objective was to collect information on a large number of initiatives 
that showed at least one of the following goals: 
· preventing separation of conception from execution; 
· preventing further detailed division of labor; 
· preventing or pushing back direct control by technical means over 
workers; 
· counteracting the disappearance of human skills and expertise into 
automatic machinery and information systems; 
· job enrichment; 
· decentralization of responsibility; 
· real participation. 
(For descriptions of these goals, see Chapters One and Five.) 
There was to be no restriction as to: 
· the level at which the initiative took place: department, plant, company, 
scientific organization, region, nation, European Union; 
· actors: managers or unionists, consultants, politicians,..; 
· type of intervention, whether it be job redesign, software development, 
standards setting, or whatever. 
In order to enhance empirical richness, I included countries in the study 
that, according to the literature, had substantial activities in the relevant 
area. Sources for cues for cases were the literature and expert advice. 
(Since a "who is who" in this field does not exist, finding out who the 
experts were was a research problem in itself.)  
It is more likely that authors and experts who offered advice 
mention successful cases rather than unsuccessful cases. Therefore, one 
must expect that the data set is biased towards success. This, however, is 
not a problem. On the contrary, it is helpful because one of the research 
questions was to what extent the types of initiatives can be successful. 
The information that I looked for pertained to real change rather 
than to ideological window-dressing. Most of this information came from 
the literature. In some instances I was fortunate enough to receive 
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unpublished case studies and internal company documents. In several 
cases I supplemented written information by interviews. This strategy 
provided a longitudinal aspect to the research as well. The interviews gave 
me an opportunity to review developments in cases that had been 
described earlier in the literature. Additionally, I participated as much as 
possible in meetings and conferences where practical experience with 
change efforts was shared. Where possible, I sought to enhance validity 
by collecting information from different sources and parties. 
 
1.6 Data analysis 
150 of the initiatives had as common characteristic that, in one way or 
another, they reached down to the level of the shop floor to create real 
changes. To process these cases, I constructed a "closed-ended coding 
instrument" (Yin 1984: 123), which I applied to each case. The initiatives 
were classified into four types of policy, corresponding to the conceptual 
framework: consensual alternative, enlightenment, worker mobilization or 
government enforced standard. For each case I recorded which of the 
following goals were pursued: 
· preventing separation of conception from execution; 
· preventing further detailed division of labor; 
· preventing an increase of direct control; 
· pushing back direct control; 
· counteracting the disappearance of human skills and expertise into 
automatic machinery and information systems; 
· job enrichment; 
· decentralization of responsibility; 
· participation. 
I also recorded whether there was any success (criteria and indicators can 
be gleaned from Chapter Five) and whether regression to the old work 
organization did take place. Other items scored were obstacles to change 
related to power or to efficiency, or other obstacles, and whether obstacles 
proved fatal or not. I also recorded changes in the size of the work force. 
Then I sorted out all the structured and unstructured data into sets 
corresponding to the various variables in the conceptual framework. 
Thereafter I analyzed each variable, creating further subdivisions. This 
means that nowhere, cases are presented in their entirety: I used 
information from cases whenever it was appropriate for the theme at 
hand. 
The coding instrument was implemented as a database application 
(developed along the lines described in Pruijt 1993). The application 
allows entry of qualitative information, like further description of changes 
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or obstacles. This made it also possible to record the unexpected 
(Zwanenburg 1994: 17).11 
For qualitative analysis, I used the program Interview Streamliner 
(Pruijt 1991). Interview Streamliner helps researchers to turn a body of 
texts, e.g. interviews, into thematically organized information. The user 
can split the body of texts into fragments and assign an arbitrary number 
of key words to each fragment. One can then, using Boolean logic where 
desired, retrieve all fragments from all texts that meet his search criteria. 
This can be an iterative process. As new ideas and concepts arise, new key 
words can be added. 
 
1.7 General theory 
As indicated in the Introduction, there are widely divergent wholesale 
interpretations of the initiatives that are the focus of this study. However, 
most interpretations have one thing in common: they analyze the initiatives 
as adaptation of the organization of work to progressively changing 
conditions in the environment. Specifically, these changes include 
increased levels of formal education, increased volatility of product 
markets, increasingly specific demands from customers and increasing 
possibilities for automation of routine work. On a meta-level, we could 
call these interpretations modernization theory. The following theories fall 
into the general category of modernization theory: 
a) Because of increased formal education, and because lower material 
needs have been met, higher psychological needs like self-actualization 
become more important. Making jobs less Tayloristic means adapting 
job design to these psychological needs, which raises intrinsic 
motivation and thus leads to increased productivity. Kelly (1982: 33-34) 
calls this the "classical theory of job redesign". 
b) Volatile markets lead to shorter production runs, requiring more 
flexibility to reduce non-productive time. Flexible work groups are the 
solution. Kelly (1982: 143) asserted that: "flexible work groups may be 
seen as a new 'best way' of organizing work under conditions of 
product and/or process uncertainty."12  
c) Streeck (1987) analyses anti-Taylorism as a strategy to attain flexibility, 
by extending workers' status to obtain "extrafunctional" contributions 
from them. 
d) According to Aglietta (1979: 129), "job enrichment, leading to the 
formation of semi-autonomous groups" is "the mode of organization" 
corresponding to the flexible integration made possible by automation 
(italics mine). 
The following chapters will show that the modernization theories do have 
explanatory power. However, several aspects of anti-Taylorism could not 
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adequately be explained as adaptation of the organization of work to 
progressively changing conditions, i.e. by modernization theories. A clue 
was provided by a study that was not on anti-Tayloristic developments at 
all, but on dockworkers "between affluence and discontent". In this book, 
Ter Hoeven (1969) maintained that as long is there exists a labor market, 
class-based action will occur. The character of this class-based action 
changes as workers become affluent and politically integrated, and as class 
struggle becomes institutionalized in the system of industrial relations. 
With respect to the concept of class, he notes that it has unfortunately 
become fixed to a 19th century perspective, and placed under taboo. 
Class analysis proved a good candidate to fill the gaps left by 
modernization theories. Therefore, I will argue that anti-Taylorism is not 
only adaptation of the organization of work to progressively changing 
conditions, but that it is also a result of a need to find new ways to cope 
with the immanent, pervasive characteristics of the employment relation. 
No matter how modern an employment relation (in the sense of wage-
labor relation) is, the following three characteristics are always there: 
 
1) Subordination 
The single most defining characteristic of the employment relation is 
subordination of the employee to the employer (within limits defined 
implicitly and explicitly by the employment contract) (cf. March and 
Simon 1990). 
 
2) Asymmetry 
Employers and employees have equivalent market positions only on pa-
per. In practice, control over the means of production is a decisive dif-
ference. The employment relationship is asymmetrical (Mok 1994: 200); 
generally the employee is more dependent on the employer than the 
employer is on a particular employee.13 
 
3) Employees are instrumental 
Employees (i.e. "those that are being used") are instrumental in the ac-
cumulation of capital, which is, as Marx (1967: Vol. 1, Ch. 10) put it: 
"dead labor, which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labor, and 
lives the more, the more labor it sucks." This means that a worker, by 
putting much effort into his job, might help to generate profits that enable 
the company to make him redundant through automation or by relocating 
production to another country. Hyman (1984: 185) notes: "management's 
role as servants of accumulation means that there is a constant drive to 
reduce labor costs, to intensify the pressure of work, to render existing 
workers 'redundant'." 
These three immanent characteristics of the employment relation-
ship lead to discontent - often latent - on the part of the employees, that at 
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certain times in history becomes unrest. There are many factors that can 
explain why this unrest rarely leads to radical action: 
· While there is a conflict of interest between employee and employer 
regarding the distribution of revenues, employer and employee also 
have a common interest in maintaining continuity of the production 
process itself (Kelly 1982: 53). Conflict is necessarily mixed with co-
operation. 
· Employees are largely dependent on the employment relation. 
· Institutionalization of class conflict in the system of industrial relations. 
· Regulations, for example on the length of the working day and social 
security, improve the position of the employees. 
· The Fordist triangle of mass production, high wages and affordable 
products. 
· To many, alternative economic systems are not attractive.  
· Individual escape from the employment relation into self-employment 
is often possible (although hiring the first employee means re-entry into 
the employment relation from the other side). 
· A self-protecting power system avoids exercise of power in such a way, 
that classes confront one another as identifiable groups (Habermas 
1968: 53). Habermas asserts that class conflict becomes latent, and that 
the conflict zone moves to other areas of society. 
The general result, in the view of Ter Hoeven (1969: 34), is that "protest 
behavior" can surface in "turnover, absenteeism, reduction of 
performance, withdrawal of efficiency, manipulation of wage standards, 
verbal expressions and other forms of striking without quitting". He 
emphasized that in many cases, this does not involve class consciousness, 
but that protest behavior flows forth from "experienced but not 
recognized" conditions. The implication is a "constant struggle around the 
workers' margin of freedom". Therefore, unease related to the em-
ployment relation is not unilaterally characteristic of workers.  
It is also a cause of stress for employers. As a joke goes: "In the 
new year, I wish that you will have lots of employees in your business", 
said the businessman to his competitor. 
The unease that emanates from the employment relation can take 
many shapes. Edwards (1990: 136) noted: "People develop policies to 
handle contradictions - or, to be more exact, to handle the consequences 
of contradictions, for people respond to felt pressures and not to the ab-
stract nature of the mode of production." Conflict, tension or "structured 
antagonism" can be latent or dormant. Much has been laid down in rules 
and regulations, the costs of open conflict are high, a certain level of 
consent is needed for successful operation for the organization14, schools 
to some extent prepare for the role of compliant worker (Edwards 1990). 
The unease that flows forth from immanent characteristics of the 
employment relation is a elusive and difficult to measure phenomenon. 
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Stuurman (1985: 152) remarked that "vague discontent and manifest, 
visible expressions of conformity do not exclude one another". Giddens 
(1979: 148) noted that: "The aggressive banter of the shop-floor is likely to 
give more insight, by its form, as well as its manifest content, into how 
labor is experienced and understood, than any number of questionnaire 
responses, or even lengthy interviews." De Swaan (1972) concluded that 
researchers resemble personnel officers, and therefore receive the type of 
answers reserved for personnel officers. 
To summarize, on the plane of general theory of anti-Taylorism I 
will argue: 
1) Up to a point, modernization theories do have explanatory value. 
2) The immanent characteristics of the employment relation tend to remain 
 unnoticed - focused as we are on the novel rather than on the more 
permanent aspects of society. However, they continue to have an 
impact. This impact is dynamic. In current society, the employment 
relation is something we cannot live with and cannot live without; 
therefore, it constantly creates a need for action. 
Anti-Taylorism is both a result of the need to adapt the organization of 
work to changes in the environment, and an effect of immanent, perva-
sive characteristics of the employment relation. It is thus a double adapta-
tion of the organization of work: to fluctuations in the environment and to 
the immanent characteristics of the employment relation. 
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CHAPTER TWO  TAYLORIST TROUBLES, ECONOMIC AND 
MORAL 
 
In the post-WW II era, all along there have been managers and organi-
zation experts, who turned away from Taylorism. This chapter explores 
the issues that caused them to do so. 
 
2.1 Inherent dysfunctions 
Taylorism in many ways is efficient and effective. Had it not been, it 
would have long been eliminated by the market forces. However, there is 
a price to be paid for organizing in a Tayloristic way. A Tayloristic 
organization of work generates system losses. Since subsequent operations 
tend to vary in duration, a complicated division of labor causes 
"balancing" (ensuring that all workstations are fully loaded) problems. 
This increases idle time, and there is a greater chance that unfinished 
products must be allowed to move on. This makes it difficult to work 
"RFB" (Right from the Beginning) (Berggren 1989: 177-179). 
Furthermore, low-trust relations introduce control costs. Thus, 
moving away from Taylorism should be appealing to managers who are 
keen to reduce labor. For example, Eckart Wintzen, CEO of the software 
company BSO/Origin until 1996, learned that "coordination is more 
expensive than letting people duplicate one another's work".15  
As early as the 1960's, cost reduction has been one of the motives 
behind initiatives to change. An example from this era is an "industrial 
democracy" project in a Norwegian fertilizer plant that was part of the 
Norsk Hydro company.16 And in the 1990's, we find a labor cost cutting 
company like Mercedes-Benz proclaiming "consistent delegation of de-
cision making, wherever this is useful, to those who add value to the 
product" as an official company guideline.17 
Inefficiencies concerning information processing are especially 
salient. In a Taylorist system, it is a logical strategy to fight increasing 
complexity by introducing more sophisticated and complex planning 
systems. Weizenbaum (1984: 31) noted that the "computer revolution" 
tends to prevent a real revolution because computers allow the process of 
bureaucratization to continue. At Felten & Guillaume (Nordenham, 
Germany), producer of components for electric installations and equip-
ment (among which are spark-free motors, distribution boxes and earth 
leakage circuit breakers), sophisticated planning systems were tried, but to 
no avail.18 In this plant, the detailed division of labor required much 
information processing. Supervisors had to give orders for each small step 
and later they had to check whether the orders had been carried out 
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correctly. An analysis showed that around half of the hours worked 
consisted of direct labor. A quarter was information processing, largely 
concerned with checking on the timely completion of orders. 
When the variety of products increased, Felten & Guillaume ex-
perienced a disproportionally steep increase in information processing 
load. In addition to this, market changes led to more express orders. An 
industrial engineer explains: 
 
"For each order, the x departments that are involved need in-
formation on y items like product, material, machine, tools, 
coolant etc. In this way, a seemingly simple express order leads to 
information about x times y items. Then the planner must push the 
order through different departments. If he has a good relation with 
the foreman ("Meister"), he will succeed. But on the other hand, it 
might happen that the foreman is not very much inclined to do it. 
Then the planner has to call in the supervisor, but he can't do that 
too often, otherwise he loses credibility." [..] 
"For the office too, it is impractical that the factory is organized in 
departments. When Sales receives an inquiry about a certain 
product - about price and when it can be delivered - they need 
information from the planning department. The planning de-
partment in turn needs information from Production, and Pro-
duction needs information from Calculation. This increases lead 
times. At each department the request for information lands in a 
basket, and there it can wind up at the bottom of the stack etc. 
Such a request for information means a one to three weeks lead 
time. With electronic data processing, and we did a lot in that area, 
it proved impossible to make an information flood like that 
manageable." 
 
This information problem was the chief impetus behind a shift in com-
pany policy away from Taylorism. 
 
Box 2.1 Feedback is a weakness of Taylorist planning 
At connectivity products manufacturer BICC, R & D worker Andrew 
Ainger discovered that feedback was a bottleneck in Tayloristic planning 
systems. The first step in his research was to take stock of the problems of 
24 plants that were part of BICC. A few underlying difficulties emerged: 
long lead times, frequent failure to meet agreed delivery dates and much 
production loss. The second step was to select four plants for further 
research. This research showed that the problems were related to the 
performance measures that were in use. One of these measures was 
machine utilization. Use of this measure led to over-production. Another 
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performance measure was the value of the products delivered over a 
certain period of time. This measure led to "cherry picking". This means 
that the parts that are easiest to manufacture get done first. As a result, the 
customer gets these parts too early. Manufacture of more difficult parts 
tended to get postponed. Thus, delivery was either too late or too early. 
Customer satisfaction was not measured at all. In the meantime, the 
market developed towards smaller batch sizes and greater variety. The 
engineers tended to try and bend this trend backwards, "making tomorrow 
look like yesterday". Following a traditional pattern, the trend was to use 
more technology instead of changing the organization and the deployment 
of workers. In the complex Tayloristic planning, feedback from the 
shopfloor to the planning department was a problem. Ainger carried out 
observations in a factory in which a group of eight planners allocated jobs 
to machines. The planning system produced lists of what should be done 
when and on which machine. Ainger proceeded to find out what 
happened to these lists of orders on the shopfloor. When Ainger, together 
with one of the workers, was going through one of these lists, the worker 
pointed to the job at the top of the list and said, "this job for instance goes 
to that machine". When Ainger asked why he chose a different machine 
than the one that was indicated on the list, the answer was that this 
machine had been scrapped two years before. The operator had 
mentioned this a few times to the supervisor, but the supervisor did not 
consider it important enough to pass the information on. As long as 
production proceeded smoothly, he was happy. It turned out that most of 
production did not proceed according to the planning department's 
schedule.19 
 
Organizations based on detail division of labor do not have the flexibility 
to thrive in an unstable environment. This was already seen in the 19th 
century by a well known management expert: 
 
"Modern industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of 
death, to replace the detail-worker of today, crippled by life-long 
repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced 
to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, 
fit for a variety of labors, ready to face any change of production, 
and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so 
many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired 
powers." (Marx 1967: 488) 
 
More than a century later, we find for, example, Mr. Stapelmann, owner 
of a metalworking company20, deliberately avoiding the introduction of a 
centralistic computerized planning system, because of limited technical 
flexibility, dependency on external suppliers, lacking standards, but 
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"above all because of the danger that it makes the production team less 
autonomous and thereby less flexible" (Lauenstein and Stapelmann 1992: 
15). 
Inflexibility causes Taylorist organizations to remain locked into 
high volume, low variety production. Companies that are moving away 
from this need a dramatic increase in flexibility. The Rietbergwerke in 
Rietberg, Germany, makers of tanks for substances like oil or fuel out of 
sheet steel are an example of this. Around 1980, increasing competition 
had put the Rietbergwerke's management in a position where they had to 
choose between either trying to cut costs through automation and a 
reduction of the workforce, or by diversifying the product range to cater 
for individual client wishes. The latter seemed the most attractive. It 
would require preservation of skilled jobs and development of knowledge 
at all levels of the firm. Organizational and technological flexibility would 
be needed. This implied that the traditional organizational structure would 
be unsuitable. 
Increasing flexibility was an important motive for starting change. 
This is clearly  compatible with modernization theory. But as many 
authors have pointed out, there are other ways to attain flexibility than by 
moving away from Taylorism. Huys, Sels and Van Hootegem (1995: 137), 
found that in the Belgian car plants, increased process control and 
modular product design made it possible to improve flexibility without 
leaving behind Taylorist principles. Using subcontractors is another 
possibility (Child 1985). 
This brings us to the question: why did some organizations choose 
to gain flexibility by going the anti-Tayloristic way? One answer is already 
contained in the data presented above. Increasing flexibility without 
decentralizing responsibility leads to high information processing loads 
(cf. Galbraith 1976). Furthermore, decentralization of responsibility makes 
it possible to cut in the ranks of supervisors. But is this all? 
 
2.2 Ethical concerns 
There are managers who attach to the quality of working life a value in 
itself, not (only) because it is instrumental for attaining flexibility. Staco's 
owner wants to stimulate workers to join into discussions and in the 
planning process, even granting them veto rights in decisions on in-
vestments. This takes more time, but he reckons that it should make 
employees identify with projects and contribute ideas. Furthermore, he 
expects that participation will lead to an early detection of teething 
problems. He wants to defer the introduction of robots until technology 
would be so much advanced, that no meaningless residual jobs, like 
simply inserting workpieces in machines, remain. 
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The experience of Staco's present owner helped shape this anti-
Tayloristic policy. In his youth, the present owner has worked on the shop 
floor on and off since he was fourteen years old. He recalled feeling the 
monotony of Taylorist work when he bended 40,000 screw hooks using a 
simple jig. 
Christian ethics inspired Klaus Hoppmann when he initiated a 
process of democratization in the car retail firm that he inherited in 1957 
(Opel Hoppmann, Siegen, Germany, 200 workers in 1981).21 In The 
Netherlands, the management of ECT (Europe Combined Terminals - 
Rotterdam's largest stevedoring company) committed itself to the 
"formation of varied and safe jobs, with room for self-development" (Van 
Delden and Stel 1985: 35). One of their design principles was that 
"automation must lead to more attractive work":  
 
"The company believes that many decisions are best left to the 
employees who do the work, provided that they get information 
that is correct, timely and understandable. A computer is an im-
portant tool for this." (Bosselaar 1986: 162) 
 
This commitment underpinned significant efforts to break out of Tay-
loristic patterns, especially in ECT's large container operations.22  
From the literature, it is easy to gain the impression that ethically -
driven social reform has given way to rationalization. Hart, for example, 
notes: "Such issues as workplace democracy, work enrichment and the 
humanization of work are becoming more integrated in production 
efficiency. Secondly, however, there is increasing acknowledgment that 
improvements in working conditions will become marginalized unless 
they are integrated with changes which have practical problem-solving 
functions" (Hart 1992: 5). Knights, Willmott and Collinson (1985: 3) say: 
"Increasingly, 'soft', high-sounding moralizing on job redesign has given 
way to a 'hard-nosed' pragmatism dictated by managerial perceptions of 
conditions in the marketplace."23 
This seems at most partly true. Both economic motives and con-
cerns for the quality of working life as a value in itself, played a role in 
"old" (1960's) cases and in more recent (1990's) cases. If we see anti-
Tayloristic initiatives exclusively as adaptation to progressively changing 
conditions in markets and technology (modernization theory), we will 
have serious trouble with the interpretation of humanistic motives. We 
would have to accuse the managers of lying or otherwise take recourse to 
the unverifiable construct of false consciousness. Humanistic motives for 
job redesign are more easily seen as reactions to the unease that the 
immanent characteristics of the employment relation cause to managers. 
This is most clear in the case of Opel Hoppmann, in which the owner 
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sought to radically change one of these characteristics by neutralizing the 
firm's capital. 
 
2.3 Labor market troubles 
Eras of full employment reveal that few people, when given the choice, 
like working on assembly lines. In assembly line work, the pressure of the 
employment relation appears in an unmitigated form:  
· discipline, relentlessly enforced by the line; 
· little possibility for the worker to see himself otherwise than as some-
one who is selling labor power; 
· the mass of dead labor that confronts the worker is clearly present in 
the form of the technical structures that control the worker's movements 
and that develop towards further rationalization and elimination of 
labor. 
In the 1960's for instance, when there was full employment in The 
Netherlands, Philips faced high turnover rates for assembly line workers. 
At one point, 80 per cent of the newly-hired female assembly workers left 
within a year (Teulings 1977:  220). 
Under full employment, the quality of working life itself becomes a 
problem of efficiency/effectiveness. In the 1960's, Philips' management in 
The Netherlands faced recruitment difficulties for simple jobs. From the 
middle echelons, initiatives emerged to provide a solution by changing the 
organization of work. A committee, chaired by a deputy director of 
production, launched the idea of "work structuring": 
 
"Work needs to be organized in such a way, that workers can use 
their abilities soon after they start in their jobs. In the long run, the 
effect of work structuring must be the development of 
'professions' for unskilled workers, that do justice to their abilities, 
ambitions and self-esteem. [..] 
Short-cycled and, for the worker meaningless, detail operations in 
situations where mechanization is not coming about, generally fit 
in ever worse with the rising individual ambitions to enjoy social 
recognition and matching responsibility. [..] The jobs of unskilled 
workers can also be extended to the organizational level, by 
assigning to them tasks that are not necessarily performed by 
indirect workers." (Bolwijn et al. 1973: 5) 
 
A more recent definition of work structuring was: 
 
"While holding on to or improving productivity, organizing work, 
the working situation and the working environment in such a way, 
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that the tasks fit in as well as possible with the abilities and 
ambitions of the workers." (Philips 1968: 2) 
 
A few years after its launching, the top management adopted the idea. 
Work structuring was not centrally planned. The ideas spread around 
through seminars and reports. A survey performed by the works council 
in 1973, showed that there were 54 projects altogether, involving 3094 
workers. In 47 cases, the initiative came from the plant management, in 
nine cases, from workers, in nine cases from staff members and in three 
cases from worker representatives (some initiatives originated from more 
than one level) (Bolwijn et al. 1973: 9-13). Only part of these initiatives 
were anti-Tayloristic. Some were merely cosmetic. In Philips jargon they 
did not go beyond the "flower box phase". Other cases dealt with just 
reorganizations or with enhancing group processes. The phenomenon of 
work structuring disappeared as full employment disappeared in the 
1970's.  
In Sweden, however, full employment remained throughout the 1970's 
and the 1980's. The unemployment figure for 1970 was 1.5 per cent, for 
1986, it was 2.7 per cent.24 Labor turnover, absenteeism and recruitment 
difficulties led Volvo management to search for alternatives for the 
assembly line in car production. One of the outcomes was the Volvo plant 
in Kalmar, which started production in 1974. In this plant, a system of 
computer controlled carriers took the place of the mechanically paced 
assembly line. A contributing factor was Volvo's President P. 
Gyllenhammar's personal interest in the quality of working life 
(Gyllenhammar 1977). 
An opportunity for drastic innovation presented itself in the 1980's 
when Volvo, for the first time since Kalmar, was ready to build a new car 
factory at the site of a former shipyard in Uddevalla. Again, a major 
consideration was the low unemployment figure (1.1% in 1990 in the 
Uddevalla area).25 
The situation in which the quality of working life becomes a busi-
ness problem is not uniquely restricted to conditions of full employment. 
Even when there is unemployment, companies can face a level of absence 
through illness that can make managers think about job redesign. In the 
late 1970's, the Dutch branch of paint producer Sigma Coatings struggled 
with a level of absence through illness, that was hampering production. 
Results were so bad that the holding company threatened to abandon 
production in The Netherlands altogether. A study pointed to 
organizational shortcomings. This study led to an anti-Tayloristic turn-
around project. 
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2.4 Summary 
When managers and organization experts have turned away from Tay-
lorism, they have done so because of the following concerns (alone or in 
combination): 
· the possibility of labor reduction through reduced need for control and 
less balancing problems; 
· keeping the information processing load within limits; 
· flexibility (in the sense of ability to change activities at short notice); 
· ethical values (in contrast with statements in the literature; this factor 
remains important over time); 
· recruitment and turnover; 
· absence through illness. 
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CHAPTER THREE  INSIDE CONSENSUAL ALTERNATIVES TO 
TAYLORISM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Managers and organizations experts, who turned away from Taylorism, 
worked to create alternatives in their own organizations. These alternatives 
tend to be consensual in nature: the managers involved see no fun-
damental contradiction between, on the one hand, improving efficiency by 
eliminating Taylorist dysfunctions and on the other hand, humanizing 
work. Therefore, they see, at least in the field of the organization of work, 
no fundamental conflict of interest between management and workers. 
This idea is expressed in the literature as well: 
 
"The trend towards integral organization renewal offers both 
parties opportunities to gain. The employers get a flexible, lean 
organization, that can quickly react to customers' wishes. The 
employees get more interesting work, more opportunities for 
training, more responsibility and because of that, higher wages. 
Gain for one party does not have to mean less gain for the other. 
On the contrary: there are many indications that no party can gain 
unless there are benefits for the other." (Buitelaar 1990: 3) 
 
In most cases, union groups subscribe to this view, sometimes playing an 
active role. A good example of this is Volvo Uddevalla. Initially, the plan 
was to set up the Uddevalla factory in accordance with the Kalmar model 
(i.e. with a system of computer controlled carriers instead of a 
mechanically-paced assembly line). Intervention from Gyllenhammar and 
pressure from the unions led to a more radical solution. The metal 
workers' union took part in the designing of the factory from the start. 
(This is unusual, union opinion is not often asked for before the first 
plans have been developed.) Six shop-stewards were members of the 
project group preparing the design of the factory. They played an active 
role in the brainstorm sessions, and not only defended the interests of 
union members, but also contributed their experience as car makers. The 
final design for the factory showed a more radical departure from the 
assembly line concept than the Kalmar plant did. 
Of the 150 cases that make up the data base for this study, 98 
belong to the category of consensual initiatives that reach down to the 
level of the shop floor to create an alternative organization of work. These 
initiatives predominantly, but by no means exclusively, pertain to 
assembly work, operating machinery in discrete production (not in an 
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automatic flow) like turning, boring and milling, and operator work in 
flow processes. Table 3.1 is a breakdown of the different types of work 
that are the foci of these cases. 
 
Table 3.1: Types of work involved26 
Type of work cases 
assembly work 28 
operating machinery in discrete production (not in an auto-
matic flow) like turning, boring and milling 
24 
operator work in flow process 18 
custom production work 1 
maintenance 1 
goods handling 5 
nursing 2 
police work (officers and clerks) 1 
cleaning 1 
sales 3 
administrative case-handling 2 
clerical work in the back office 2 
other clerical work 4 
cooking and serving food 1 
mining 4 
bus driving 1 
 
This chapter describes some of the activities involved in creating con-
sensual alternatives. 
3.2 Changing structures 
Changing structures are the most tangible aspect of consensual alterna-
tives. Breaking with Taylorism entails structural changes that transcend the 
level of the  individual jobs. The depth of change varies, but there is a 
tendency towards deeper change. In 1973, the Philips works council noted 
that projects were too isolated. That is to say, the change projects did not 
touch product design and factory lay-out. An "integral approach" was 
lacking (Bolwijn et al. 1973: 21). Furthermore, the works council criticized 
the organization structure for not supporting the initiatives to change, in 
particular, the budgeting system, the methods of cost accounting and job 
rating, and "the many do's and don'ts issued by staff departments and 
corporate management" (Bolwijn et al. 1973: 8). The "integral approach", 
that - among others - the Philips works council had been clamoring for, 
later became de rigueur. In such an approach, organizations engage in 
several of the following activities. 
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1) Team formation 
At DAF Trucks, the transformation involved the creation of a cell 
structure, covering the entire production organization. Each cell is the 
domain of a team, or, in case of shiftwork, two teams work in the same 
cell alternately. 
The size of the team varies. In Component Manufacture, teams 
number six to ten workers. Mr. A. Coppens, a DAF organizations expert, 
considers this to be the ideal size. In Assembly, team sizes range from ten 
to twenty. This is because in Assembly, the infrastructure does not have 
the logical decoupling points that are required for smaller cells. 
At the level of production at Van Nelle, the old organization 
structure consisting of two departments gave way to a team-based or-
ganization. One team receives incoming tobacco, checks its quality, mixes 
it and adds flavoring to it. Then they pass it on to a second team, who cut 
it. Three more teams handle the packing. There is a team for packing large 
volumes (this team is based in another plant). Then there is a team that 
operates packing lines for medium-sized batches. Finally, there is a team 
that packs special orders. 
In the Halmstad County Hospital, the wards are subdivided into 
mini-wards. For each mini-ward, there is a team of three nurses and three 
assistant nurses that is responsible for seven patients. For the patients, this 
means that they have to deal with fewer nurses. This facilitates the 
development of relations of trust.  
 
2) Defunctionalization 
In a functional or synonymously, product-centered organization, each 
different operation to be performed on the products is, in principle, 
concentrated in a special department. Felten & Guillaume initiated a 
change from a functional organization to an island-based organization.  
For example, in the manufacture of metal parts, previously there were 
separate departments for turning, drilling/milling, punching, bar work, 
soldering, indexing table machines, sheet-metal working and electro-
plating (Klingenberg and Kränzle 1988: 8). 
At Felten & Guillaume, the island principle means that the machines 
that are necessary for making a particular type of product are grouped 
together. The workers who man these machines operate as a team. Islands 
are profit centers. Each production island has an island leader. Production 
islands have between four and ten workers. (A side effect of a shift from a 
workshop-based organization to production islands is that it becomes 
easier to transfer the manufacturing of a product to another country.) 
 inside consensual alternatives 41  
When products require a heterogeneous set of operations, creating 
production islands involves moving machines to new locations. This was 
the case at Felten & Guillaume and the Rietbergwerke.27  
A limitation of defunctionalization is that it can harm flexibility. At 
IHC, 1984 saw a cautious start with a regrouping of products. This 
involved the formation of production teams, each with its own array of 
products. This proved not practical because it was too rigid. Many 
products were one-offs. Furthermore, it can happen that a certain product 
is not being made for two years.  
 
3) Decentralization 
Several organizations decentralized secondary functions and brought these 
closer to production. 
In addition to the production islands, Felten & Guillaume has lo-
gistical islands. These islands consist of four persons with the following 
functions: 
· Sales management. This person is supported by a sales information 
system. 
· Order tracking. This worker has a database with basic production data 
at his disposal. 
· Materials planning, supported by a production information system. 
· Purchasing, supported by a purchasing information system. 
The four workers in a logistical island share one large desk. They coor-
dinate their decisions in personal interaction, but not through the infor-
mation systems. It was a conscious decision not to integrate the four in-
formation systems, keeping the workers in the island in control. The lo-
gistics island makes a rough planning; detail planning takes place in the 
production islands. The production islands only report back when they 
finish the job completely (Klingenberg and Kränzle 1987: 16). 
In the DAF Trucks engine plant, teams keep their own supplies; 
there is no central warehouse.  
 
4) Creating a specially adapted built environment 
Defunctionalization and decentralization put special demands on the or-
ganization's built environment. Volvo's Uddevalla plant mainly consisted 
of six small factory buildings connected to a central warehouse. The 
design goal for the new Sigma plant in Amsterdam was to ensure that 
there would be no way back to a traditional organization. Four product 
groups - two for decorative paints, one for maritime products and one for 
powder coatings - constitute four factories inside the factory. Each 
product group has its own identical "working differently-strip" consisting 
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of an office, a laboratory, a canteen and a smoking room. Packaging also 
has its own "working differently-strip". 
 
5) Adapting production technology 
Changing the organization of work without changing technology can 
cause difficulties. In many factories, noise hinders communication, 
thereby forming an obstacle to efficient horizontal coordination and co-
operation (Bolwijn 1973). A cell-based structure, a common cornerstone 
in anti-Tayloristic factory redesign, involves grouping different machines 
that are needed for making a family of products. This can increase the 
noise level. When AEG introduced complete assembly of power drills to 
replace assembly line production, noise levels increased (Klingenberg and 
Kränzle 1986: 29-38). Machine paced systems, like assembly lines, inhibit 
decentralization of responsibility, because they preclude group 
discussions. This a problem at Mercedes-Benz in Bremen, particularly 
because of the policy that the line should not be stopped. In a German 
micro-electronics firm (E-T-A), clean room conditions impeded the 
development of group structures. 
In the examples above, non-compatible technology stood in the way 
of change. A case in which specially adapted technology did get created 
was Volvo Kalmar. This plant required a flexible alternative for the 
assembly line. This resulted in the development of a patented carrier 
system (Gyllenhammar 1977: 56). 
 
6) Flattening the organization 
In some cases, a reduction of the number of management layers was part 
of the change. An example is the SKF D3 bearing factory, which reduced 
the number of management layers from six to three (Hellstrand 1989: 13). 
German research manager P. Binkelmann said that the flattening of 
an organization in Germany usually involves the level of the foremen 
("Meister"). Further reduction of management layers seldom occurs. The 
firm's organization is something no one wants to touch. 
 
7) Changing from production pushed by projected sales to production 
pulled by orders from customers 
In classical mass production, the mode of production that most closely fits 
Taylorism, quantities of standardized products are made in the hope that 
the sales force will succeed in selling all the products. In an organization 
where production is pulled by customers' orders, nothing is produced 
unless there is an order for it. Many production chains are in effect a mix 
of both modes, with pushing going on at the beginning of the chain and 
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pulling taking place near the end. In some cases, organizations shifted 
their approach from production pushed by projected sales to production 
pulled by orders from customers. 
Before the change, workers at Staco produced anonymous grids in 
standard dimensions. Other workers would then cut these grids to the 
exact dimensions that customers needed. This required intermediate 
storage and led to wear on saw-blades and to waste. Staco changed this 
around completely and integrated jobs. Now workers produce grids for 
specific customers in the correct sizes right from the beginning. Lauenstein 
and Stapelmann write that this was a much more difficult way than, using 
new technology, optimizing the Taylorist way of working. Nonetheless, 
according to all concerned, the goals were met, including providing scope 
for job enlargement and decision-making by workers (Lauenstein and 
Stapelmann 1992: 15, 75-80). 
 
8) Introducing specially adapted information systems 
Information systems often reflect the organizational structure to such an 
extent, that they become obstacles to change. This prompted several or-
ganizations to include information systems among the targets for change. 
In German life insurance company Aachener & Münchener Le-
bensversicherung, teams take care of all the business of all clients in a 
certain geographical area. To make the change more feasible, pro-
grammers created an overarching interface for the various applications 
and put the supporting handbooks on-line  (Müller, Münster and Nocker 
1990). 
In a German steel factory sales, calculation, work preparation and 
quality assurance were integrated into teams. The project involved the 
creation of software to integrate the applications for sales, calculation, 
work preparation and quality assurance (Thienel, Richter and Zimmerman 
1990). At Sigma coatings, the new information systems reflect the 
decentralized structure based on product groups.  
The value of specially adapted information systems is underlined by 
the experience gained in cases where these systems were not available. At 
ECT for instance, information systems that gave one-to-one instructions 
were hampering efforts to move towards more autonomy (Bouwman, Van 
Halem and Van Klaveren 1989: 14-15). 
 
9) Introducing pay systems that are compatible with a flexible or-
ganization 
Pay systems that are geared to Tayloristic organization tend not to reward 
but rather punish flexibility. They penalize the learning time that workers 
need when they switch to other tasks. A case in point is the German 
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clothing industry (Gebbert 1991: 86). A remedy is to develop alternative 
pay schemes. One of these is a system of pay supplements for learning 
new operations that is in use at the Willy Bogner clothing firm in Germany 
(Paß 1991, Gebbert 1991). 
 
10) Formation of business units 
A drive to increase responsibility does not have to limit itself to workers' 
jobs, it can include managers' jobs as well. The formation of business 
units is a strategy to decentralize business responsibilities. 
The first step in the change process at the tobacco branch of Van 
Nelle in Rotterdam, a success story of Dutch sociotechnical systems design 
(Van Amelsfoort 1992: 64-74, Kuipers and Van Amelsfoort 1990: 129-132, 
Joosse et al. 1990, Pot et al. 1989: 199-204), was to turn the tobacco 
branch into an "operational group", responsible for buying raw materials, 
production and sales and having its own technical department.  
At IHC, 1987 saw the formation of business units. These units can 
try selling products on the external market. For example, one of the units 
operates an automated welding line for hull panels. This unit started 
selling panels to other shipyards. 
 
11) A new orientation towards the market 
Getting out of mass markets can be part of the set of strategies involving a 
departure from Taylorism. A good example is the Rietbergwerke, that 
geared production more closely to customers' specifications and entered 
the market for environmental protection technology. 
 
3.3 Changing attitudes 
Responsible autonomy28 requires more worker commitment than direct 
control.  In several cases, a proportion of the workers did not show a level 
of commitment that commensurated with responsible autonomy. The 
active union members that I spoke with in the Volvo Uddevalla plant (a 
car builder and a warehouse worker) emphasized that Volvo Uddevalla 
should not be regarded as an ideal factory. A major problem, as they saw, 
was the lack of commitment on the part of many employees; a new way of 
working, such as that at the Uddevalla factory, could only succeed if all 
employees were interested in the work. This was a point of serious 
concern. In their opinion, the lack of commitment jeopardized the success 
of the factory.  
Furthermore, the atmosphere in some of the teams was bad. People 
could ask to be transferred from one team to another, but evidently, this 
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presented no real solution to the problem of poor relations within the 
teams. 
It is an almost typical experience that part of the workers do not 
show commitment. "If you would interview people now, you would 
probably hear: 'it is all shit'", says an industrial engineer at Felten & 
Guillaume, "This happened in a TV program, leading to all sorts of 
questions. Partly they have not known the old workshop-based organi-
zation, partly they take the present organization for granted." A unit 
manager at Van Nelle notes: "There must clearly be more discipline, I 
must lay down a guideline. For example, it happened that they went home 
at half past nine, while there was still a pile of work. That would have had 
to be ten a clock." 
At ECT, researchers assessed whether workers were interested in 
job enlargement and job enrichment. Half or more of the operational 
workers wished to have some of these activities added to their jobs, in 
order of popularity: cleaning equipment, safety, scheduling vacations and 
days off, organizing training, manning and allocation of work, en-
vironmental protection and scheduling manning of equipment. 38 per cent 
were interested in recording data, 36 percent in administrative work, 32 
per cent in processing and analyzing data, 33 per cent in dealing with 
malfunctions, 31 per cent in light repairs, 29 per cent in preventive 
maintenance. There were employees who were interested in organizing 
tasks, but they were not the majority (Bouwman, Van Halem and Van 
Klaveren 1989). 
At Holec, worker commitment to teamwork fluctuates. When it goes 
down, it results in increased lead times, in losses through manufacturing 
wrong products, waste of material, poor quality and low productivity. 
Language skills (in the vernacular) are an important requirement for 
efficient socialization into teamworking. A manager at Van Nelle explains: 
 
"There is good cooperation in the workteam for special products, 
which does manual work. In other teams, it can happen that when 
you just pick someone, that he does not even know that he is part 
of a workteam. With some foreigners, it is difficult to discuss ab-
stract things because of language problems. Workteams may not be 
abstract, but nonetheless more abstract than 'put the lid on that 
thing'." 
 
At Holec, several migrant workers do not speak Dutch. There were 
language courses, but not everyone was interested. 
There is no shortage of possible explanation why employees - in 
significant proportions - do not wholeheartedly embrace anti-Tayloristic 
change projects: 
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1) The new job content can be too demanding.29 At Holec in The Ne-
therlands, this was initially the case for several workers with good tech-
nical skills, who ran into difficulties when they had to perform organizing 
duties. 
 
2) Task integration often entails inclusion of less desirable tasks in jobs. 
 
3) "Instrumentalism", i.e. the attitude that work content is not important, 
that work is no more than a means to an end. In some cases, this has been 
part of the management experience. In the Rietbergwerke, one of the 
explanations advanced for the lack of interest in training is that workers 
are rurally molded ("ländlich geprägt"). At home, many of these workers 
are involved in agriculture or livestock breeding. "Some of the workers do 
not want more interesting work at all", says a manager at Van Nelle "They 
do what they have to do. Then they get their coffee, they go on working, 
have lunch, get coffee and go home. They find it important to be able to 
talk while working." 
 
4) Through anti-Tayloristic change, jobs acquire characteristics of higher-
paid jobs. Employees can be expected to want pay raises in return, which 
in fact has often happened. When satisfactory pay raises are not 
forthcoming, wage-effort bargaining might ensue. Huiskamp (1991: 13) 
mentions a case of a factory where, after the introduction of semi-
autonomous groups, effort bargaining took place. In some sectors there is 
a tradition of game-like effort bargaining. An example is mixed or general 
cargo stevedoring (Smit 1992). But in organizations where no explicit 
wage-effort bargaining takes place, employees can still withhold 
commitment when they are not financially satisfied. 
 
5) Anti-Tayloristic developments can threaten the ways in which, in the 
words of Watson (1987: 223) "people adjust to the variety of ways in 
which they are made use of in the employment situation". A change from 
line assembly to complete assembly in individual workstations can 
minimize the possibility for non-work related conversation. When a re-
designed job requires constant attention, possibilities for daydreaming and 
conversation become less. 
Shop-floor culture may be an area where some self-expression 
takes place. According to Willis (1979: 188-189) "working class culture of 
work is not simply a foam padding, a rubber layer between humans and 
unpleasantness. It is an appropriation in its own right, an exercise of skill, 
a motion, an activity applied towards an end". Elements of shop-floor 
culture are a "half-mythical primitive confrontation with the task" (Willis 
1979:190) and a sense of competence involving the superiority of practice 
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over theory. The social group is the basis. Apart from sexist attitudes, 
jokes are important: 
 
"It is the area precisely of irony and the joke where the controls 
downwards from supervisors can be partially blunted by joking. 
[..] The shop floor with its 'piss-takes', 'wind-ups', and jokes 
inserts the young worker into something of an artificial reality: 
denying the strict logic of a capitalist productive disposition of real 
bodies in the labor process; denying a direct control of the 
individual body. This supports practically the possibility of al-
ternatives: and that the abstract logics of control need not always 
be followed. The cultural apprenticeship is an important ground 
for the practical, often unpleasant learning of the range of the ways 
of being related to work, of handling external direction, of 
understanding the invisible bargains over how work is shared out 
and finally limited through informal control. It is one of the con-
crete modes of opposing the 'political technology' of the factory 
with its rule book, interdicted areas, and the pace of the machine. 
Of course, and this is crucial, all this is experienced culturally, as a 
living out, not as a political opposition to the logics of capital." 
(Willis and Corrigan 1983: 96)    
 
A small gain in work interest as a result of job redesign might not com-
pensate for the associated loss of self-expression through shop floor 
culture. 
De-bureaucratization paradoxically can mean a loss of autonomy at 
the bottom of the organization. Following Crozier, Giddens (1981: 311) 
concluded that "it is plausible to argue that the more tightly knit and 
inflexible the formal relations of authority in an organization, the more 
they can be circumvented and manipulated by those in subordinate 
positions to their own advantage". 
In order to effectively perform any job, an employee must do at 
least a little more than just follow the rules (cf. Edwards 1990: 140-141). If 
employees are, at the outset of anti-Tayloristic change, unwilling to put at 
least some creativity into their work, we can read this as resistance to the 
employment relation in general. Gorz (1980: 45) describes this kind of 
resistance as "active passivity". 
 
6) It may be that job redesign in general benefits management more than 
employees. Some writers on organizations have come to this conclusion. 
In a handbook on organization, Child (1988: 46-47) writes (following 
Kelly 1982): 
 
 inside consensual alternatives 48  
"[..] the needs and interests of workers which are involved in job 
redesign are not confined to 'psychological' aspects such as job 
satisfaction or personal fulfillment. They also extend to economic 
issues such as an acceptable intensity of effort, job security and 
levels of pay. In our present social and economic system, most 
employees will of necessity if not of preference, give highest 
priority to these requirements being met. Since keeping effort 
down, security and pay are at the sharp edge of conflict with 
management (which will perceive the same issues in the opposite 
terms of raising effort, treating labor as far as possible as a 
variable not a fixed resource, and keeping wage costs down), then 
it is appropriate to examine how the introduction of job redesign 
has affected this balance of interests. The conclusion is that it has 
generally benefited management far more than workers." 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that employees themselves might come to 
similar assessments (cf. Elshof and Wetzel 1992). 
 
7) Insofar as the change project involves participation, employees may 
fear that their knowledge is appropriated by management, thereby 
weakening the position of the employees.  
 
Thus, making people fit into the new structure is a major management 
problem in consensual alternatives. Two basic strategies to deal with the 
problem of worker commitment are evident. Both strategies in some way 
violate the idea of decentralization of responsibility.  
One strategy relies on rewards to stimulate compliance with the new 
system. In the Halmstad County Hospital one finds informal rewards in 
free time. One of the head nurses faced the problem that particularly older 
workers were not interested in the change: 
 
"At first, I invested a lot of energy in people who did not want to 
change, later I concentrated on the people who did want to change. 
For example, as a reward they would get a few hours off. The 
other saw this and thought 'that's interesting' Now there are only 
two older nurses left who do not want to participate." 
 
Furthermore, there are specially designed pay systems for encouraging 
learning. In the Volvo Uddevalla plant, the larger the proportion of a car 
that an employee mastered, the higher the pay. However, this only applied 
up to a certain degree. Consequently, learning to assemble an entire car 
was not encouraged financially. In the new factory of Sigma Coatings, pay 
is based on knowledge rather than performance. At IHC, every course out 
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of the training program, that is successfully completed, leads to a pay 
supplement. 
Time and again, the idea of group bonus systems in the form of 
additional wage comes up; but it is generally unpopular. Works councils 
fear that teams will push out weaker workers. In some cases (Holec, Van 
Nelle), teams receive bonuses that they must use collectively. At Van 
Nelle, one team decided to use their bonus for buying ventilators, another 
team decided to spend it on a stereo system for their department. 
However, a Holec manager experienced: "Something like this works only 
for a short time. The renewal must come from inside." At IHC, there is no 
group bonus for performance: "We still assume that everyone does his 
best. After a terrific performance there is cake for the entire production 
personnel." 
The second type of strategy uses direct control. "We used gentle 
pressure to move them to get training", says G. Hedemann of Felten & 
Guillaume "After the training, they did not find it a problem. As an ar-
gument we told them that their jobs would be more secure if they would 
participate. We told someone, who was only engaged in boring, that there 
might be less boring to do in the future, or that there might only be 
punching, and that it would make his job more secure if he would be able 
to mill and turn. But some resistance remained, some people did not want 
to participate at all." 
At Sigma coatings, potentially less popular jobs like filling are part 
of the rotation schemes. In case of unwillingness, some pressure is 
applied. When hiring new personnel, willingness to rotate is a require-
ment. For example, no one can be hired who wants to work only in the 
laboratory.30 
In 1994, ECT tried to achieve a breakthrough in the area of job 
rotation. (Earlier attempts had been unsuccessful.). The new Delta 2 
terminal runs on an experimental basis under a job rotation scheme. All 
workers on the Delta 2 terminal have chosen to work in this place, 
knowing that there would be job rotation. Job rotation is mandatory, but 
Willem Galama, ECT's in-house organizational expert, says that ma-
nagement seldom has to intervene. Workers consider job rotation a right 
rather than a duty. One reason for job rotation is to reduce physical strain. 
The job structure on the new terminal has four levels. On the lowest level, 
workers have two jobs, on the second level three jobs, on the third level 
four jobs and on the fourth level, five jobs, including the coordination 
role. The idea is that everyone tries to get to the highest level, taking all his 
jobs with him. The carrot in this scheme is that participation in rotation is 
a precondition for moving up one level. 
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3.4 Social movement aspects 
On a deeper level, consensual alternatives exhibit aspects of social 
movements. To a varying extent, there is unmanaged and open-ended 
collective action, directed towards change. This involves a mobilization 
process, not just of workers but at all levels in the organization. It includes 
bottom-up mobilization activity - a process completely different from 
change program implementation by management.  
Bader (1991: 362-363) and others pointed out that it is possible to 
see social movements as collective learning processes. Indeed, in con-
sensual alternatives, one finds intensive and collective learning. This does 
not only include learning how to achieve certain goals, but also setting and 
redefining goals. In the literature on organizational learning, this is often 
referred to as "multi-loop learning" (Ramondt 1996: 119).31 Multi-loop 
learning is seen as the highest stage of organizational learning. The lowest 
stage is single-loop learning. Single-loop learning is based on detecting 
and correcting deviations from pre-given operating norms. The next stage, 
double-loop learning is an extension of single-loop learning: it involves 
taking a "double look at the situation by questioning the relevance of 
operating norms" (Morgan 1986: 88). The highest stage is multi-loop 
learning. It involves reflection on the context for learning (Ramondt 1996: 
120).  
There is a pro-active consciousness, a sense of history making, of 
making a difference. Actors seek to acquire freedom to maneuver. Sub-
groups are expected to develop their capacities for self-organization; 
debate and involvement rather than compliant apathy are the norm. 
Emancipation goes on as part of the process. 
Finally, there is a strong element of voluntariness. Although all 
participants are paid for their work, their commitment extends far beyond 
the call of duty. Since taking control of the organization of work is a 
central feature, these social movement-like processes are in conflict with 
the general characteristics of the employment relation. 
As said, the strength of this dimension varies. A case in which all 
elements of the social movement aspect are present is the Halmstad 
County Hospital (Sweden), in which grassroots mobilization led to an 
effective organization redesign process. Traditional Tayloristic principles 
had shaped the organization of work in the County Hospital of Halmstad 
for decades. Normally, one person did the same thing for all the patients 
in a ward. Furthermore, there was a deep division of labor between 
assistant nurses and regular nurses. Assistant nurses made beds, washed 
patients and served meals. Regular nurses restricted themselves to the 
more medical tasks. Taking blood samples, letting patients take baths and 
internal transportation of patients were separate jobs. Although nurses 
were qualified, their autonomy was limited because they could not do 
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much without the consent of the head nurse. Looking back at this period, 
a head nurse remarks: 
 
"I was the main person, the central figure. I 'knew everything', 
everybody had to talk to me about the patients, I gave all the or-
ders as to what they should do." 
 
The head nurse was the only person who was in contact with the doctors. 
Thus, one person was responsible for all the patients in a ward seven days 
a week, 24 hours a day. 
When we look for the impetus to change, we find that it did not 
originate from higher management, i.e. above the level of the head nurse 
and the department doctor. The shortcomings of the ossified organization 
structures were most acute at the ward level. This held certainly true for 
workers who knew from their own experience that the organization of 
work could be different and more effective. One of these workers was 
Eva Jönsson. After nursing school, she started her career in an intensive 
care unit. Intensive care units tend to be characterized by teamwork. Every 
nurse is responsible for his or her "own" patients. Later, Eva Jönsson 
became one of the head nurses at the clinic for Internal Medicine. There 
she found that nothing had changed since her days in the nursing school. 
Under the right circumstances, discontent at the shop floor level can 
lead to innovation. In this case, the catalyst was a crisis, in which working 
stress ran unacceptably high. Several of the nurses wanted to quit, saying 
that they would take jobs anywhere except in health care. Eva Jönsson 
discussed the crisis with Bengt-Göran Hansson, the department doctor, 
and together they came up with the idea to introduce teamwork. The 
staff's reaction was "let's do it, it can't be worse". They organized meetings 
in which all who worked in the ward, from cleaning person to doctor, 
discussed the manner of working and the organization. There were 13 
meetings of three hours; all held after working hours. The reason for 
having the meetings after working hours was to enable everybody to 
participate, except the two or three nurses that had to stay in the ward. 
Training officers participated in the meetings as well. 
The solution that emerged was to subdivide the ward into two parts, 
each part having 14 beds. In each part, a fixed team would work. This 
new organization required having an extra part-time nurse in the ward. 
The possibility for obtaining money for this depended on a political 
decision. In Sweden, local politics has a substantial influence on hospital 
management, because local taxes provide the funding for the hospitals. 
The innovators managed to influence the county council's decision in their 
favor. At the same time, the training department of the hospital exerted 
political influence. They felt that it would be a good idea to give all nurses 
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management training. They made this suggestion to politicians, who 
decided accordingly.  
Giving management training to persons who are not managers is, 
regardless of the content, a somewhat subversive activity. A doctor de-
scribed the effect as follows: 
 
"We send nice nurses [to the course], and we get troublesome 
nurses in return." 
 
Plans for a new building offered chances for a more radical application of 
the team concept. A nurse, who had been a hospital manager in charge of 
nursing, was responsible for investigating the organizational aspects of the 
new building project. The organization of work was part of this. Local 
politicians encouraged her to look into possible alternative ways of 
organizing. In Denmark and Norway, she found a system of "primary 
nursing" that had been adapted from the U.S. In the primary nursing 
system, every patient gets assigned a primary nurse with whom he or she 
has the most intensive contact. Primary nursing, however, was not an 
employable concept because it involves only regular nurses. This would 
have been unacceptable to the assistant nurses' union. For this reason she 
tried to avoid the term "primary nursing" as much as possible. Instead, she 
coined the term "deeper teamwork". This concept involves assistant 
nurses and regular nurses in equal numbers. 
From this point onwards, redesign activities built on the experience 
accumulated in Eva Jönsson's ward; the ward that had already been split 
up in 1980. One of the shortcomings in this ward was that the teams were 
too large, causing an ever-present danger of a relapse into the old pattern. 
Therefore, they were eager to reduce team size, but they would need 
additional staff for this. This experience provided a strong argument for 
basing the design of the new organization on smaller teams. A nation-wide 
study by SPRI (Planning- and Rationalization Institute) helped set the 
scene for a change in the organization of work. That is, their study 
concluded that it would be preferable to have smaller teams and to employ 
more nurses. This prompted politicians to put alternative hospital 
organization on the political agenda. 
In the hospital, a wide debate followed. From a hospital in Stock-
holm, where one ward worked with the primary nursing system, came a 
delegation consisting of a doctor, a head nurse, a nurse and an assistant 
nurse to share their experiences. 
The innovatory coalition grew stronger by the day. To this testifies 
the fact that Eva Jönsson and Bengt-Göran Hansson rose to the ranks of 
management respectively as nursing manager and as chief doctor. 
Finally, a political decision made the new working organization the 
norm for the entire hospital. Eva Jönsson played an important role in 
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stimulating the head nurses, who were to implement the changes. A head 
nurse commented: 
 
"To get such an organization like we have, you need a person like 
Eva Jönsson and you need ward nurses that got education, and of 
course, believe that it is possible to work like this." 
 
Another head nurse commented that: 
 
"It is because of Eva Jönsson that we are what we are." 
 
The change process required a commitment from the head nurses, that 
was way beyond the ordinary. A head nurse noted: 
 
"To be able to do this, you must be idealistic, you must be there at 
all times and you must motivate people. For six years, the change 
cost me my spare time, Saturdays and Sundays. Now it works well 
and I don't have to be around constantly." 
 
Often, the communication structures are not conducive to social move-
ment-like developments. A Swedish change project in a police organi-
zation aimed to enhance representative co-determination through the 
unions with direct influence by individuals in their own work groups. 
However, an evaluation study showed no increase in employee influence. 
The study concludes that there was no demand for influence because there 
was no room for discussion (Naschold 1992b Anhang C: 92-107). 
The remnants of old power structures can slow down a process of 
change. At the beginning of the change process in the County Hospital in 
Halmstad, one of the head nurses faced old problems that had accu-
mulated over a period of twenty years. Under the regime of the old head 
nurse, who had worked there for twenty years, there had never been a real 
discussion. 
On a different level, a sociologist working in a Mercedes-Benz car 
plant as a teamwork consultant cannot approach plant management 
directly. What he wants to say has to pass through several management 
layers to reach the top. In order to get in touch with plant management, he 
has to resort to the trick of organizing a workshop. Moreover, at his level, 
there are no contacts between the various Mercedes-Benz plants that are all 
presumably trying to move in the same direction. 
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3.5 Summary and conclusions 
Increasingly, consensual alternatives involve more wide ranging change 
than just job redesign. On the level of structure, the following types of 
changes could be identified: 
· team formation; 
· defunctionalization; 
· decentralization; 
· creating a specially adapted built environment; 
· adapting production technology; 
· flattening the organization; 
· changing from production pushed by projected sales to production 
pulled by orders from customers; 
· introducing specially adapted information systems; 
· introducing pay systems that are compatible with a flexible organization; 
· formation of business units; 
· a new orientation towards the market. 
In the area of workers' attitudes, there were widespread difficulties to be 
dealt with. As a rule, it seems safe to assume that around half of the work-
force do not wholeheartedly support anti-Tayloristic change. Top-down 
management strategies to change workers' attitudes to adapt them to the 
new structures entail rewards and direct control.  
In addition to the (re)design process of structures, and efforts to 
manage workers' attitudes, consensual alternatives exhibit spontaneous 
processes that are reminiscent of social movements. Among these are 
collective learning processes. 
In fully developed consensual alternatives, the design of structures, 
top-down policies to change the attitudes of employees and the social 
movement-like process constitute a trinity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - ENLIGHTENMENT, SHOWING MANAGERS 
THE WAY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with policies originating from outside the organizations 
to be changed, designed to promote and support the implementation of 
consensual alternatives. These policies are directed toward modernization, 
but at the same time they are also a continuation of a long line of policies 
to protect employees from damaging aspects of the employment relation 
(like policies to limit the length of the working day, to stamp out child 
labor, to limit unhealthy working conditions). 
The basic assumption underlying these policies is that there is an 
inextricable link between, on the one hand, efficiency, and on the other 
hand, humanization of work (i.e. breaking with Taylorism). This implies 
that real opportunities exist for interventions to promote a shift away from 
Taylorism. That the world has not yet witnessed a breakthrough in 
humanized work is explained by failure of managers to see the advantage 
in this32, or ignorance about the possibilities for change. Given the 
ignorance and backwardness of managers, there is room for 
enlightenment efforts. Indeed, one can find a range of activities designed 
to promote, support and enhance local activity in consensual alternatives. 
These enlightenment activities are the business of researchers, who, while 
combining consultancy and research, accumulate expertise on changing 
working life and offer to feed this back into organizations. 
In several countries, politicians have initiated working life policies 
that aim to enlighten managers. Especially in Scandinavia and in Germany, 
there are consensus-oriented research and development programs that are 
pursuing alternatives to Taylorism. In these programs, government 
agencies and research institutes work together with companies to create 
consensual alternatives. Finally, there are engineers who try to develop 
technology without a Taylorist bias. 
 
Box 4.1 Main enlightenment Research & Development programs 
dealt with in this study 
Norway: Industrial Democracy Project 1962-(approx.)1975 
Sweden: Development Program 1982-1987, LOM (Leadership, Organi-
zation, Co-determination) Program 1985-1990, MDA (People, Data, 
Working Life) Program 1987-1992 
Germany: Humanization of Working Life 1974-1989, 
Work and Technology 1989- 
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In this chapter, I will do the following, and in the following order: 
1) Introduce the activities of the consultant-researchers who engage 
themselves directly in change processes in organizations, and highlight 
examples of interventions in organizations. I shall begin with the 
activities of the consultant-researchers because they are closest to the 
change processes in organizations. 
2) Then I shall go into different strategies to increase the diffusion of 
successful models. 
3) The development of anti-Tayloristic technology is another, totally dif-
ferent but also indirect way of stimulating change. I collected infor-
mation on anti-Tayloristic technology projects and tried to establish 
whether they contributed to actual change at the shop floor level. 
4) As a supportive policy, sometimes subsidies are given to organizations 
who engage in change projects. The question is: are subsidies an 
effective catalyst for change? 
5) Finally, I shall move to the level of politics, where we find large dif-
ferences between nations. Some countries have stable, long-term en-
lightenment policies, while others have not. 
 
4.2 Scientific support, the business of consultant-researchers 
Scientific support is the mainstay in the enlightenment efforts. It is a 
dialectical combination of research and intervention. The school (or 
better, schools) of sociotechnical systems design offers the most visible 
body of general theory in this area. The sociotechnical paradigm in or-
ganizational and management studies, at the origin of which were the 
Tavistock studies, had a number of anti-Tayloristic characteristics: 
· Emphasis on self-regulation in semi-autonomous teams (responsible 
autonomy). 
· Organizational design according to the principle of redundancy of 
functions instead of redundancy of parts. These are two different ways 
for organizations to deal with a changing environment. Redundancy of 
parts involves setting up new, special departments or new, specialized 
jobs, while redundancy of functions means that workers acquire 
additional skills and competence to deal with new demands. 
· The possibility for workers to decide in their jobs ("control capacity") is 
important. 
· People are not seen as extensions of machines (Trist 1981: 22-23). 
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Box 4.2 The sociotechnical tradition started by learning from dis-
coveries made by workers and managers 
In the U.K.’s coal industry, the introduction of conveyer belts and coal 
cutters had entailed a further division of labor and a deepening of the 
separation of conception from execution. Along with the mechanization 
there had developed a standard way of working, the "longwall method of 
coal getting". In this method, the coal face is 160 to 180 meters long. 
Coal-getting takes place in cycles of 24 hours, employing 40 miners. The 
cycle comprises seven consecutive steps. For each step, there is a separate 
job. This division of labor deprived the majority of the miners from the 
possibility of performing a whole, complete task. This limited the 
satisfaction that they could get from their work. 
The fact that the steps were interdependent and the cycle was rigid, created 
more problems. If one step was not completed 100% successfully, the 
entire process would be disturbed. For their incomes and their working 
conditions, the miners were dependent on the quality of the work 
performed in the preceding step. This led to tensions in miner's 
communities. This situation differed sharply from the way of working 
prior to mechanization. Then it was customary for small (between two and 
eight miners), relatively autonomous teams to do all the underground 
tasks in coal-getting. Coordination and supervision were part of the work; 
between management and team there was a contract relation (Bamforth 
and Trist 1951). With the introduction of the longwall method, 
coordination disappeared from the circle of miners who did the actual 
work of coal-getting (Trist et al. 1963: 62).  
Researcher Ken Bamforth of the Tavistock Institute for Human Relations, 
who had worked as a miner at the coal face for 18 years, had the 
opportunity to do a study in the same mine where he had worked before. 
There he discovered an alternative organization of work that was based on 
semi-autonomous teams that took care of the entire cycle and rotated jobs 
among themselves (Van Eijnatten 1991: 8-9). The technical concept came 
from the Area Technical Manager. Miners had, with union support, 
proposed the organization of work. They drew their inspiration from the 
organization in pre-mechanized times. Researchers found strong personal 
commitment, high productivity, low absenteeism and a low accident rate. 
They concluded that the miners had found a way "of recovering the group 
cohesion that they had lost and of advancing their power to participate in 
decisions concerning their work arrangements" (Trist 1981: 22). 
The Tavistock researchers did not restrict themselves to value-free des-
cription, but wished to contribute to the diffusion of the innovations that 
they were investigating. They analyzed the conventional longwall method 
as a "technological system expressive of the prevailing outlook of mass-
production engineering" (Bamforth and Trist 1951: 5) and the 
development of the "composite" system as an organizational choice that 
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ran counter to the dominant way of designing organizations along Tay-
loristic and bureaucratic principles (Trist 1981: 22). 
The local managers and the local trade unionists agreed to the plan to 
study the innovation with a view of diffusion to other pits. The Area 
General Manager, who was in charge of twenty pits, supported this (Trist 
81: 21-22). However, a higher management echelon, the Divisional Board, 
vetoed the plan. According to Eric Trist (1981: 27) these managers were 
afraid that granting autonomy to miners would lead to a power shift. They 
wanted stronger management control to speed up mechanization. 
Subsequently, Tavistock researchers carried out various projects in U.K. 
mines. In one of these mines, they discovered a local experiment with new 
technology in which semi-autonomous teams of 20-25 men performed the 
whole cycle. All men participated in all operations. They were all multi-
skilled and earned the same wage. Productivity and work satisfaction were 
good. The local manager wanted six other pits to switch to the new 
system, and researchers from Tavistock would provide scientific support. 
The plan was to set up a conference for managers and an Area Training 
School for miners who would go over to the new system. However, a new 
division manager canceled the project. 
Trist mentions three causes for the demise of the project: 
- The project was seen a purely technical one that did not happen to fit in 
with plans for further mechanization. The manager did not acknowledge 
that organizational renewal had a value of its own. 
- Granting autonomy to miners was not popular. 
- On the regional level, the union had won a wage increase for the op-
erators of new equipment, which destroyed the unity within the teams. 
Before two years had passed, everything was as it had been before. 
The National Coal Board did not show interest in the research results that 
proved the productivity edge of semi-autonomous teams (Trist 1981: 28-
30). Trist (1981: 28) came to the conclusion that the effect of the mining 
studies on industrial practice was negligible. 
 
Subsequently, researchers expanded the paradigm by embracing concepts 
that they predominantly derived from systems theory.33 
A second line of expansion was a shift away from a nearly exclu-
sive concentration on job design at the level of the shop floor to the or-
ganization at large, including its relations with the outside world. This is 
the "integral approach" that the Philips works council had called for in its 
1973 evaluation of the work structuring projects. A short summary of the 
goal of integral design is: "complex jobs in a simple organization instead 
of simple jobs in a complex organization" (Hasken, Den Hertog and 
Verschuur 1990). The integralization of sociotechnical systems design 
reached a peak in The Netherlands. Dutch researchers, following 
Sociologist De Sitter, dissociated themselves from "classical" or 
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"traditional" sociotechnical design and sought to establish a science of 
integral design (De Sitter 1981: 234). This implies a joint optimization of 
all aspects of management. The researchers reject "partial design" in 
which, for example, automation is the province of the Information Sys-
tems department and quality of working life is the area of the personnel 
department. 
A third line of expansion of the paradigm is a bifurcation that de-
veloped between more participative approaches (in Scandinavia) and 
more expert oriented approaches (in The Netherlands).34 A major point of 
divergence between the Scandinavian and the Dutch approaches is that the 
Dutch approach exclusively plays the card of modernization. It has three 
main (re)design objectives: flexibility, controllability and quality of work 
(De Sitter in Van Eijnatten 1993: 143). However, it defines quality of work 
in terms of "control capacity", i.e. "structural possibilities to cope 
effectively with variance" (Van Eijnatten 1993: 179). Thus, quality of 
work is an instrumental concept directed at adjusting the level of flexibility 
to business requirements. Theoretically, this means that an assembly line 
based factory could be a sound sociotechnical design, provided that there 
are no large fluctuations in its environment. The Dutch approach has no 
built-in drive to find ways to cope with the immanent characteristics of the 
employment relation. 
This is different in the Scandinavian approach. For Gustavsen 
(1992: 74), a theoretical figurehead of the Scandinavian approach, the 
employment relation as such is an important problem: 
 
"Basically, any enterprise organization, however 'flat', is a steering 
system. It can be much else, but it is always more or less of a 
steering system. It consequently always raises the problem of how 
to unify a steering system with human motivation: How to 
combine a system which, at least in certain respects, 'tells people 
what to do' with a high motivation to do it? This is an eternal 
dilemma." (Gustavsen 1992: 74) 
 
A Scandinavian way to cope with this dilemma is to pursue a "dialogue-
based development strategy". 
 
Box 4.3 Sociotechnical theory can be a source of inspiration 
At DAF Trucks in The Netherlands, cost cutting was an important driving 
force for moving away from Taylorism. In the early eighties, initiatives 
such as department meetings, quality circles, job rotation, job enlargement 
and multi-skilling emerged. The firm had a special staff department 
"Quality of working life and of the organization" comprising four people. 
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In 1983-1984, the market collapsed. This situation asked for investment in 
new technology and in the development of new products. But, being 
financially unable to do both, management chose to invest in new pro-
ducts; so DAF would generally have to make the most out of the existing 
technology. As a way to cut costs, top management contemplated 
discontinuing the production of a number of components and to buy these 
instead. 
Jacques Huberts was Head of the Personnel Department for the compo-
nents plant which would be threatened by such a scheme. Inspired by 
writings on sociotechnical systems design by U. de Sitter and J. in 't Veld, 
he, together with the head of Development, wrote a paper in which they 
proposed organizing the plant along sociotechnical lines. In their opinion, 
the quality of working life had to be the overarching goal. The top 
management reacted with a statement like "if you think you know what 
should be done, you might as well do it yourself" and appointed him as a 
plant manager. This was not a risky decision, because if the proposed 
changes should fail, they had least a plant manager from the social sector 
in place to close the plant down gracefully. However, a change process got 
under way and gained momentum. Contacts developed with 
sociotechnically-oriented researchers and graduate students from the 
Catholic University of Nijmegen. 
Subsequently, the new way of organizing spread throughout the company. 
 
In Germany, researchers developed and successfully applied a body of 
theory, that has no basis in sociotechnical systems design theory. The 
extensive publications from the Humanization of Working Life program 
demonstrate this, because they hardly make any reference to the socio-
technical literature. Furthermore, in the self-image of sociotechnical 
systems design, as captured in the review by Van Eijnatten, German re-
search plays no role. In a list of 180 institutes and companies, it does not 
mention any of the German research institutes, and only one German 
company (Siemens).35 
One possible explanation might be that in the shaping of the theo-
ries, factors other than the requirements of effective intervention against 
Taylorism play a part. According to Emery (1993: 192-193), one of the 
founding fathers of sociotechnical systems design, it was subject to: 
a) Scholastization for the sake of academic respectability, for which the 
production of learned papers is more important than reality testing. 
b) Consultants' interest in client dependency. 
c) Political accommodation. 
On the level of practical organizational design, end results in The Ne-
therlands, Germany and Sweden were not radically different. One prin-
ciple that the Dutch Integral Sociotechnical Design most heavily stresses, 
parallelization of order flows, was practiced in all three countries. 
 enlightenment 61  
 
4.2.1 Interventions 
How productive is scientific support in terms of causing or promoting 
social change? In this section, I shall describe the various types of con-
tributions that researchers made to the cases of consensual alternatives in 
my dataset. These are: diagnosing the failure of Taylorism to provide both 
efficiency and an acceptable quality of working life, aiding in the design 
of the production structure, accounting and wage systems and 
qualification programs, consultancy and monitoring performing evalua-
tions, providing training to management and influencing management 
views to make these more radical. 
 
Diagnosing the failure of Taylorism to provide both efficiency and an 
acceptable quality of working life 
In a few cases, studies that pointed to Taylorism-related flaws in the or-
ganization were instrumental in a process of change. Examples are a 1981 
study by CCOZ into the causes of absence through illness at Sigma 
Coatings and a study by a team of the Free University of Amsterdam for 
the works council at ECT (container terminals) (Van Delden and Stel 
1985: 37). 
 
Box 4.4 Researcher involvement at ECT 
In the late 1970's, criticism against the level of worker autonomy emerged. 
A publication by the General Action Committee of the Rotterdam 
Dockworkers on the occasion of the port strike of 1979, states: "The tasks 
are fixed, the freedom to make decisions independently is minimal. 
Whatever you do depends on what the computer tells you to 
do."(Gezamenlijk Aktiekomité van Rotterdamse Havenarbeiders 1979: 20). 
A former truck driver, who works at ECT, notes: "When I get into my car 
after work, I have already forgotten the whole business. With my former 
employer it was not like that. There, unlike with ECT, one had certain 
responsibilities. At ECT I see myself more as a number."(Gezamenlijk 
Aktiekomité van Rotterdamse Havenarbeiders 1979: 20). The quality of 
working life showed up on the firm's political agenda in 1981, when the 
works council received a request for advice on the social plan for a new 
terminal, the Delta 1 terminal. By then, the planning process for this new 
terminal was already in its seventh year. To be able to offer a 
well-founded judgment, the works council wanted to know well the 
experiences and opinions of the workforce. Therefore, they drafted, in 
collaboration with the unions, a proposal for a survey. Researchers from 
the Free University of Amsterdam did this survey, in which 600 workers 
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participated. The researchers found shortcomings in the function 
structure, the working environment and in communications (Van Delden 
and Stel 1985: 37). 
 
 Aiding in the design of the production structure, accounting and wage 
systems and qualification programs. 
At Felten & Guillaume, researchers participated in the planning and in-
troduction of production islands, management structures and information 
systems that supported these islands, and training measures (Klingenberg 
and Kränzle 1987: 12). 
Not only research institutes were involved in this line of work, but 
also consulting firms. In The Netherlands for example, consultants from 
Bakkenist, Spits and Co. helped the tin can factory TDV change from a 
function-oriented to a product-oriented organization. 
In Sweden, researchers found that the way in which ball bearing 
manufacturer SKF measured productivity did not stimulate workers to 
improve production. They developed a new system "which increases job 
motivation and raises productivity, and will not be used for central control 
in the conventional way" (Hellstrand 1989: 18). 
For STACO (steel grid), researchers made a "qualification concept". 
Further examples are a new job grade system for a stevedoring 
company in Rotterdam and a new pay system in the German clothing 
industry.36 
There are indications that there is a real demand for social science 
expertise on organization transformations. In the early years of the Hu-
manization of Working Life program, researchers tended to focus on data 
collection. Later, companies wanted rewards in return for providing 
access for research. Initially, managers expected researchers to moderate 
in power conflicts. Later, researchers had to contribute expertise. 
Sociologists who did not go ahead in this direction, could forget about 
doing research in the Humanization of Working Life / Work and 
Technology programs.37  
 
Box 4.5 "Pure" action might not make it, but in the long run, "pure" 
research might not make it either 
One of the plants that I visited had been a research site in the 1980's where 
two famous sociologists collected data for a landmark study. However, 
their reputation inside the plant was not nearly as brilliant as their 
scientific reputation. They were seen as "spongers", who just collected 
their data, never to be heard of again, being only interested in producing 
their publication. 
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However, the research institute changed its policy shortly after the study 
that caused dismay. It now routinely reports back to the company that was 
studied, six months after completion of the data collection. This led to a 
request to the institute to support the development of teamworking in a 
car-producing company. 
 
 Consultancy and monitoring 
Anti-Tayloristic consulting firms like the Dutch ST Group can clarify 
options for management and suggest ways to overcome stagnation and 
setbacks. A example of an organization where such consultancy was in-
strumental is the Van Nelle tobacco processing plant in The Netherlands.38 
 
 Evaluation 
In most of the cases some form of evaluation took place, sometimes with 
before-and-after measuring. An example of this is the evaluation of the 
training program at Opel Hoppmann.  
 
Box 4.6 Evaluation and training at Opel Hoppmann 
In 1975, Opel Hoppmann started with a project consisting of evaluation 
research and a training and organization development program to further 
develop the participation model. Researchers conducted a survey among 
the Opel Hoppmann workers and a control group consisting of workers 
from another Opel retailer. Job satisfaction turned out to be higher at Opel 
Hoppmann (92.5 per cent satisfied) than in the control group (87.4 per 
cent), but this difference was not statistically significant. The motivations 
of the workers who were satisfied with their jobs, however, diverged 
widely. In the control group, 21.8 per cent indicated "because I know that 
in other firms it is not any better". None of the Opel Hoppmann workers 
chose this answer category. For them, social climate (Hoppmann 51.9 per 
cent, control group 21.8 per cent), social benefits (Hoppmann 15.5 per 
cent, control group 3.6 per cent) and management behavior (Hoppmann 
17.1 per cent, control group 9.1 per cent) were important motives. Half of 
the Opel Hoppmann workforce expressed willingness to take part in the 
firm's representative bodies, against 40 per cent in the control group 
(Hoppmann and Stötzel 1981: 83-85). 
The ensuing training and organization development program consisted of 
33 seminars.39 Besides general discussions, there were sessions focusing 
on practical problems and solutions. Examples involve redistribution of 
tasks, and research and decision-making in connection with automation. 
After one of the seminars, managers collectively made the following 
statement: "We commit ourselves to a democratic conception of 
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management. The point is not to discard management in the enterprise, but 
to reduce it to the functionally required level and to check it 
democratically." (Hoppmann and Stötzel 1981: 131) 
In a seminar with spokespeople from the work groups, the idea emerged 
to create a small handbook on participation. 
After the two-year long training and organization development program, a 
second survey took place. The main difference  compared with the earlier 
survey was that workers attached more importance to the work groups 
relative to the other participatory bodies. 
 
 Providing training to management 
In several cases, researchers applied training to enlighten managers. In 
Rotterdam, the Port Authority organized training in sociotechnical design 
principles for managers (and works council members and trade unionists) 
of stevedoring companies. Holec had in-house evening classes given by a 
sociotechnical researcher/consultant40. 
 
 Influencing management views to make these more radical 
Originally, the owner of steel grid producer STACO in Germany was 
attracted to the Humanization of Working Life program because he wished 
to combine rationalization with noise reduction. Preliminary discussions at 
the project agency and discussions during the starting phase of the project 
caused a shift of emphasis from reducing purely physical strain to 
changing the work content, to job enrichment and decision-making on the 
shop floor (Lauenstein and Stapelmann 1992: 23-24). 
 
From the examples we can conclude that researcher involvement can 
make a difference. However, it is important to note that there are cases of 
very successful change with minor researcher involvement. An example is 
The Halmstad County Hospital (see case description in Chapter Three) 
where grassroots mobilization was the driving force behind an effective 
organization redesign process. Characteristic in this case is the freedom to 
maneuver that the innovators enjoyed. Because of this, one would be 
hard-pressed to find ways in which outside consultants/researchers could 
have achieved a more thorough process of change. 
On the other hand, there are cases that enjoyed extensive researcher 
involvement, but where it resulted in little change. An example is the 
Unitcenter container terminal in Rotterdam (Spanjersberg 1992). 
Especially those cases, in which social scientists took the initiative 
to start participation projects, met with little success. The main thrust of 
these projects was to enhance participation through the creation of 
problem solving groups. An example is a project in a machine tools 
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construction department of medium-sized firm in Baden-Württemberg 
(Girschner-Woldt 1986). In this project, sociologists interviewed all 
workers to obtain an overview of the problem areas. Then they organized 
five problem-solving groups, each numbering between six and seventeen 
participants. In each group, a member of the works council and a 
sociologist were present. Management representatives did not take part in 
these groups. In their final report, the researchers themselves concluded 
that nothing changed as a result of the project. This case reveals limits on 
the influence by external policy makers on the implementation of 
consensual alternatives: a certain level of commitment to anti-Tayloristic 
change among line managers is a necessary precondition. Also, there must 
be a real demand from within the organization in which the consensual 
alternative is to be developed. 
 
Box 4.7 Researcher involvement is not necessarily without friction  
In one of the cases, a German engineering firm, there were several points 
of friction between industrialists and researchers as evidenced by the 
following list of complaints shared by the production manager and the 
chairman of the works council. All of these point to errors by researchers 
and culture clashes: 
 "One of the researchers spent his spare time, or the greater part of 
his time, restoring old-timers. He had to introduce himself to the works 
council. He came right from his workshop, with dirty hands; he had 
simply put a parka over his tinkering clothes. The works council members 
sat there smartly dressed in suits and ties. The workers had a certain 
expectation about the appearance of a scientist [..]. 
This let itself more or less be glossed over. Later he went, together with a 
number of workers, to a fair to look at some new machines. There he took 
off his self-knitted sweater, revealing a shirt with one striped and one 
checkered arm. From that moment onwards, the workers never took him 
seriously, no matter how hard he tried." 
 "There was a seminar on planning. The woman, who was teaching, 
started to explain to the skilled workers how one builds a rack. I was 
sitting at the back, having invited myself as an observer. With one hand I 
had to hold on to my stomach with laughing, my other hand turned into a 
clenched fist. Later we hired two school-teachers. They could get the 
matter across. They organized an exam, because of this, the workers paid 
more attention." 
 "At the start there were information meetings. The workers would 
ask things like 'what's the use of it'. The social scientists would then say 
'we are only moderators'. They did not want to make any statement. We 
had to take over, but the social scientists did not want that either. At this 
sort of meetings social scientists were taking video shots. Video 
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equipment had to be especially bought for this. The film was never shown 
to us." 
 Further complaints: 
- There were endless meetings, minutes of which had to be taken down. 
- Industrial scientists would discuss grand views at length, but declined to 
help working out practical details, although it had been agreed that they 
would help. 
- Paperwork that the social scientists produced, like questionnaires, 
looked sloppy (products of industrial scientists looked all right. 
- There were internal conflicts among the researchers. 
There was a debate on the wage system, whether there should be piece 
rates or hourly wages. The works council asked the workers which system 
they preferred, and they chose for the piece rate system. Nonetheless, the 
social scientists insisted that "Accord ist Mord" (piece rates are murder). 
The trade union was involved in the project, through a humanization of 
working life advisory agency (HdA Beratungsstelle). Inside the plant, they 
were known as the gang of ten. One of their tasks was to prepare a 
presentation on bonus systems. What they produced instead, were "old-
fashioned class-struggle stories". Management denied them future access 
to the premises. This was the start of a protracted conflict. 
 
4.3 Strategies for diffusion 
The classic strategy to foster diffusion is presenting star cases as examples 
for other organizations to follow. For this purpose, organizations involved 
in enlightenment programs published success stories41. Two of the 
Swedish research and development programs, the New Factories Program 
of the 1970's and the Development Program of the 1980's, included 
concerted efforts to disseminate the knowledge that the experiments 
generated. This was not to be done in the form of elaborate scientific 
reports, but in the form of easily readable, practically oriented 
publications. The Development Program in particular issued communi-
catively correct booklets (Utbult: 1988 & 1989, Hellstrand 1989, Burell 
1989), some of them using human interest to drive the message home. 
In Germany, one of the points of criticism leveled at the Humani-
zation of Working Life program was that scientists tended to write reports 
that practical workers were unable to read. This criticism gave rise to 
special projects for dissemination. For example, projects in the steel 
industry led to the development of guidelines for organizational design, 
aimed at practical workers. More and more, scientific final reports were 
left unpublished. 
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Notwithstanding the care involved in making success stories public, 
policy makers and observers are unhappy with the star case based 
diffusion strategy. 
Reflecting upon disappointing diffusion from the Scandinavian 
development projects, Gustavsen, who is an insider in these projects, 
identified weaknesses in the heart of the star case-diffusion mechanism 
itself. He noted that the transfer of experiences from experiments entailed 
an unfavorable "discursive formation" (Gustavsen 1988: 3). The 
participants in the experiments face the task of explaining their complex 
experiences to outsiders who are not familiar with field experiments. In 
this process, the participants tend to get quickly overburdened, and are 
likely to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the outsiders. 
In addition to this, he noted that changing a working organization is 
a too complex process to be brought about by copying a solution that has 
proved to be viable elsewhere. The development, for example, of a 
factory is a chain of thousands of events that has to be gone through from 
the beginning. This takes years, and thousands of practical problems have 
to be solved in the process.  
Also in Germany, both observers and participants in the en-
lightenment activities are unhappy with diffusion: 
· In a review of humanization activities, Bilderbeek (1987) concluded that 
the demonstrations project had high public relations value, but he 
doubted the possibilities for diffusion. 
· In their account of the changes in the German car industry towards new 
production concepts, Kern and Schumann (1984: 48, 98) see the 
humanization debate and the humanization projects in the car industry 
as irrelevant for the changes. 
· Looking back at the Humanization of Working Life program, a decade 
later, Schumann (1993: 190) wrote: "The teamwork concept did hardly 
go beyond the experimental field and it did not get widespread. As an 
alternative concept for the tested Taylorist organization of work, it did 
not develop enough power." 
· According to Schneider (1990: 45) of the DGB (Trade Union Confe-
rence) the program convincingly demonstrated "the possibility for re-
alizing conditions of work that are adapted to the human scale", but he 
added that the program "produced many disappointments from the 
point of view of the expected contribution to the improvement of 
working conditions". 
· Representing IG Metall, Drinkuth (1992: 42) noted that "lacking im-
pulses and structures for putting partly outstanding research results into 
practice and to diffuse these" were a large weakness of the Hu-
manization of Working Life program. 
· Altmann, Düll and Lutz (1985) interviewed fifty-nine researchers about 
Humanization of Working Life topics. Researchers tended to be critical 
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about the value of development models and test projects (star cases). 
Some researchers found that these models and projects were 
indispensable to explore possibilities for development and constraints. 
Many, however, felt that possibilities for diffusion depended on busi-
ness preconditions that were seldom made explicit. Research manager 
P. Oehlke maintains that even when these preconditions seem to be 
met, diffusion often does not come about. 
Nevertheless, a few qualifications can be made: 
1) Star cases did at least generate interest. The present study is an example. 
This interest can make an impact. 
2) Tayloristic star cases like Ford in the pre-WW II era and Toyota did 
give rise to effective diffusion. Therefore, arguments ascribing the lack 
of diffusion in anti-Tayloristic cases to the star-case-mode of diffusion 
itself may be ways to avoid facing fundamental obstacles in the way of 
the consensual alternatives movement. 
 
4.3.1 Diffusion networks 
The unsatisfactory performance of the star cases mechanism gave rise to a 
new, network based model for diffusion. An example is the Swedish 
LOM program ("Leadership, Organization, Co-determination", 1985-
1990). This program embodies the idea that the leader/followers pattern 
can be avoided by starting a set of parallel experiments while bringing 
together the participants in a network. This promotes communication 
based on equality, the idea being that everybody has something to con-
tribute and something to learn. It seems likely that lateral contacts between 
various levels of changing organizations can help bring this about. Criteria 
for admission included interest in improving working conditions and in 
co-determination. The cost of the LOM program was about SEK (Swedish 
Crowns) 100.000 per participant, for coordination and research. 
Participating firms and institutions were brought together in clusters of 
four. Each cluster conducted a starting conference in which managers, 
unionists and "ordinary" workers took part. The starting conference was 
devoted to what the participants saw as a desired development of their 
work and to the ways to achieve this. In case of fear to reveal business 
secrets, it was possible to organize a starting conference for one firm 
alone. In the period after the starting conference, attempts were made to 
arrive at definitions for projects, of which research had to be a part. The 
role of researchers was to be supportive, they were not to structure the 
projects. Because of the emphasis on developing a network between 
change-oriented individuals, the LOM program can also be seen as an 
attempt to organize a social movement. The architects of the LOM 
program did not make this comparison. They called the desired process 
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"democratic dialogue" or "discourse formation" (Gustavsen 1988: 55; Von 
Otter 1990: 3). 
However, according to Von Otter (1990: 3), the LOM program 
produced only one or two successful local networks of firms. In his of-
ficial evaluation of the program, Naschold (1992a: 130) reports that in 
practice, the instrument of clusters was hardly realized. 
In Germany too, a network based strategy for diffusion developed. 
An example is the "alliance project" ("Verbundprojekt") in the foundry 
industry. An evaluation of earlier projects had shown that "isolated 
measures did not strike home". Therefore, the project agency started an 
alliance project. Its core consists of four large foundries, each of which 
concentrated on a different aspect. Four smaller foundries try to adopt the 
solutions. Three institutes that perform supporting research provided the 
cross-linking. Regular meetings took place, hosted in turn by the 
participating companies. For some meetings, more companies from the 
industry were invited.42 
 
4.4 Developing anti-tayloristic technology 
In an article first published in 1974, Stephen Marglin (1982: 286) wrote: 
 
"Were the social sciences experimental, the methodology for de-
ciding whether or not hierarchical work organization is inseparable 
from high material productivity would be obvious. One would 
design technologies appropriate to an egalitarian work or-
ganization, and test the designs in actual operation. Experience 
would tell whether or not egalitarian work organization is utopian. 
But social science is not experimental." 
 
Nonetheless, since then, enlightenment programs made some attempts in 
this direction. Writers on organization have pointed to technologies that 
are Tayloristically biased, like CNC (computer numerical control), expert 
systems and centralistic logistical systems (see Chapter One). Some people 
are not content with just producing arguments, but have tried developing 
an anti-Tayloristic technology. Activities in this field took place in 
Sweden, funded by the MDA program and in Germany, funded by the 
Humanization of Working Life / Work and Technology program. ESPRIT, 
the European Strategic Program for Research and development in 
Information Technology program, financed one project, the "Human 
Centered CIM (Computer Integrated Manufacturing) Systems" project. 
This is an exceptional project, since the outlook of European Research & 
Development programs tends to be Tayloristic: adding ever more 
technology and moving towards more complex automation.43 
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Typically, the idea is that interdisciplinary teams with social 
scientists and computer scientists do the development work. In the 
Swedish MDA program, an interdisciplinary approach was a precondition 
for funding. 
The programs included various technical projects that tied in with 
the debate on the relation between technology and Taylorism. 
 
CNC-related projects 
As indicated earlier, the introduction of CNC entails the risk of a deepened 
separation of conception from execution. To limit this risk, efforts were 
made to adapt control systems in such a way that these become easier for 
skilled machinists to program. This helps preventing the division of labor 
between operators and programmers. And in cases where CNC is already 
in use, shop floor programming means job enrichment for operators. The 
German administration subsidized the development of a programming 
system that used a graphical interface instead of a programming language. 
The idea was to make shop floor programming more feasible by making 
use of the skills that the machinists possess. A second project went a step 
further by integrating traditional manual controls into the software. This 
enables the program to develop while the machinist produced the first 
workpiece using the manual controls. Thus, the goal was to close the gap 
between conventional control and CNC. This was part of a project aimed 
at "stabilizing" older workers in small and medium sized businesses 
(mathematical programming requires a way of thinking that skilled 
workers are not used to).44 
 
Planning systems that support decentralization of responsibility 
A relatively large proportion of the projects focuses on developing plan-
ning systems that support decentralization of responsibility. One of these 
is the planning system ACiT (Appropriate Computer integrated Tech-
nology), developed at the U.K. BICC company, as part of the Human 
Centered CIM Systems project of the European ESPRIT program. ACiT is 
a tool for capacity planning in manufacturing, i.e. for planning what 
should be done, when and at which workstation. 
 
Box 4.8 ACiT 
What makes ACiT into a "human centered" (and an anti-Tayloristic) 
program? 
- Planning with ACiT is not automatic, but interactive. The program does 
not impose solutions on the user. On the contrary, it supports decision-
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making through its simulation capability and by presenting relevant 
graphical and numerical information. 
- ACiT is meant for use in organizations that have delegated part of the 
planning activities to production cells or teams on the level of the shop 
floor. 
In ACiT, planning takes place on two levels. At the highest level, that of 
the central planning department, planners make a rough capacity planning 
and allocate work over the various production departments or cells. 
The lower level is that at the production department or cell. Here, workers 
perform an exact scheduling of work, based on locally gathered data, and 
monitor whether production proceeds according to schedule. This 
approach enables planners at the high level to concentrate on satisfying 
customer demands, without getting bogged down in detail planning. 
ACiT runs on small computers that are linked by a local area network. Its 
main parts are two modules, the "Factory Planner" for the central planning 
department and the "Cell Scheduler" for the semi-autonomous production 
cells.45 
 
The Factory Planner 
Let's suppose that new orders arrive at the central planning department. To 
fit these orders in, planners can use the Factory Planner to view a model 
of the entire factory. In this model, every cell or department is a separate 
production resource, basically as a black box. The Factory Planner shows 
the workload of all cells in the coming period. Bottlenecks stand out in 
red. The planners give the new orders the status of "provisional" and enter 
them into the model, allocating them over the cells. By simulating, they 
can plan backward from a given delivery date to arrive at an optimal 
rough capacity planning. The rough capacity plan results in lists of 
provisional orders that are made available to the Cell Scheduler modules 
that are running on computers in the various cells. 
 
The Cell Scheduler 
The Cell Scheduler can retrieve the list of provisional orders that are 
assigned to that particular cell. Workers can use it to produce a schedule 
of the various operations that will take place in the cell's machines of 
workstations. They can enter constraints, for example, that a certain 
machine is not available during a certain period. By simulating the work in 
the cell, they can assess whether the raw planning, made by the central 
planning department, is realistic. The Cell Scheduler allows the user to 
choose between several algorithms to produce schedules. Apart from 
using algorithms, it is possible to create a schedule manually. 
ACiT represents the chosen schedule in a Gantt chart, showing jobs as 
bars located along a time axis. By simulating alternatives, workers can 
arrive at an optimal schedule. 
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When the workers in the cells signal to the planning department that the 
proposed rough production plan is realistic, the central planners can turn 
provisional orders into definitive ones. In the cells, the Cell Schedulers 
use these definitive orders to make final adjustments to the schedule and 
to print lists of operations for the various machines. In case of an un-
foreseen difficulty, simulation of the production process in the cell 
scheduler makes it possible to find a solution. The Cell Scheduler helps 
tracking the execution of the plan by means of links with manual or 
automatic data collection systems. 
The simulation capabilities of the Cell Scheduler are far-reaching. For 
example, users can easily add a hypothetical extra machine to the model 
and find out what the effect on the lead time would be. The features of the 
Cell Scheduler should make it possible to make use of the local 
knowledge that workers in the cell possess, and to develop this knowledge 
further.  
 
Visual programming tools 
Another MDA project deals with computer support for creative work. 
This project is not, in the first place, directed at the elite that already 
enjoys creative work: "On the contrary, an attempt is being made to 
demonstrate the opportunities available to enrich and upgrade the level of 
expertise in jobs which, at present levels of applied technology, are both 
repetitive and impoverished". One of the areas in which this is attempted 
is "visual programming" (programming by manipulating visual 
representations on the screen). "The intention is to develop such methods 
not only for use by professional programmers but also for the benefit of 
occupational groups where no programming takes place at present, but 
where it could represent an enriching input into the work in question." 
(MDA 1989: 1) 
Development of CNC programming tool for machinists, decentralized 
planning systems, and tools aimed at job enrichment by adding pro-
gramming tasks, fits in closely with the debate on the relationship between 
technology and Taylorism.46 
4.4.2 Making an impact 
Most of the technology projects result in methods laid down in learned 
papers and/or in prototypes. The aim of these projects is to improve the 
content of jobs indirectly. For example, research results can be used in the 
training of future managers.47 
Changing software developers' attitudes is an implicit goal of the 
German Work and Technology Program (Gorny 1992). The desired at-
titude involves "systematically taking into account human-centered design 
goals". Developers should build into their products leeway for the users to 
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decide how to carry out their work and to enable the users to shape the 
labor process. 
Schwab (1992) notes that in industry, the idea of user participation 
tends to have a restricted value. Developers tend to underestimate the pay-
off of user participation. In humanization projects, on the other hand, user 
participation  involves preparation and support through education. It also 
entails ample time allotment and a symmetrical balance of influence 
between systems developers and users.48  
There are serious limitations to the strategy to achieve change in the 
workplace by educating software developers: software is a global 
business; Europe is a net importer of software. 
Apart from these indirect interventions, there are projects that take a 
more direct approach to social change by trying to develop marketable 
products.   
Typically, these projects involve companies that are focused to-
wards marketing and towards developing marketable (software) products. 
According to an evaluation of German humanization projects in the area 
of software (Gorny 1992), this is necessary because scientists do not know 
how to sell.49 
The cooperation between scientists and commercial developers is 
not necessarily trouble-free, since they have different interests. In one 
project, developers were very dissatisfied with the attitude of some of the 
scientists, who were busy working on a book rather than aiding in the 
practical work (scientists from another country helped out). On top of 
that, the book fails to mention the resulting marketable product at all. 
A further step towards success in the marketplace is to establish 
links with organizations  that have a need for the intended product. This 
helps to get inspiration as to what features to include in the design. 
Getting user organizations involved is a double-edged sword. It 
does not only give inspiration but it also provides demonstration cases that 
can help to establish to product on the marketplace. In the case of ACiT, 
this went wrong.  BICC management pushed out ACiT's developers, in 
favor of the development of Taylorist planning systems based an artificial 
intelligence techniques. 
The developers of ACiT formed their own company, Human 
Centered Systems, but had to scramble to find organizations that would be 
willing to be the first to try out the new product. 
The German Planleit project (also aiming to develop a planning 
system) involved an extensive network of participating user organizations. 
The input of all these firms led to too much functionality in the finished 
product, making it too difficult for skilled workers to use. Even scientists, 
specialized in designing planning systems, needed a few days to climb the 
learning curve. 
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The harvest in terms of software projects that enjoy some measure 
of success in the market is small: three cases out of a total of fifteen.50 It 
would be wrong to attribute this to the specific non-Tayloristic character 
of the projects. EEC/EU information technology projects in general are 
known for lack of success in the marketplace.51 For purely commercial 
technical projects as well, the road to success in the marketplace is 
perilous. Notable casualties are IBM's Displaywrite word processing 
program and Philips' V2000 video system. 
Even if the project leads to a product that finds its way into the 
marketplace, this does not necessarily mean that the humanization goal is 
being achieved. Humanization projects in the field of software run the risk 
of resulting in products that may be very usable, but that do not promote 
social change in the workplace. For example, the final report on the 
change project in the Rietbergwerke states that an information system will 
be implemented that supports decentralized coordination. But a visit, 
several years after the appearance of the report, made clear that the system 
was indeed in use, but that it did not fulfill its intended role in promoting 
decentralized coordination. The manager told that "there was nothing 
humanizing about the system". The design of the system allowed every 
worker access to the data, but it simply did not happen that, for example, a 
welder would use it. Welders would just ask for information that they 
needed, because they found that easier. 
Schnepel-Boomgaarden (1991: 92-93) warns that it is possible to 
use software systems in ways that runs counter to the original goal. Es-
pecially "humanized" software is vulnerable in this respect, because it tries 
not to force the user into a passive role.52 
Developers can try to avoid non-humanizing use by creating 
"religious" software, that presupposes a certain humanized way of 
working. By way of its two level structure, ACiT fits in closely with an 
organization that has decentralized planning. But even ACiT can be used 
for centralized planning. One customer had asked ACiT's developers to 
give the program the capability to try all built-in scheduling algorithms, 
choosing automatically the solution that leads to the fastest completion. 
This would only have required a few extra lines of code, but the chief 
developer refused, because it would violate the Human Centered 
philosophy.53 
The problem with religious software is that it aims for a niche 
market. ACiT's target market consists of manufacturing companies with a 
cell-based organization and decentralized detail planning, that are also 
ready to introduce computerized planning tool on the shopfloor. Com-
panies that showed interest in ACiT did not have the cell-based organi-
zation, while in many cell-based organizations there was no interest in a 
computerized planning tool for the shopfloor.54 In these organizations, 
managers felt that manual planning systems were adequate. 
 enlightenment 75  
Finally, there is a risk that projects spend humanization resources 
on a type of product that not-ideologically motivated companies are likely 
to provide as well. A case in point is visual programming. The MDA 
program was active in this area, while Microsoft and Borland were doing 
the same. 
 
4.5 Subsidizing firms for implementing alternative organization 
models 
Within the framework of consensual policy, subsidizing firms for im-
plementing changes away from Taylorism seems odd, because these 
changes must be profitable by themselves. Nonetheless, subsidies do exist, 
Germany being the biggest spender. Since the start of the Humanization of 
Working Life program in 1974, the German government spent in the order 
of 100 million DM per year on change projects. Right from the start, 
participating firms had to bear half the cost. In this way, the Humanization 
of Working Life program gave expression to the tension between 
economic rationality and government intervention. Subsidies enable the 
state to impose conditions. One of these conditions was that to every 
change project, there had to be coupled a supporting social research 
project ("Begleitforschung"). This allowed social researchers access to 
companies and it made it easier for managers to acquaint themselves with 
applied social science knowledge. 
Subsidized and non-subsidized projects are not two worlds apart. 
Both categories involve the same range of issues: alleviation of technical 
discipline, job enlargement, job enrichment, decentralization of respon-
sibility and participation. This implies that subsidizing does not open up 
an entirely new realm of possibilities. 
But are subsidies an effective catalyst for change? Official 
evaluations are a logical starting point for finding an answer. In Germany, 
the Batelle Institute embarked on a one million DM evaluation study on 
the Humanization of Working Life program. However, results from this 
study were never made public. Doing a comprehensive evaluation of the 
program must be a daunting task, considering that there were 1925 
different projects in the period 1974-1991. 
In the Humanization of Working Life program, it was not common 
practice to evaluate projects a few years after the intervention, to see if the 
effect persists. The program agency could only insist on this, when it was 
agreed upon in advance. Normally, this is not the case. According to a 
research manager, it is "difficult or impossible" to get grants for this type 
of evaluation. A rare case was an evaluation by F. Weltz of one of his 
projects in office work. He found that there was not a single trace left of 
his originally successful project. Also subject to evaluation are projects in 
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the foundry sector. These projects took place from 1974 till 1982. As late 
as 1992, there was permanent monitoring to see whether installations are 
really in use and are not rusting away. 
By and large, the official evaluations that were available did not 
answer the question whether enlightenment programs are an effective 
catalyst for change. However, there was one exception to the underde-
veloped state of evaluation. For the relatively small (total cost: fifty 
million SEK) Swedish LOM program, a comprehensive evaluation does 
exist. In this program, 148 organizations participated, ten of these dropped 
out along the way. In eight cases, there was some impact in the area of 
organization (Naschold 1992a: 8).55  
The dataset, accumulated for the present study, made it possible to 
compare subsidized with non-subsidized cases. It turned out that among 
the non-subsidized projects, there is a significantly larger proportion that 
shows job enlargement (i.e. adding more tasks without raising the overall 
level of skill required), than there is among the subsidized projects.56  
An explanation is, that job enlargement is merely a fast, direct route 
to labor costs reduction (and a modification of Taylorism rather than a 
break with it). This difference between subsidized and non-subsidized 
project suggests that subsidizing may help pulling projects off that initially 
do not promise an obvious financial gain through labor cost saving. 
Some authors warn for "take-away effects" (Naschold 1992a: 122). 
Clear examples, however, were far and few between. There was one case 
at the beginning of the Humanization of Working Life program where an 
already existing project got subsidized.57 
Of the many cases that show productive effects of subsidized ac-
tivities, generally it is difficult to say whether these activities would have 
happened had these not been subsidized. In a few cases, however, 
interviewees pointed to facilities that would not have come into existence 
without subsidies. At Felten & Guillaume, subsidies made broad training 
possible. After the project, broad training is no longer available. Training 
is now restricted to learning specific new technology. In the Halmstad 
County Hospital, one extra worker was needed to start working in teams. 
Local politicians provided funding.58 
4.6 The political level: Institutionalization of humanization policy 
Up to this point, we have looked at two levels of anti-Tayloristic policy. 
The first level consists of what managers and workers are accomplishing 
inside consensual alternatives. The second level entails the activities of 
researcher-consultants, who support consensual alternatives. Now we 
move on to the third level, that of political activities designed to enable 
and sustain the activities on the second level. 
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A long-term effect of policies to promote, support and subsidize 
change in the workplace is institutionalization of humanization. This is the 
case in the Humanization of Working Life program. Auer, Tergeist and 
Penth (1983: 12) observe that the term "humanization of working life" has 
become "an element of everyday speech with union officials, employers, 
government officials and media". They describe "Humanization policy" as 
a "political alliance, that includes unions, employers' organizations, the 
state apparatus and the science system". According to Paul Oehlke, a 
decisive effect of the program is that a far-reaching consensus developed 
between employers and unions about wishes in the area of humanization. 
IG Metall's A. Drinkuth noted (in 1994) that in the course of fifty 
post-WW II years, a culture developed between employers and unions, in 
which the parties are able to trust each other. "In this culture, it is the 
arguments that are being listened to. Who is saying what, is less im-
portant", Drinkuth said, "it is a space outside the class struggle". The 
Humanization of Working Life Program exploits this space. Drinkuth 
credits union influence for the continued existence of the program, stating 
that IG Metall was successful in getting the importance of the program 
across to politicians.59 
The strength of consensus on the need for humanization policy is 
evident in the history of the Humanization of Working Life Program. It 
suffered attacks from several sides, but its basic approach remained un-
scathed. 
In the mid 1970's, following experiments in engine assembly at 
Volkswagen60, IG Metall opposed the introduction of semi-autonomous 
teams. Reasons were:  
· A system of semi-autonomous teams would mean competition for the 
system of co-determination (the union had to protect the powerful 
works council chairpersons); 
· Fear that weaker workers would be pushed out (the "Olympiareife 
Mannschaft"); 
· Uncertainty about new wage systems.  
This opposition caused the term "semi-autonomous teams" to vanish from 
the program's dictionary, to be replaced by "work structuring". The 
content of the program, however, did not change by this. 
In 1979, IG Metall complained that the program had brought hardly 
any improvements for its members but instead brought some de-
terioration, among which speedups without wage increase and jobs being 
rationalized away (Wilfert 1984: 56). On the other hand, employers felt 
that in its early days, the program worked exclusively in the interests of 
the employees (Heß 1993: 38). From their point of view, there was not 
enough recognition of the relation between the goal of humanization and 
economic efficiency. They criticized unions for putting humanization 
before efficiency and for wanting to lay down work content and skill 
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levels in advance and thereby to pre-program wage increases (Wilfert 
1984: 48-58). Furthermore, radical social scientists irritated employers. 
This feeling was expressed by P. Wilfert (1984: 58) who wrote, in an 
"Employer's Assessment": 
 
"Social scientists often seek to bring about thorough-going 
changes in society and use their scientific work in the humaniza-
tion projects to raise the worker's willingness to raise their de-
mands. This can be authenticated by declarations such as: 'In-
creasing worker's readiness to fight to achieve their interests is the 
key precondition for realizing the concept of work humanization 
which aims equally at a structural change in the conditions of 
work and society'. Or: 'The researcher cannot be shut out of the 
world of conflicting interest; hence he must ask himself who will 
benefit from his work and who is harmed by it; and he must adapt 
his way of acting accordingly'". 
 
The employers' organization BDA demanded that: 
 
"Research on work sciences, especially in the field of the social 
sciences, must not unilaterally side with the presumed interests of 
the workers". 
 
In Parliament, the Christian Democratic parties (CDU and CSU) appeared 
receptive to the employers' views. However, the employers did not want to 
see the program discontinued. When the Christian Democrats came to 
power in 1982, both employers' organizations and unions spoke for 
continuation. In fact, in 1983, the new government decided to retain the 
program, but it stipulated that the program should support the integration 
of humanization and innovation (Dankbaar 1986: 42). The intention was 
to restrict subsidies to projects that promised economically viable results. 
But the program's Advisory Board was not ready to reject proposals on 
grounds of economic viability. The Board noted that: 
 
"Proof of economic viability of projects around humanization is 
necessary. But this should be based on the same type of criteria as 
used in areas like advertising, research and development. In those 
areas as well, it is difficult to estimate the specific contribution to 
the firm's performance." (Dankbaar 1986: 43) 
 
In 1987, there was a new wave of criticism from the Christian Democratic 
fraction in Parliament. Points of criticism were that subsidies went to large 
firms and to unions and that the social research was of questionable 
quality. 
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This criticism led to the replacement of the "Humanization of 
Working Life" program by a new program "Work and Technology". 
However, apart from the changed name, there was continuity between the 
two programs. Some observers perceived in the history of the German 
enlightenment programs a de-radicalization and a shift from humanization 
to effectiveness.61 This may be so at the level of ideology, but there was no 
evidence that this was the case in terms of impact at the level of the shop 
floor. 
In Scandinavia, institutionalization of humanization policy took 
place as well. In Sweden, in 1972, the Arbetsmiljöfonden (Work Envi-
ronment Fund) was created. This organization is engaged in education and 
in the setting-up of development programs aimed at using new technology 
in such a way, that democracy and participation on the shop floor are 
promoted, and worker satisfaction and skill levels are raised (Gill 1985: 
146-147). The work environment fund is, with consent of the unions, 
largely financed by the employers in the form of a levy on wages. 
This involves around SEK 500 million a year (Gill 1985: 146). In 
connection with the Co-determination Act in 1977 the Arbetslivscentrum 
(ALC, Swedish Centre for Working Life) was created, financed by Ar-
betsmiljöfonden. (ALC later became the Institutet för arbetslivsforskning - 
ALFI, The Swedish Institute for Work Life Research.) 
The center was to deal with co-determination issues via research, 
dissemination of information and consultancy. The government proposal 
specifies that the research should, for a large part, consist of action re-
search. The Arbetslivscentrum is controlled by a supervisory board with 
representatives of unions, employers and the Swedish state. The Work 
Environment Fund financed programs as diverse as the LOM program and 
the Development Program. 
The institutionalization of humanization policy helps diffusion of 
organizational innovations. It leads to an increased visibility of the hu-
manization debate and draws opinion leaders among managers into it. 
Furthermore, it helps provide "cues-to-action" - events that cause a fa-
vorable attitude to crystallize into overt behavior change (Rogers 1983: 
222). A research manager explains how such a cue-to-action can come 
about: 
 
"A head of a department, who wants to go higher up, contacts a 
scientist that he knows, or the other way around. They get together 
and draft a proposal. When the board of directors takes a 
favorable view, a grant is applied for. In this way, a successful 
project can develop." 
 
Continuous funding, as it exists in Sweden and in Germany since 1972 
and 1974 respectively, provides for a constant impetus for change ac-
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tivities. In The Netherlands, where no comparable funding was available, 
change activities came in waves. The first wave died out in the mid 1970's. 
A second wave developed in the late 1980's. According to Van Klaveren 
(1994: 13), Dutch quality of working life policy is not very "crisis 
resistant". 
International comparative literature indicates that in the U.K., there 
was relatively little activity to change working organizations (Auer en 
Engel 1983: 105, Gill 1985, Den Hertog and Schröder 1989). Explanations 
point in the direction of antagonistic industrial relations.  
4.7 Conclusion 
Taken together, there is, especially in Scandinavia and in Germany, a good 
match between, on the one hand, the requirements posed by initiatives to 
create consensual alternatives and, on the other hand, enlightenment 
activities. By replacing the star cases diffusion mechanism with the 
network based diffusion mechanism policy makers showed a capability 
for innovation.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  CONSENSUAL ALTERNATIVES: 
ACHIEVEMENTS IN JOB DESIGN 
 
Job design is the final touchstone for determining whether anti-Tayloristic 
policies are successful. This chapter presents the outcomes in terms of job 
design  of the consensual stream of anti-Tayloristic policy. To recapitulate: 
the mechanism for change in the consensual stream is the consensual 
alternative, that is, managers and organization experts creating an 
alternative inside their own organizations, with the support of workers' 
representatives. External enlightenment policies link up with the dynamic 
of consensual alternatives, trying to stimulate their genesis and to support 
their development. This chapter evaluates the outcomes of the entire chain 
of activities that start with enlightenment (independent variable), runs 
through the development of consensual alternatives (bridging variable) 
and ends with the dependent variable de-Taylorization of jobs. The 
previous chapter offered an assessment of the contributions of the various 
types of enlightenment policies, now the entire chain is taken as a whole. I 
surveyed sixty-two cases of consensual alternatives (these were the cases 
for which sufficient information was available) for indications of shifts 
away from Taylorism at the shop floor level. 62 The observed changes fall 
into five categories: 
· alleviation of technical discipline; 
· job enlargement; 
· job enrichment; 
· decentralization of responsibility; 
· participation. 
 
5.1 Alleviation of technical discipline 
Initiatives involving alleviation of technical discipline took place mainly in 
the electronics, electrical equipment and automotive industries. Fig. 5.1 
gives an overview of the various forms. The prime target for change was 
the assembly line. Some initiatives did not go further than modifying the 
assembly line concept. Other initiatives entailed abandoning the assembly 
line concept altogether. 
A slight modification of the assembly line concept is the intro-
duction of buffers, thereby insulating workers from the pace of the line. 
Examples are an experiment in the 1970's by Bosch with buffers in 
dishwasher production, and the introduction by AEG-Telefunken of 
buffers in electric motor assembly. 
A second type of modification is the use of AGV's (Automated 
Guided Vehicle), computers controlled carriers, instead of the traditional 
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assembly line. In the Volvo car plant in Kalmar, AGV's moved the cars 
being assembled from work station to work station. The production line 
was subdivided into sections. Each section was manned by a team of 15 - 
20 persons. Per section, the work was split up over four or five work 
stations, successively attended by the AGV. Workers could follow the 
AGV along the work stations within their section, doing all the work to be 
carried out within that section (Agurén et al. 1984, Berggren 1989). In the 
early 1970's, Volvo started in Sweden with engine assembly using AGV's 
as well, in its Skövde plant. 
A third modification in the assembly line concept is dock assembly. 
In dock assembly, objects can be taken out of the flow, to be worked 
upon for a longer period. Volvo Kalmar used this method in conjunction 
with the AGV system. This meant that the AGV could be brought to a stop 
at a work station for a longer time to enable a more extensive task to be 
carried out. This system was aimed at stimulating group work (Agurén et 
al. 1984, Berggren 1989). 
Mercedes-Benz uses AGV's and docks in its Bremen plant in the 
production phase in which workers install the wiring into the C class cars. 
For mounting folding tops and installing wiring in the SL sportscar, 
Mercedes uses "star boxes". In this system, cars come from above and 
turn into empty docks. When the job is done, the worker signals that the 
car can re-enter the stream. 
At DAF Trucks, attempts to get rid of the assembly lines are res-
tricted to one experiment with dock assembly. In this experiment, workers 
take some of the engines, that are finished as far as the inside is 
concerned, off the line and put these in stationary docks. Then they 
complete the engine by attaching external parts. This experimental set-up 
allows comparison between line assembly and dock assembly. The 
completion phase is relatively amenable to dock assembly since there is a 
considerable variation between engines in terms of external parts. As-
sembly of the interior parts will continue to take place on a line, because 
of the use of expensive machinery. 
Comparable arrangements exist for assembling smaller items, like 
electrical appliances. In the 1970's, the Bosch group experimented with 
several ways to assemble loudspeakers in groups rather than on an as-
sembly line. The alternative lay-outs featured work stations grouped to-
gether. This saved the workers from the strain of being paced by the as-
sembly line. Furthermore, their tasks became somewhat wider. Other 
experiments were in the areas of sub-assemblies for color television sets 
and electrical hand tools. Group assembly of remote control units showed 
that large series could be effectively produced without an assembly line. 
In all these modifications of the assembly line concept, products 
under construction move from work station to work station. Abandoning 
the assembly line concept implies keeping the object being assembled in 
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one place. In the 1970's, Bosch experimented with a system in which all 
workers assembled entire car radios. AEG introduced complete assembly 
of power drills to replace assembly line production. One of the stated 
goals was enhancing flexibility so that two models could share the same 
production facilities (Klingenberg and Kränzle 1986: 29-38). 
In the early 1970's, Volkswagen experimented with complete as-
sembly of gasoline engines. Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz, producer of diesel 
engines, changed from an assembly line over to "assembly islands". The 
change was motivated balancing losses and a need for more flexibility. 
This was not an experiment, but a real change (Klingenberg and Kränzle 
1986: 39-50). 
In car assembly, the traditional lion's den of Fordism and Tay-
lorism, Volvo took the most radical step with its new plant in Uddevalla. 
This factory was subdivided into six analogously operating mini-factories 
in which the assembly took place. Each car was assembled in one place, 
that is, without being moved from that place. Apart from the six mini-
factories, there was a central warehouse. Thus, the organization of 
assembly was decentralized, the supply of materials was centralized. The 
mini-factories were supplied with the bodywork, already painted and 
made in Gothenburg. The further components necessary to assemble the 
car on the basis of the bodywork were collected in the warehouse and 
delivered at the bodywork as a kit by an AGV. Assembling was carried 
out by teams of eight to ten persons, working together on four cars at the 
same time. 
Nearly all initiatives that involve alleviation of technical discipline 
aim to modify or to replace assembly lines. In two cases, Volvo's "E" 
engine plant in Skövde (Gyllenhammar 1977: 109) and tin can factory 
TDV in The Netherlands, there were changes that saved workers from 
being tied to one machine. This granted them at least some freedom of 
movement. Consensual alternatives that involve abandoning computerized 
disciplinary systems, like the systems that control warehouse workers, 
were not to be found. 
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Fig. 5. 1 Forms of alleviation of technical discipline in consensual al-
ternatives 
 
5.2 Job enlargement 
A way to push back system losses is "job enlargement". Job enlargement 
means assigning to workers additional tasks, that do not require a higher 
level of skill than the original task.63 It does not represent a break with 
Taylorism, rather a modification of it. As such, it fits into an array of 
strategies to compensate for the dysfunctions of Taylorism: high wages, a 
positive corporate image, a pleasant working environment might 
compensate for inherent boredom and meaninglessness. 
While job enlargement increases variety in work content, it may can lead 
to job degradation when lower-quality tasks are added. As an example, 
crane operators in the Port of Rotterdam are generally not enthusiastic 
about job rotation, since operating a crane is the most craved for and best 
paid of all operational jobs. A dockworker analyzed this as follows: 
 
"In fact everyone is a terminal worker. The consequence is that 
you can be assigned to any task, in the sense that a skilled person, 
for example, a van-carrier driver, can be employed as a lasher, 
while a lasher, when there are not enough van-carrier drivers, can 
not be employed, because he does not know the work. Thus, it is a 
trick to make skilled people do unskilled work." (Gezamenlijk 
Aktiekomité van Rotterdamse Havenarbeiders 1979: 24) 
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Typically, alternatives to the classic assembly line entail some job en-
largement. Tasks become somewhat wider, but not necessarily more 
complex. For example, the evaluation report on an experiment in loud-
speaker assembly at Bosch describes the change as "stringing together the 
easiest tasks" (Heinrich and Schäfer 1982: 83). A convenient indicator for 
this type of job enlargement is the change in work cycle time. A Philips 
publication on work structuring states: 
 
"In the old arrangements, job cycles of five to ten seconds were no 
exception. Among eight different experiments, cases were found in 
which job cycles were extended to ten or twenty minutes and even 
to more than one hour." (Philips 1968: 9) 
 
An evaluation of German humanization projects in the period 1974-1980 
showed that on the average, work cycle times doubled (Projektträger 
"Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens" 1981: 93). For the relevant cases in the 
present study (for which information on cycle times was available), see 
Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Cycle times before and after change 
Initiative Cycle time 
before 
change 
Cycle time after 
change 
AEG-Telefunken electric 
motor assembly (AEG-Tele-
funken 1983b) 
48 seconds 96 seconds 
Bosch-Siemens washing ma-
chine assembly (Wexlberger 
1984, Klingenberg and 
Kränzle 1986: 67-90) 
2 minutes 4 minutes 
Philips TV assembly in 
groups of 7 instead of line 
with 30 workers (Den Hertog 
1975: 85-92) 
3.5 minutes 20 minutes 
Philips - groups of 3 instead 
of line (Philips 1968: 33-35) 
50 seconds 13 minutes 
 
In lean car plants, work cycles are generally around one minute (Womack, 
Roos and Jones 1990: 101). Table 5.2 shows that longer cycles may be 
achieved. 
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Table 5.2 Cases in the automobile industry 
initiative cycle time  
Volvo Skövde, engine as-
sembly using AGV's 
(Forslin 1992: 13) 
2 - 20 minutes 
Volvo Vara, engine as-
sembly - one worker as-
sembles two half engines 
per day (Forslin 1992) 
4 hours 
Volvo Kalmar, car assem-
bly using AGV's (Berggren 
1989: 183) 
maximally 25 minutes, when workers 
followed the AGV along the work stations 
within their section, doing all the work to 
be carried out within that section. 
Volvo Uddevalla, complete 
car assembly  
several hours 
Mercedes-Benz Bremen, 
installing soft top and 
wiring in SL sportscar 
using "star box" arrange-
ment (dock assembly) 
> 1 hour 
 
 
In addition to lengthened work cycles, three more types of job enlarge-
ment were in evidence (Fig. 5.2). Institutionalized cooperation can serve 
to enlarge jobs. An example from the 1960's is the Industrial Democracy 
Project in the Hotel Caledonien in Kristiansand (Norway) (Gustavsen and 
Hunnius 1981: 51-56). One of the changes introduced was that in the grill 
restaurant, waiters en cooks shared responsibility for cooking and serving. 
A formal way to organize job enlargement is job rotation.64 A case that 
combines job rotation with a sort of dock assembly is the first pilot project 
on teamworking at Mercedes-Benz in Bremen. This project takes place in 
the phase where pre-assembled T and SL engines are completed by 
mounting hoses and several other parts. Before the project, assembling 
took place on a line, with the engines sitting on carts, that were pulled. T 
and SL engines shared this same line. This was not efficient, since the SL 
(station car) engine required more work than the engine for the T model 
(sportscar). In this situation, workers rotated tasks. The pilot project 
involved moving the work on the SL engine from the line to newly 
created "boxes". Boxes are floor areas which are separated by racks filled 
with materials. The team takes care of assembling, transportation and 
collection of parts. Management demanded job rotation, and this worked 
out. The team members themselves proposed to discard the line altogether 
and to perform all assembly work in boxes. In their solution, each box has 
room for two engines at a time. All nine workers have the same 
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qualifications. All have obtained a driver's license for the electrical 
transportation vehicle. There is always one worker who collects parts and 
one worker who does the transportation. All tasks rotate. 
Finally, there is the possibility that workers take over tasks that had 
formerly been part of jobs that no longer exist in the organization. For 
example, in the Hotel Caledonien, waiters started allocating guests to 
tables. Formerly, this had been part of the headwaiter's job, a job that was 
eliminated. Job enlargement (not job enrichment) in the German Prozos 
project in social security administration was of the same type. One of the 
goals was to make the job of the social security officer more complete. 
This meant that one officer had to be capable of performing all tasks, 
from registration of data to payment of benefits. This is job enlargement 
rather than job enrichment, since the additional tasks are simpler in nature 
than the older tasks. In the old organization structure, there were no 
specialists for difficult cases or for difficult parts of the process. There 
were clerical workers who handled chores like the typing of letters. Their 
tasks were integrated into the job of the social security officer. (The 
displaced workers did not become social security clients themselves, since 
there were jobs elsewhere for them.) 
 
 
Fig. 5. 2 Job enlargement 
 
5.3 Job enrichment 
Quite apart from compensatory strategies like job enlargement, there are 
ways to break out of the Tayloristic patterns. Job enrichment is a strategy 
that does exactly this. Job enrichment is a movement in the opposite 
direction of separation of conception from execution. The essential 
criterion for job enrichment is that the required skill level increases. Job 
enrichment entails the addition of more interesting (complex) tasks such 
as elements of planning, work preparation, control, and support.  
A way to achieve job enrichment is to combine previously divided 
tasks. Ceteris paribus, job enrichment for one worker means job impo-
verishment for another. This risk was clearly present in the Volvo Ud-
devalla project. Because a complete component kit was made up for each 
car, there was much more warehouse work at the Uddevalla plant than in 
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a conventional factory. In principle, this could have implied that the 
quality of work gained in the assembly would be lost again in the 
warehouse, because of the increase of dull operations to be carried out 
there. This risk was taken into consideration in the set-up of the material-
handling system. 
It would have been too expensive to automate all routine operations 
at the warehouse. In fact, the only thing automated was the collecting of 
quantities of small components. Consequently, there was still a lot of 
manual work, and it was mainly organizational measures that had to 
ensure an acceptable quality of work at the warehouse. Thus, it was 
decided to let some of the assembly work take place at the warehouse: rear 
axles, front members and exhaust systems were pre-assembled there. 
In the warehouse, the employees were organized in teams. Tasks 
rotated so that the task of composing the component kits alternated with 
replenishing stocks (fork-lift truck) and putting together the "pre-assem-
blies". Buffers introduced into the material-handling system helped create 
some latitude in the operational process. At the SKF D3 factory, an 
engineer indicated that his job has, as a result of the enrichment of 
operator's jobs, become so narrow that he himself would eventually like to 
get job enrichment (Hellstrand 1989: 17). 
If, however, new developments bring new, interesting tasks to the 
organization, this offers the opportunity to arrive at a redistribution of 
tasks that benefits all.  
 
Box 5.1 Software development as an opportunity for job enrichment 
Increasingly, the software industry turns out products that aim at making 
programming easier. "Programming" in this context does not only mean 
the creating of applications, but also customizing ready-made applications. 
Since the beginning of software technology, there has been a strong 
tendency to use the computer to alleviate the problems of programming. 
An important step was the development of "high level" or third generation 
programming languages, like COBOL, in the 1950's and 1960's. These 
languages insulate the programmer from the complexities of the hardware. 
In the 1970's and 1980's, a new era followed with the introduction of 
database management systems like ORACLE and dBase. A database 
management system (DBMS for short) is a computer program which 
serves as a tool for storing data in a database, for retrieving information 
from it and for keeping it up to date. The advent of the DBMS made 
creating information systems a much less technical affair (Pruijt 1993). 
Graphical tools that allow users to program without writing code, can take 
the development towards user programming a step further. Apart from 
this, many off-the-shelf applications feature programming tools that 
enable user to customize them. 
 achievements in job design 89  
Traditionally, there exists a strict division of labor between "users" and 
computer professionals. An explanation for this is the level of skill that 
programming required, and the time-consuming character that pro-
gramming once necessarily had. Since then, the technical barriers for 
enriching jobs with some software development - a very direct way to 
gain more control over one's own job - are giving way.  
 
This section presents the harvest in terms of job enrichment. As an 
analytical starting point, I will use the distinction between direct and in-
direct labor (Fig 5.3). 
Job enrichment in the realm of direct labor can be summarized as a 
movement from fragmentation towards completeness. Change in 
qualification requirements is one of the items that can serve as indicators 
for job enrichment. 
 
Box 5.2 Learning and training for job enrichment: some examples 
In one experiment at Bosch, the goal was to allow (female) assembly 
workers to learn testing skills. This was not to be done through training, 
but through the design of the labor process itself, by creating "working 
structures with educational relevance". This implied that there would be 
no assembly line, and that there would be teamwork. There was a division 
of labor, but work-stations had a variable task content to accommodate 
different stages of learning. Task content of work-stations overlapped to 
encourage workers to learn from each other. Job rotation took place and 
variable buffers allowed some freedom to maneuver (Heinrich and 
Schäfer 1982: 84-114). Another experiment aimed to qualify all workers to 
assemble an entire radio, to test it and to package it. The works council 
remarked that the groups did not have any indirect tasks. In this 
experiment, training did take place (Heinrich and Schäfer 1982). 
At Felten & Guillaume, the job enrichment required training: technical 
courses, product specific knowledge and communication skills. Workers 
were used to just receive orders, and now they had to make mutual 
agreements. They had to learn this. 
In Volvo's Uddevalla plant, apart from practical training, employees re-
ceived a three-day computer training course given by fellow employees. 
Employees also learned a few things about ergonomics and fire safety. 
Furthermore, they learned how to estimate the amount of time they need 
to carry out certain operations. 
IHC provides training to make workers multiskilled, both within their 
fields and outside. For instance, an ironworker gets a welding course and 
the other way around. For coordinators, there are courses in guidance and 
management. These are general courses that have been adapted for use at 
IHC. Every course that is completed successfully leads to a pay 
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supplement. Policies regarding access to the courses vary. In the machine 
factory, access to training is restricted to control wage costs. In the 
shipyard, everyone can take any course. 
In the Rietbergwerke, the training program offered seminars on planning, 
reading technical drawings (errors related to misreading decreased), 
technical matters and safety. 
At Sigma Coatings, it is the intention to train all workers to become all-
round operators. The pay system supports this, since it renumerates 
knowledge rather than performance. There was basic language training as 
well. A CITO test (a test designed for use at completion of elementary 
school) showed that a number of workers, among them several 
Dutchmen, had difficulty in reading and writing. A course  to remedy this 
had a success rate of 95 per cent. 
 
Change in pay is another item that can indicate job enrichment. To give a 
few examples: at Holec, everybody in the factory earned more - around 
200 guilders per month (as a result of the changes); at Van Nelle, operators 
moved to a higher pay scale, now reaching the same scale as maintenance 
men. For many workers at Felten & Guillaume, the change brought higher 
pay, pay being based on skills rather than on performance. 
In industrial production work, teams making complete products, 
and within these teams, workers learning to do a larger part of the work, 
can be the basis for job enrichment. In Volvo's Uddevalla plant, the 
training time required to master the assembly work was sixteen months. 
New employees learned from their fellow team members. A new 
employee on an assembly team was first given an easy task that could be 
done in one or two minutes. The more he learned, the more tasks he was 
given. After four months, he should be capable of assembling fifteen per 
cent of a car; after ten months, thirty per cent was a good result. The idea 
was that eventually everybody should be able to build thirty per cent of an 
entire car.65  
In the summer of 1990, approximately twelve employees had 
learned how to build an entire car within the standard time, meeting the 
quality requirements. However, this was not a management goal, but 
rather a matter of honor for the employees involved. 
This long learning process did not lead to marketable skills. Re-
portedly, the original intention was to train each group member to the 
level of skill of a qualified automobile mechanic (Auer and Riegler 1990: 
37). This did not materialize.  
Womack, Jones and Roos (1990: 102) criticized the designers of 
Volvo Uddevalla for a "very limited vision of job enrichment" describing 
the work as "simply bolting and screwing together a large number of parts 
in a long cycle rather than a small number in a short cycle". Their claim 
that lean production does better in this respect rests on the assumption that 
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routine jobs in lean plants will be automated away. As I have stated 
before, their own findings contradict this assumption: the most efficient 
plant in their survey was the least automated of the Japanese plants 
(Womack, Jones and Roos 1990: 94). 
Job enrichment through teams making complete products occurs in 
other industries as well. An example is the German clothing firm 
Wolfgang März, where teams of twenty workers make complete products. 
According to a report, this requires a much higher qualification and means 
more interesting work (Lütteke 1991: 53-54). In banking and insurance, a 
way to achieve job completeness is to base the division of labor not on 
operations but on categories to which customers belong. In the German 
life insurance company Aachener & Münchener Lebensversicherung, 
teams take care of all the business of all clients in a certain geographical 
area. (Before the change, a single client's business was handled by five 
different departments.) All team members are in principle qualified to deal 
with any client (Müller, Münster and Nocker 1990). In the Vereins- und 
Westbank, each back-office team handles the money transfer work for a 
specific set of branches. In this case, the level of completeness is limited 
because there are two specialist teams that deal with exceptional cases. The 
changes in this company count as job enrichment, because it proved 
necessary for workers to acquire enhanced, albeit company-specific, 
banking knowledge. Job enrichment included error correcting and 
maintaining contact with branches. 
Several cases showed an increased all-roundness of jobs as a result: 
in the IHC shipyard, the Tayloristic division of labor between marking, 
cutting, shaping, making sub-assemblies and final assembly has partly 
given way. Marking, cutting and shaping are now the province of 
all-round iron workers; a change project in a German steel works resulted 
in the formation of teams comprising sales, calculation, work preparation 
and quality assurance (Schulte-Hille w.d., Thienel, Richter and 
Zimmermann 1990); in a LOM project in an agricultural cooperation in 
Falköping (Sweden), field workers took on additional tasks like 
consulting on pesticides and credit matters (Naschold 1992b Anhang C: 
28-49). 
Finally, there are initiatives that upgrade jobs somewhat by adding 
more demanding tasks: in the Norwegian Industrial Democracy project in 
Hotel Caledonien in Kristiansand unqualified kitchen helpers started, for 
part of the time, doing more qualified work; in a steel firm in Hattingen 
(Germany), typists became sales assistants (Schulte-Hille w.d., Thienel, 
Richter and Zimmermann 1990). 
In the County Hospital of Halmstad, pairs of assistant nurses and 
nurses keep the patients' records. They discuss the patient with the 
doctors, talk to the relatives and do the social planning, i.e. they arrange 
for the care that older patients need after they leave the hospital. Especially 
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for the assistant nurses, this meant job enrichment. Notwithstanding this 
integration of tasks, there remain tasks that only regular nurses can do, 
like intravenous injections, blood transfusions, administering drugs and 
tube feeding. 
Apart from job enrichment in the realm of direct labor, it happens 
that jobs are enriched with indirect tasks. These indirect tasks can be 
management tasks or non-management tasks. Among non-management 
indirect tasks that enriched jobs were: 
· Quality control: Philips work structuring projects in light bulb and 
electronic tube assembly (Den Hertog 1975: 93-108); a 1960's change 
project in a Dutch Postgiro data-entry center involved a shift from 
external to internal quality control (Van Beinum et al. 1969, Ramondt 
1975); the diesel engine factory of Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz in Ulm 
added quality control to assembly work (Klingenberg and Kränzle 1986: 
39-50); experiments at Bosch in car radio assembly involved learning 
testing skills (Heinrich and Schäfer 1982); at the Tobacco unit of Van 
Nelle in Rotterdam, quality control was part of the teamwork; Holec 
Hengelo; at Sigma Coatings in Amsterdam, each team has its own 
laboratory for quality control and workers rotate between production 
and laboratory. 
· Maintenance: to some extent in the 1960's Industrial Democracy ex-
periment in a fertilizer plant belonging to Norsk Hydro (Thorsrud et. al. 
1976: 437).; the SKF D3 bearing plant in Gothenburg (Hellstrand 1989, 
Sandberg et al. 1992: 81-82); Holec Hengelo; Sigma Coatings in 
Amsterdam. 
· CNC programming: at Felten & Guillaume, machine operators take care 
of all CNC programming; at DAF Trucks, most of CNC programming 
takes place in the cells. 
· Adapting CNC programs: Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen (ZF) 
(Schultz-Wild et al. 1986: 522); in case operators at DAF Trucks do not 
program themselves, they can at least adapt the programs that they use. 
· Machine-setting and pre-adjusting: diesel engine factory of Klöck-
ner-Humboldt-Deutz; DAF Trucks; Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen (ZF). 
· Administration: Philips work structuring project in light bulb assembly. 
At Sigma coatings, in each product group there is an information 
assistant, who is responsible for updating the SAP information systems. 
This task rotates among operational workers who are suitably qualified. 
In 1993 ten out of the 200 operational workers had qualified themselves 
for this job. 
· Logistics: Holec Hengelo. 
· Repair work: the SKF D3 bearing plant in Gothenburg. 
· Requisitioning components: SKF D3 bearing plant in Gothenburg. 
· Financial tasks: in the Hotel Caledonien, waiters handled day-to-day 
economic control (Gustavsen and Hunnius 1981: 51-56). 
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· Training new employees: SKF D3 bearing plant in Gothenburg; Volvo 
Uddevalla. 
· Dealing with internal and external customers. This happens to some 
extent at DAF Trucks and the Rietbergwerke. 
A further opportunity is integrating development work into production 
work. It is useful to make a distinction between product and process in-
novations. In the Rietbergwerke, workers take part in product innovation. 
According to an evaluation report, a development group comprising 
workers from all echelons developed a new line of tanks for applications 
in environmental protection (Braun et al. 1988: 158). The contribution by 
workers on the shop floor to product development is the construction of 
prototypes. There is no separate department for prototyping; production 
workers make the prototypes themselves. Problems that become apparent 
lead to design changes. Sometimes they find, through handling the 
products, ways to improve the design. In 1993, forty out of a total of 64 
workers had been involved in development work. However, the volume 
of development work on the shop floor is small. The plant manager 
estimates that, on the shop floor, about 300 of the 40.000 man hours per 
year consist of development work. 
Further cases in which workers undertook development work dealt 
with process innovation.  
In some cells in components manufacture at DAF Trucks, workers 
set up a kanban system (with outside help). 
Operators in Van Nelle's tobacco unit faced the problem of occa-
sional leaky seams in tobacco pouches. They invented a system that blows 
air against the filled pouches, causing leaky seams to open up. Photo cells 
detect this. The operators built this system themselves, against the will of 
technicians, who felt that it was their job to develop systems like this. A 
repairman designed and built an entire machine that is part of a packing 
line. This was against the will of the central technical department, which 
insisted that this was engineering work instead of maintenance. In the 
municipality of Emstal (Germany), there was an experiment in which 
clerical workers develop information systems.66 
In assembly work, there is little evidence of process innovation by 
production workers. Even at Volvo Uddevalla, the car plant that repre-
sented the most radical departure from the assembly line concept, team 
members do not spend much time working out new methods. In 1990, the 
exact working method had not yet been determined, but there was a 
development towards regular procedures in which the "best" method was 
laid down. 
Several initiatives enriched jobs through adding management tasks. 
In Hotel Caledonien, waiters handled distribution of work, re-
cruitment, leaves, rosters, shift plans and organization for the holiday 
season. In the work restructuring project in light bulb assembly at Philips, 
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teams handled distribution of tasks (Den Hertog 1975: 93-108). In the 
Vereins- und Westbank in Hamburg, teams plan the arrangement of work 
stations, job rotation, and holidays and overtime (Brater 1993: 8). In the 
SKF D3 bearing plant in Gothenburg production teams took on planning, 
budgeting, and measurement of productivity (Hellstrand 1989, Sandberg et 
al. 1992: 81-82). At DAF Trucks, the fact that there are workers on the 
shop floor who take on management duties, shows in the number of 
different pay grades on the shop floor. This number increased from two to 
four. Because the workers on the shop floor at Felten & Guillaume 
assumed planning and managing tasks, the number of workers in 
production increased, while the number of indirect workers decreased. 
Management tasks on the shop floor level are typically connected to 
the position of team leader, coordinator, spokesperson or island leader. In 
some cases, this is a permanent position, limiting job enrichment through 
adding management tasks to one worker per team. At Sigma Coatings, 
each product group (i.e. team) has a product group manager and two shift 
leaders. These are assigned jobs that do not rotate. In other cases however, 
the leading position in the team rotates. At Felten & Guillaume, workers 
can move up to the position of island leader, but this depends on their 
qualifications. Theerkorn (1991: 192-193), who played an important part 
in the change process, notes that these qualifications are not attainable by 
many workers. At Felten & Guillaume, the job of island leader is 
comparable to the job of foreman ("Meister"). 
In Volvo's Uddevalla plant, there were no foremen. Each team  
member was eligible for it. The spokesmen took part in production 
meetings at a factory level. There was disagreement between management 
and unions on the number of employees per team eligible to assume the 
role of spokesman. Management wanted this restricted to four or five per 
team; in the union opinion, as many as possible of those who were able to 
perform that function should also be entitled to do so. 
At IHC, management wanted to have two permanent coordinators 
per team. The works council was opposed to this and felt that the role of 
coordinator had to rotate among team members. The works council 
convinced management that this was the way to do it. Each team had two, 
three or four persons who can take on the coordinator role. They are 
renumerated for their availability. At IHC, coordinators have no authority 
to issue commands. When they cannot solve their problems with 
coworkers, they have to take the matter to the manager. The team elects 
the coordinators, but the manager can take away someone’s coordinator 
status, if he does not set a good example for his coworkers.  
Apart from this, there are no strict rules that prescribe how a co-
ordinator must operate. Rotation takes place every two of three months, 
that is up to the team, as long as the job gets done. 
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Fig 5. 3 Job enrichment 
 
5.4 Decentralization of responsibility to the shop floor level 
Intimately linked with job enrichment is decentralization of responsibility, 
which involves granting of autonomy to workers. Some writers (Bamforth 
and Trist 1951, Friedman 1977) use the term "responsible autonomy" for 
this.67 Several levels of autonomy can be distinguished, like the autonomy 
to decide about: 
· working pace; 
· sequence of operations; 
· methods; 
· goals.68 
A way to organize decentralization of responsibility is to create semi-
autonomous groups, each working at a more or less complete task. Semi-
autonomous groups institutionalize horizontal coordination. 
Cases exhibit three types of decentralization of responsibility (Fig. 
5.4). In some cases, decentralization of responsibility to the shop floor 
level takes the form of delegation of detail planning. In as far as this 
makes the job more complex, this represents job enrichment as well: 
· At tin can factory TDV in The Netherlands, the logistics department 
used to plan production on a day-to-day basis. After the changes, they 
make a weekly planning. 
· In the island concept at Felten & Guillaume, planners are not concerned 
with intermediate steps. Detail planning takes place in the production 
islands. (It is not necessarily machine operators who perform this detail 
planning.) For example, in the manufacturing of cable eyes, this detail 
planning includes: planning the order of operations; deciding who 
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should make the CNC program, optimizing methods and processes; 
organizing maintenance of machines; checking if maintenance takes 
place in time; deciding whether it is possible to perform all production 
steps inside the island (Theerkorn 1990: 193-195). An evaluation study 
revealed that, after the change, there was somewhat more freedom to 
determine the order of operations (Simon 1992: 43-44). 
· At Holec, work preparation, CNC programming and rough planning 
takes place in the office, but team members do detail planning - only 
reporting back when the product is finished. 
· At Sigma Coatings, planning is decentralized. This planning entails the 
order of operations. However, since the weather determines demand to 
a large extent, not too much planning is possible. The main thing is to 
keep lead times as short as possible. Apart from product group 
managers and shift leaders, operational workers play a part in planning. 
In 1993, thirty per cent of the operational workers had been involved in 
planning. 
· In Van Nelle's tobacco unit, one of the teams (a team that does hand-
packing of special orders) plans its own activities within a one week 
time horizon. 
A second form is decentralization of the authority to take action when 
problems arise: 
· Workers at Felten & Guillaume can, after consultation with Logistics, 
independently choose alternatives, when the materials in the parts list 
are not available (Simon 1992: 44-45). In case of a breakdown, they can 
call the maintenance department directly and assist the repairman, 
instead of reporting the disruption to the supervisor. 
· The IHC shipyard confines this responsibility to the team coordinators. 
They act as troubleshooters. A former coordinator says:  "In the old 
situation, you took problems first to the supervisor. Then he would 
eventually call in the production office or the quality department. One 
could distinguish supervisors because they wore yellow overalls, 
common workers wore blue overalls. If you, wearing a blue overall, 
walked into the production office, you would get odd looks. They 
really had to get used to workers in blue overalls having re-
sponsibilities."  
· In the Halmstad County Hospital, there exists a list of drugs that nurses 
can give without a doctor's prescription. When a patient is in pain, the 
nurse can decide to give, for example, an injection. She has the patient's 
medical records and there she can find which drugs are allowed. 
Previously, something like this had to go through the head nurse. Now 
nurses can determine whether a blood test or an infusion is necessary. 
· At DAF Trucks, teams decide for themselves about the things they want 
to improve. "We advise managers to endorse this choice at all times", 
say A. Coppens, "unless it clearly goes against the interests of the 
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company. The team's choice is a measure for what they feel is 
important. When a manager has emphasized that productivity must go 
up, and the team did not chose this aspect for improvement, then he 
knows that his message did not come across." The improvement pro-
cedure further involves defining how to measure the results and 
measuring before and after implementation of the solution. 
Apart from these relatively clearly defined forms, one finds a general 
reduction of supervision density. In one of the Philips work structuring 
project foreman's positions were eliminated. Workers became more re-
sponsible for quantity and quality of output (Philips 1968: 33-35). The 
LOM project in the Tomteboda post terminal introduced delegation of 
planning and allocation of work to workers (work groups). Groups be-
came responsible for filling places that were vacant because of short-term 
sickness. In the customs area, foreman's functions disappeared, groups 
assumed budget responsibility (Naschold 1992b Anhang C: 108-125, 
Gustavsen, Hart & Hofmaier 1988). At DAF Trucks and Volvo Uddevalla, 
and in the pilot projects on teamworking at Mercedes-Benz in Bremen, 
teams work(ed) without supervisors or foremen. At Sigma Coatings in 
The Netherlands, there had previously been one supervisor for every five 
workers. After the change, there was one supervisor for every ten 
workers. In this plant, team leaders function as supervisors, but they 
normally are only present during the day shift, leaving coordinators some 
leeway during the late shift. At Holec, team members spend the greater 
part of their time without direct supervision, since supervisors have a span 
of control of four teams. 
In the Halmstad County Hospital, in which teams of three nurses 
and three assistant nurses are responsible for their own seven patients, 
workers actively defend their autonomy.69 There are signs of an eman-
cipation process of nurses in respect to doctors. A head nurse comments: 
 
"I teach the nurses that doctors are not gods, that you  can ask 
them things and give them your opinion." 
 
A doctor: 
 
"Before the changes, you had more power, you could just  say do 
this and do that, now the round takes more time." 
 
It happens that work teams achieve such a level of autonomy, that the 
labor process becomes a black box for management. To the workers, this 
can be a source of power.70 This occurred in the IHC shipyard. A 
personnel official explains: 
 
 achievements in job design 98  
"The teams in final assembly [of ships] work most independently. 
Often, customers come directly to them. They like to mount things 
before management knows about it. That the boss says 'but it 
cannot be mounted yet' and that they can say 'but it is already in 
place!'. Management lost track of what they are doing. They 
exploited this position already twice by threatening to strike, with 
the argument that they had taken over tasks that once were part of 
much more well-paid jobs. They got their pay raise. Managers 
accept their independence because things are going so well." 
 
The possibility to obtain autonomy depends on the type of work, or more 
precisely, on the way in which systems boundaries are drawn. In IBC’s 
pipe-making department, for instance, the labor process offers little 
opportunity for decision-making. 
Decentralization of responsibility implies that management accepts 
that workers implement the organizational changes at their own pace and 
in their own way. "When you lay responsibility at a low level in the 
organization, you must not push", says Piet Wemmers of IHC: "If you do, 
you breed resistance, you have to allow them time." One of the teams in 
the IHC machine factory has no coordinators, they were happy when they 
got rid of their bosses. They did not participate in the courses that were 
part of the project "Working Differently". Management accepts this, since 
their performance is on a par with the other team in the same workshop, 
that did participate. 
 
 
Fig 5. 4 Decentralization of responsibility 
 
5.5 Participation 
Introduction of real participation is the third aspect of strategies for 
breaking away from Taylorism. 
A convenient way to approach the definition of real participation is 
to distinguish it from pseudo-participation. We can distinguish two types 
of pseudo-participation: strategies to foster worker commitment to 
management plans (Pateman 1970: 68-69) and on the other hand 
"vampyrist" (Blume 1993: 583) participation designed to extract infor-
mation that is valuable for systems development. Someone is involved in 
real participation if (irrespective of the formal arrangement, for example, 
 achievements in job design 99  
consultation, negotiation, joint project groups, veto powers or not) the 
locus of decision-making (about matters that transcend the boundaries of 
his or her primary task) is at least partly inside his or her head. 
Quality circles are a common form of participation (see Fig. 5.5 for 
a small catalogue of forms of participation in the workplace). Siemens 
started in 1979 with quality circles. Before 1986 there were 600 of these 
circles. Klingenberg and Kränzle document a case in which a quality circle 
provided a real solution for a real quality problem. (This problem had to 
do with the production of cables. The production required temporary 
connectors. When it was time to remove these connectors, there was a 
tendency that some would remain unnoticed. Klingenberg and Kränzle 
1986: 91-104). Participating in a quality circle does not change the 
predetermined nature of the job (Stekelenburg and Warning 1983: 218). A. 
Coppens of DAF Trucks experienced: 
 
"With circles alone you do not change much. When the work is of 
type X and the circle is an activity of type Y, then the enthusiasm 
for the circle diminishes if the rest of the work remains of type X." 
 
A different form of participation is participation in design. An example is 
the Volvo engine plant in Vara, in which workers participated in the 
designing right from the start (Forslin 1992). One of the goals for the 
change project in the Rietbergwerke was to supplement representative 
participation with direct participation. Both forms were not to compete 
with one another, but to mutually enhance one another and to get in-
tertwined. Participation took place in planning groups, chaired by action 
researchers. Subjects were factory lay-out, design of machinery and the 
organization of work. In the LOM project in the linoleum and vinyl floor 
covering factory Forbo-Forshage in Gothenburg, operators participated in 
the choice of new technology and in the decision-making about this 
(Naschold 1992b Anhang C: 1-27). 
Information systems tend to undergo continuous development, 
allowing participation in design to become structural. A case in which this 
happened to some extent was the development of the PROSOZ system for 
the social security service in Bremen.71 This case is also interesting because 
it was possible to trace the effects that participation had on the design. 
There were two forms of participation: through the employee council 
(participation by representation) and through a project group. The 
employee council demanded that workers would not have to work on 
their personal computers for the whole working day. This stand led to a 
final agreement that half of the working day should consist of non-
computer work. To achieve this, one procedure (support obligations 
towards dependents) was deliberately not automated. Furthermore, some 
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calculations were left out of the system. The officers would perform these 
by hand, then enter the results into the information system.  
Another way to cut down on VDU-related work was to decide not 
to put technical and juridical reference material on-line. Other points in 
the agreement were: 
· the system should not collect data on worker performance; 
· users should have more workspace (fourteen square meters) than in the 
old situation (ten square meters). 
The second form of participation in this case was through a project group. 
Eighteen social security officers participated in this group. They tested 
prototypes, and exerted a traceable influence on the design. This made the 
system more practical. The first version that the developers came up with 
was more or less a translation of the law. The result was that users needed 
to wade through several layers of menus to reach commonly used 
functions. An example is the function "unemployment", which is most 
frequently used. To the dismay of the users, at first, the designers buried 
this function deep into the menu system. The project group changed this 
completely. In the newer version, commonly used functions are readily 
accessible. Function keys allow rapid changing between functions. There 
is a summary screen for the case in question from which all functions are 
accessible and which show markers for aspects already dealt with. 
The first version of the program decided whether or not the appli-
cant's rent was appropriate, considering family size and the average level 
of rent in the district. The members of the project group felt that it was the 
task of the officer to take decisions like this, so they dropped this feature 
from the program. 
A further indication for the significance of the participation in the 
project group is that developers continue to ask them to provide input 
during the further development of the system. Also, the former members 
of the project group have taken on a part-time supportive role, helping 
their coworkers to cope with the new system. In this case, it is fair to say 
that there was structural participation, but only for eighteen workers out of 
a total of 360. 
A paradoxical point, however, is that through participation the 
system improved so much that other cities adopted it. By adopting a 
ready-made system, these cities denied their social security officers the 
opportunity for participation that their colleagues in Bremen had. 
An entirely different tack in the area of participation is the 
establishment of a democratic structure. This is the focus at car retailer 
Opel Hoppmann in Giessen (Germany). In this firm emerged, via several 
intermediate steps, an alternative decision-making structure parallel to the 
traditional management hierarchy and the works council. It was the ex-
plicit intention that this form of worker participation should not compete 
with co-determination through the works council and the trade union. 
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The "Company Committee" (Wirtschaftsausschuß) became the 
highest decision making body. The Company Committee is a body that is 
required by law. It normally has an advisory role vis-a-vis the entre-
preneur. The Company Committee is a joint committee. The works 
council and the management choose four members each. The chairperson 
is neutral and has to be acceptable to both sides. The Company Committee 
has a say in matters like the sales and investment programs, larger 
investments, plans for rationalization, financial commitments over a 
certain threshold level and organizational changes. 
The second level in this structure consists of work-groups. Each 
worker is a member of a team of seven. From their midst they choose a 
spokesperson. The work groups enjoy information rights and the right to 
be heard in matters like changes in modes of operation, redesign of work 
places and transferal of personnel. Work-groups have veto powers in 
decisions about hiring workers after their trial period. 
Work-groups can take initiatives as well. For examples: buying, 
installing and changing technical equipment; in one of the branches there 
was an initiative to change the division of labor between the "Meister" 
(first level supervisor), his deputy and the group; the painters' group took 
the initiative to have their health risks assessed. 
The change process shows care to avoid pseudo participation. This 
was the reason for instituting parity in the Company Committee. 
Hoppmann and Stötzel write: 
 
"Workers see through bogus democratic procedures. These  lead 
to irritations. The only way to deal with mistrust vis-a-vis forms of 
participation, that have been installed from above, is with 
openness, by making the company affairs transparent." 
(Hoppmann and Stötzel 1981: 185)  
 
The owner "neutralized" the firm's capital by irrevocably handing over 
98.5 per cent to a newly created foundation "Democracy in Everyday 
Life". This foundation finances activities for the benefit of disadvantaged 
children and youths. One of the reasons for creating this foundation was 
to progress further along the path of worker participation: 
 
"It is [..] a piece of evidence to show that we are serious in our 
efforts for democracy in the workplace, and that we want to dis-
sociate ourselves from all attempts to create a pseudo-democracy." 
(Hoppmann and Stötzel 1981: 38) 
 
Another reason was to ensure continuity by sheltering the  firm's capital 
from the whims of future private owners.72 A third reason was to reduce 
the dependence of the participation model on the person of Klaus 
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Hoppmann (many had expressed doubts about the viability of the model 
without the personal involvement of Klaus Hoppmann). 
When Klaus Hoppmann proposed introducing semi-autonomous 
groups, the employees blocked this. This testifies to their real influence.73 
In the county hospital in Halmstad, the change process brought a 
participatory culture rather than participation channeled through demo-
cratic structures. Nurses have, albeit limited, influence on treatment. Every 
day, doctor, nurse and assistant nurse discuss their patients. 
(Assistant)nurses can contribute useful information, because they know 
the patient well. A head nurse notes:  
 
"The nurses can look critically at drug use and ask themselves if so 
many pills, expensive as they are, have any effect at all. Whether 
you can say something like that to a doctor depends on how you 
say it. A sense of humor is important." 
 
Another head nurse indicates that it is up to the doctor how deep this in-
volvement can be: 
 
"You might discuss alternative treatments with the patient, but .. 
there are doctors and then there are doctors. A young doctor will 
ask the nurse anyhow 'and what shall we do now?'." 
 
Similarly, workers at Sigma Coatings feel that their opinion matters: 
"Previously, the engineering department provided transportation carts. In 
practice, these were often not handy. Now they first ask you, what you 
want". When management plans an investment in a production line, they 
ask workers for their opinion. One worker found it very striking that, 
when he is working at some machine, it happens that someone calls him 
with a query. 
 
 
Fig 5. 5 Forms of participation 
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5.6 A note on prevention 
The issues dealt with so far in this chapter, alleviation of technical dis-
cipline, job enlargement, job enrichment, decentralization of responsibility 
or participation are all ways to change existing situations. On the other 
hand, there were a few initiatives, in which there were elements that 
focused on preventing further Taylorization.74 For example at DAF 
Trucks, the personnel department tries to prevent impoverishment of jobs 
as a result of technical change. One of their instruments is a database in 
which they record sociotechnical solutions for various problems, which 
they gather from the literature. When presented with a plan for technical 
change, they can retrieve design options from this database. Another of 
their instruments is a computerized questionnaire, designed to assess the 
quality of working life. Its output consists of thermometer-like graphs, 
showing among other aspects, the score on an autonomy scale. The 
personnel officers use this program to evaluate the quality of working life 
before and after technical changes. It is customary for staff from the 
personnel department to be involved in technical change. A. Coppens 
explained: 
 
"It has even occurred that we had a project canceled. A technology 
aficionado wanted to deploy a welding robot at the certain point. 
In this way, the skilled work would be automated, leaving only a 
totally impoverished job. We told him 'Who do you think you are 
going to put there? You can better automate the loading and 
unloading.' [..] It proves to be very important for the quality of 
working life to work preventively. When the investments have 
been made, you can at best make little adjustments to make the 
work somewhat nicer." 
 
The two other initiatives that had a preventive aspect involved agreements 
not to use information systems to track errors down to individual 
workers.75 
5.7 Success and regression 
Most consensual initiatives met with some degree of success. In 72.6 per 
cent, the initiators completely realized their plans. In another 16.1 per cent 
of the cases, the original ideas were only partly realized. In 8.1 per cent of 
the cases, there was no change at all in the organization of work. There 
may have been changes in working conditions, like a reduction of 
physical strain, but this type of change lies squarely outside the scope of 
the present study. In terms of a movement away from Taylorism, these 
cases did not progress beyond the phase of ideas. None of the five basic 
issues: alleviation of technical discipline, job enlargement, job enrichment, 
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decentralization of responsibility or participation is excluded from this 
success.76 Impact rates for the respective issues show this. (For example: 
the impact rate for participation is the percentage of the attempts to 
establish participation that were to some degree successful in making an 
impact on the organization of work.) 
Here, "impact" means that there was at least some traceable effect. 
 
 
 
Fig 5. 6 Impact rates per issue 
 
However, in many cases, the initial success did not last. In these cases, 
regression to more Tayloristic ways of working occurred. Of all the cases 
in which the initial plan was realized, regression in some form or another 
occurred in 35.6 per cent. In 55.6 per cent of the cases, I could not 
determine whether or not there had been a regression. In just four cases, 
8.9 per cent, it was clear that no regression occurred, at least not in the 
indicated time frames. These cases were the Social Security Service in 
Bremen, Germany, 1987-1993; the Volvo car assembly plant in Uddevalla, 
Sweden 1988-1990 (closed down in 1993); the County Hospital in 
Halmstad, Sweden 1980-1992; Opel Hoppmann, 1961-1981 (in 1990, the 
democratic structure was still in place). 
In some cases (Sigma Coatings, DAF Trucks, IHC Holland) re-
gression was merely a dip in a development away from Taylorism.  
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Regression to more Tayloristic ways of working can occur in a 
variety of ways. In industry, buffers and arrangements like dock assembly 
that shield workers to some extent from mechanical pacing, risk being 
eliminated. Early in the eighties, Volvo Kalmar took steps towards 
rationalization. The method of dock assembly was abandoned (Agurén et 
al. 1984: 41). Buffers between the sections also disappeared, with the 
exception of the buffers that were deemed necessary in connection with 
the inflow of components. Thus, most of the deviations from the 
assembly-line principle were abandoned again. The most important 
difference that remained was that the workers could still follow an AGV 
on its way through the subsection, which allowed for a maximum cycle 
time of 25 minutes (Berggren 1989: 183).  
Relatively high-level tasks that enrich jobs are at risk too. At Van 
Nelle, one of the work groups used to receive incoming tobacco, to check 
its quality, to mix it and to add flavoring. Eventually, however, the 
management of the parent company moved the quality control work to the 
buying department. A shortage of skills can have the same effect. A 
manager at Holec says: 
 
"[Team structures threaten] people who had for years been 
pushing themselves to their limits. All of a sudden they had to 
organize, to read and to write. And people who knew their work 
technically like the back of their hands, who were used to going to 
work every morning, who were completely confident that no 
difficulties would come up, all of a sudden had to rotate jobs. For 
such workers there was no relief. Actually, one would have to talk 
to workers of over forty years of age separately, to impress upon 
them that they have to make themselves receptive ('kwetsbaar'), if 
at least they know what that means. 
People have fallen ill because of the demands that we put on them. 
Men who skillfully operated the same machine for years, who 
were the petty boss over that machine, and who were its best 
operator, got fear of failure when they had to do organizing work. 
Now we no longer assume that everybody has to do organizing 
work. [..] A collective sigh of relief went through the teams. Many 
members had suffered fear of failure. Someone is really in trouble 
when everybody thinks that he is a master craftsman, and then it 
turns out that he can't read." 
 
Reintroduction of supervisors can seal the fate of a declining decentralized 
responsibility. Ten years after the start of the change project, management 
reintroduced foremen in the Rietbergwerke. 
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Box 5.3 Social tension on the shop floor can lead to regression 
Responsible autonomy can lead to social tension on the shop floor. Ro-
tating coordinatorship can put workers in the uncomfortable position 
where they have to give orders to fellow workers, who in turn would be 
in the same position. After years of trying to work with rotating coordi-
natorship, the Rietbergwerke reintroduced foremen ("Meister"). In the 
beginning, the system of rotating coordinatorship system worked well. 
Workers proved that they were up to it. But soon problems arose, when 
coordinators had to take unpopular decisions. When the person affected 
by such a decision would later take over the coordination role, he would 
get back at the previous coordinator. For this reason, coordinators grew 
ever more careful and more reluctant to make decisions. Besides, cliques 
formed that picked the best pieces of work for themselves. A manager: 
"This led to tensions that the workers took home with them. The former 
coordinators were not angry when the system was abolished. They were 
taking the conflicts home with them, and deep down they felt relieved. But 
the job enrichment was gone. For years we had tried to hold on to the 
coordinator system, but the mood worsened and worsened. The works 
council, too, felt that it could not go on like this. The abolishment meant a 
drop in pay; coordinators were making 200 marks per month more. The 
collective agreement, after the project had been extended to three of four 
years, was canceled."  
Employing foremen ("Meister") was expensive, but management and 
works council felt that there was no other choice, due to the inefficiencies 
caused by the social friction on the shop floor.77 
 
Finally, within semi-autonomous teams, a division of labor can crystallize 
that again separates conception from execution. This happened in six 
cases. 
A report by the Philips works council mentions as one of the 
problems with work structuring projects, that informal group leaders 
become bosses (Philips 1973: 7). The ECT home container terminal ex-
hibited segmentation inside the work groups as well. At Van Nelle, or-
ganizing tasks eventually concentrated on the coordinator. According to a 
Van Nelle manager, one of the coordinators acts as a foreman: "He formed 
inside his work group a Tayloristic bunch, of which he is the foreman." 
Having a large proportion of temporary workers in a team is con-
ducive to regression. In the shipbuilding units of IHC, more and more 
work was done by temporary workers; in some teams the proportion came 
close to 100 per cent. This caused team coordinators to act as bosses. It 
can happen that one welder, assisted by temporary workers, puts a whole 
section together. Reliance on temporary help is a cornerstone in IHC's 
policy to maintain flexibility. Thereby, management puts up with the risk 
that it threatens team structures.78  
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The members of one of the teams in the IHC machine factory find 
that they can not take the burrs of workpieces, because they have to attend 
at their machines permanently. Therefore, they have a special person 
around who does nothing but removing burrs. 
In the production islands of Felten & Guillaume, one finds un-
skilled workers ("Ungelernte"), semi-skilled workers ("Angelernte"), 
skilled workers ("Facharbeiter") and foremen ("Meister") working to-
gether. Within the islands, there develops a division of labor between 
these categories of workers. Moreover, skilled workers tend to hold on to 
qualified work. For example, a worker who had, as part of the change 
project, learnt CNC programming had to make a stand to be allowed to 
practice his newly acquired skill. 
In the final analysis, decentralization of responsibility implies 
granting workers the right to create Taylorist structures. From this 
dilemma there is no easy way out.79 The tendency for managers is to 
tolerate it as long as it seems efficient. "One of the coordinators is a 
complete leader who gets involved in everything," says a manager at Van 
Nelle: "When you say, 'Now it is time for you to work at a machine, you 
have to rotate too', he does not like it a bit. It is hard to come to a good 
judgment about this. I am reluctant to make an inroad upon the informal 
organization. You strongly reduce somebody's motivation if you take 
away his status." 
The occurrence of regression on this scale makes it very difficult to 
see anti-Taylorism exclusively as modernization. If anti-Tayloristic change 
adapts organizations closely to their increasingly fluctuating environment, 
regression would be an unlikely outcome. Regression is more compatible 
with the view that anti-Taylorism is one of the fluctuating ways of coping 
with the immanent tensions produced by the employment relationship. 
 
5.8 Contingencies reveal vulnerability 
Contingencies like mergers, restructuring, resignation of key persons 
(both managers and union officials) and financial troubles can kill or 
damage initiatives, or cause regression. A 1960's experiment with in-
creased worker responsibility in a carpet factory in The Netherlands 
(Hatéma) collapsed when the experimental department disappeared fol-
lowing a merger (Ramondt 1975: 92-95, Ramondt 1968). In Norwegian 
metal working company Nobø, participating in the Industrial Democracy 
program, change activities dwindled when management moved 
production to another location (Thorsrud et al. 1976: 434-436, Bolweg 
1976: 64-65). A factor in the stagnation of the Industrial Democracy 
experiment in the Norsk Hydro fertilizer plant was the departure of the key 
union leader and secretary (Thorsrud et al. 1976: 436-438, Bolweg 1976: 
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65-70). A study, conducted seven years after the beginning of engine 
assembly at Volvo's Skövde plant, showed that the concept had not 
developed after the first year and that there had been a regression. It 
turned out that success was dependent on visionary managers. When they 
left, traditionalists took over (Forslin 1992: 13). In the 1990's, a renewal of 
management hampered the development of a LOM project in a steel plant 
(Naschold 1992b Anhang C: 76-90). In 1987, DAF Trucks had a 
reorganization of management. Before this, a single manager was in 
charge of both production and development. The reorganization separated 
these responsibilities, causing management support for the new way of 
working to diminish. Furthermore, increasing production (up to ten 
percent per year), the takeover of British Leyland and the introduction of a 
new logistical system, all took management's attention away from 
developing the organization of work. Finally, in 1990, Womack, Roos and 
Jones published "The Machine that Changed the World". "Jones was 
invited to elaborate on the study", said A. Coppens, "and with the 
functional managers the idea of lean production was a huge success." 
However, he added that "in the meantime many things had changed on the 
shop floor that could not be undone". 
At the stevedoring company Swarttouw in Rotterdam, job en-
richment activities were under way, when it merged with GEM (Graan 
Elevator Maatschappij). At GEM, there were no planning or organizing 
tasks at the operational level, but wages were higher than at Swarttouw. 
When given the choice between the Swarttouw collective agreement and 
the GEM collective agreement, the Swarttouw workers chose for the 
higher wages, giving up the prospect of job enrichment. 
Financial troubles slowed down the change process in the Halmstad 
County Hospital. A planned reduction of the bed capacity left employees 
worried about their jobs. In the social security department of the city of 
Bremen, cuts in government spending delayed implementation of the new 
system. 
Technological change by itself can lead to regression, even if the 
new technology is appropriate for non-Tayloristic organization devel-
opment. Sigma Coatings' new plant in Amsterdam represents a jump from 
the middle ages to the late twentieth century. Closed installations with 
computer controlled hoppers, valves and grinding machines replace age-
old messy manual processes. Operators control production from consoles 
that are located on the shop floor. Running a Microsoft Windows based 
application, the consoles display a schematic of the current process. It is 
possible to display a recipe for the product in a window. However, the 
transition to this completely new technology sent the workers on the 
organizational level back to square one. 
This vulnerability to all kinds of contingent obstacles indicates a 
weakness in consensual alternatives.80 
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5.9 Diffusion 
Diffusion did take place, but the extent was often disappointing for the 
people involved in the change process.81 In 11.7 per cent of the cases, 
there were signs of diffusion from the kernel, where the process started, to 
other places inside the plant, to other plants belonging to the same 
company, or outside the company. 
In several cases, the initiators found themselves in the paradoxical 
position that there was large external interest in their initiative, while at the 
same time interest from other parts of their own organization was lacking. 
An example is the tobacco unit of Van Nelle, a textbook case of a 
shift away from Taylorism. The coffee and tea units, housed in the same 
building, do not show interest in the new organization of work, that 
developed in the tobacco unit. 
Outside interest has often been great. In the 1960's, the Industrial 
Democracy experiment in the Nobø metalworking plant in Hommelvik 
attracted attention from the media and from other companies, especially 
from Sweden (Thorsrud et al. 1976: 434-436, Bolweg 1976: 64-65). The 
experiment in the Norsk Hydro fertilizer plant drew many national an 
international labor and management visitors (Thorsrud et al. 1976: 436-
438, Bolweg 1976: 65-70). In a 1973 evaluation of work structuring, the 
Philips works council reports that visitors from all over the world came to 
see the projects (Bolwijn et al. 1973: 5). 
Interest in consensual alternatives did not wane over time. More 
than a decade later, the change project of Felten & Guillaume received 
1500 visitors (Theerkorn 1990: 49).  Around 1990, many came to Ud-
devalla. 
 
5.10 Conclusions 
Braverman (1974: 29) made the following judgment about workplace 
reforms: 
 
“They represent a style of management rather than a genuine 
change in the position of the worker. They are characterized by a 
studied pretense of worker 'participation', a gracious liberality in 
allowing the worker to adjust a machine, replace a light bulb, 
move from one fractional job to the other, and to have the illusion 
of making decisions by choosing among fixed and limited 
alternatives designed by a management which deliberately leaves 
insignificant matters open to choice."  
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The organizations that figure in this chapter go beyond changing the style 
of management. Especially in those cases that entailed job enrichment, 
there was a transformation of work content. But this transformation was 
not so profound as to help the beneficiaries break out of the framework of 
industrial production or bureaucratic organization into craft production or 
professional work. Nevertheless, limitations became apparent: 
a) Some initiatives failed to have an impact (eight per cent failed com-
pletely, sixteen per cent failed in part). This point becomes more sig-
nificant due to the fact, that the cases that make up the data base for the 
present study were not a representative sample of companies. The set of 
cases must rather be seen as part of the vanguard of anti-Tayloristic 
change. 
b) In some segments of working life, anti-Tayloristic initiatives seemed 
non-existent (in terms of jobs: supermarket checkout clerks, fast food, 
bank tellers, in terms of technology: there were no alternatives for 
computerized disciplining systems). 
c) Initiatives tended to remain isolated alternatives; clear examples of 
diffusion were scarce. In eleven per cent of the cases, there were signs 
of diffusion. In several cases there was no diffusion inside the plant in 
which the initiative took place. 
d) Regression to more Tayloristic ways is a common phenomenon. 
e) Consensual alternatives prove vulnerable to various kinds of contin-
gencies like mergers and the departure of key managers. 
This corroborates the conclusion of the first chapter, that Taylorism is a 
persistent phenomenon. 
It may seem compelling to comfortably stay inside the enlighten-
ment paradigm. There are promising results, and ample opportunities for 
further elaboration by pointing out that not enough attention has been paid 
to factors "X". "X" might be something like: participation, management 
commitment, culture, (a certain deep level of) communication, 
organizational learning, parallel learning, n-th-loop learning, an integral 
approach, sociotechnical design, flow-oriented design, a process oriented 
approach, chaos, complexity and so forth. 
However, the ideal of value-freedom requires us to look beyond 
this paradigm. This mean that we have to explore how constraint variables 
affect the de-Taylorization process. 
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CHAPTER SIX  MANAGEMENT POWER AS AN OBSTACLE TO 
CHANGE 
 
6.1 Introduction  
A well known theory holds that in company decisions, control over labor 
is an explicit criterion alongside economic rationality (Van Klaveren 1994: 
24). 
 
Box 6.1 "What Do the Bosses Do?" 
Marglin (1982) extensively criticized the dominant view that improving 
efficiency was the main driving force in the genesis of the factory system, 
with its capitalist hierarchy that denies self-expression to the majority. 
According to his analysis, workers first lost control over their product. 
The mechanism for this was a division of labor in which workers 
specialized in a small step in a production process. This precluded that the 
workers could produce marketable products on their own, and gave the 
capitalist an essential role to play, that of integrating production and acting 
as an intermediary to the market. Marglin argues that Adam Smith's 
example of a pin factory was wrong. Smith may have been right in 
claiming that separating the steps in pin production, like drawing wire, 
straightening it, cutting it, pointing it etc. boosted efficiency by reducing 
setting-up time. But, in contrast to Smith, Marglin (1982: 292) does not 
conclude that workers should specialize in one of the production steps: "A 
workman, and his wife and children, could have proceeded from task to 
task, first drawing out enough wire for hundreds or thousands of pins, 
then straightening it, then cutting it and so on with each successive 
operation, thus realizing the advantages of dividing the overall production 
process into separate tasks."  
Surviving wage records of an early 19th century pin factory indicate that 
no great skills were required, which otherwise might have necessitated 
specialization. 
After losing control over the product, workers lost control over the pro-
duction process when they were gathered into factories. Marglin asserts 
that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the use of water and steam 
power was only secondary in importance to the enforcement of discipline. 
 
To what extent does control as an end in itself constrain the development 
of consensual alternatives? This is the guiding question for this chapter. 
In the literature, we find many analyses that would lead us to be-
lieve that a constraining effect of control as an and in itself will not be 
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prohibitive. Generally, the foundation for these analyses is a non-zero sum 
and multi-layer concept of power. Giddens (1979: 93) provides a 
definition of power that conforms to this concept: "The capability of 
actors to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes de-
pends upon the agency of others." 
A non-zero sum and multi-layer concept of power opens the way to 
realize that in anti-Tayloristic initiatives, only a specific kind of control is 
given to workers. This "dependent control" is very different from 
"independent control", which means that "the workers' side does actually 
exert an independent force" (Goodrich 1975: 257). Managers grant detail 
control to workers and reserve general control for themselves (Edwards 
1990: 145). 
Howard (1986: 116) notes that: "There is a world of difference 
between being allowed to control certain limited areas of working life 
defined entirely by the norms and decisions of others, and having the 
influence actually to shape the scope and the content of those norms and 
decisions themselves."  
Many writers employ the notion of hegemonial control, that is 
control without conflict or manipulation, which is embedded in everyday 
commonsense understandings of reality. Doorewaard (1989: 132) asserts 
that, what managers lose on the hierarchical level, they can more than 
recover on the hegemonial level. Child (1985: 127) states that a 
management strategy to make workers more "polyvalent" emphasizes the 
"consensual and positive" side of the employment relation. 
For managers, a last line of defence is the employment relation it-
self. The dependency on the employment relationship is a factor that tends 
to keep workers in line (Kalecki 1972: 424, Littler and Salaman 1982: 
261), especially when there is a lack of alternative employment 
opportunities. 
On the multilevel chessboard of power, managers do not easily run 
out of options. They can pursue strategies to "manufacture consent" (cf. 
Burawoy 1979), increase organizational transparency and use computer-
based control systems (Van Klaveren 1984: 50, Rolf 1989: 90). 
Furthermore, they can introduce new "bureaucratic controls". Bureaucratic 
control (Edwards 1979: 112) is based on rules, detailed job descriptions 
and institutionalized talks with unions. Bureaucratic control is generally 
applied to the employees who are central to the company and hard to 
replace. An example of a new bureaucratic control, created with de-
Taylorization, is a rule that workers must participate in job rotation to be 
eligible for promotion (ECT container terminal in The Netherlands). 
In some respects, anti-Tayloristic change might even strengthen 
management control. Child (1985: 127) points out that "polyvalence" 
increases the worker's dependence on the internal labor market, since 
opportunities for learning are defined in terms that are specific for the 
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organization; letting workers perform complete tasks makes it easier to 
locate responsibility for errors. 
In Chapter Three we have seen that Taylorist patterns may provide 
workers with the opportunity to create a specific kind of autonomy. Anti-
Tayloristic projects change this, to the extent that they entail, as Willis 
(1977: 182) noted: "the ordered internalization - on conditions - of the 
foreman into the informal culture which otherwise anarchically usurps 
and challenges his role." 
Finally, anti-Tayloristic job redesign offers managers a convenient, 
pleasant vocabulary to discuss policies that might adversely affect 
worker's interests. Doorewaard (1989) gives a few examples: talking about 
participation instead of speaking about opening the black box of work 
processes; emphasizing all-round jobs instead of automation. Beirne and 
Ramsay (1986) assert that job redesign can be a "manipulative device" in 
work intensification drives. 
 
6.2 Power related constraints in consensual alternatives 
This sections presents information obtained by scanning the cases of 
consensual alternatives for indications of power-related constraints. Be-
cause the present study is based on cases of organizations in which anti-
Tayloristic policies are implemented, it is impossible to completely answer 
the question whether managers in general are in favor of or against anti-
Tayloristic change. 
 
Results 
In eight cases out of 61 (or 13 per cent) there were indications that power 
holders obstructed the change process because they held on to their 
power. In two cases, this proved fatal to the change initiative.82 
In the two fatal cases, the top management halted further devel-
opment of consensual alternatives. In these two cases there were merely 
indications - nothing more than that - that top managers, after experiments 
with non-Tayloristic structures, became afraid for their power positions. 
A German state official, who had been involved in the 1970's 
Volkswagen experiment with complete engine assembly, maintained that 
the real reason for Volkswagen management to keep semi-autonomous 
groups a temporary thing, was to preclude that production knowledge 
came exclusively in the hands of the workers. In principle, this would 
have enabled new forms of strikes.83  
At Felten & Guillaume, top management canceled a second hu-
manization project, although the first project had been successful and a 
grant for the second project had already been awarded. Reasons for this 
 management power 114  
decision were not given, but the autonomy of project staff may have been 
a threat to top management. Because of the external funding of a large part 
of their work, the project staff had become more independent. 
Furthermore, the project staff gained external recognition and fame. 
Thus, we can not rule out the possibility that there is a section of 
top management that, for reasons related to the maintenance of ma-
nagement power, wants to block anti-Tayloristic developments altogether. 
(In a way, however, top managers even stand to gain from anti-Tayloristic 
change. By making the organization flatter, they can eliminate competing 
lower-placed managers.) 
In the other cases that exhibited power-related constraints, the effect 
was not so drastic as to block anti-Tayloristic initiatives completely. 
In some of the cases, middle management limited the extent of 
worker empowerment. Decentralization of responsibility to the shop floor 
level and participation threatens middle and lower managers most directly. 
A middle manager at Sigma Coatings recalled his experience: 
 
"All of a sudden, the situation was such that you had to hand over 
an immense amount of knowledge and skill, and that you received 
little in return. Then you feel like standing still, if you can't get 
involved in new things." 
 
Middle managers feeling threatened can cause a change project to slow 
down or stagnate.84 The Norwegian Industrial Democracy projects in the 
1960's had their share of these problems. In the experiment in the Norsk 
Hydro fertilizer plant, supervisors and middle management felt that their 
traditional roles were threatened (Thorsrud et al. 1976: 436-438, Bolweg 
1976: 65-70). In the experiment in the Hunsfos pulp and paper mill, 
resistance by foremen caused one year of standstill (Bolweg 1976: 60-54, 
Thorsrud et al. 1976: 431-433). 
The democratization process in the car retail firm Opel Hoppmann 
made supervisors unsure about themselves. In the course of 1972, it 
became clear that they felt threatened. But according to Hoppmann and 
Stötzel (1981: 58-63), later they learned to handle the situation in which 
they enjoyed less authority and had to depend on their professional 
knowledge. However, supervisors continued to exhibit braking behavior. 
At the IHC shipyard in Sliedrecht management tried to achieve a 
similar shift to team working as in Kinderdijk. However, in Sliedrecht, the 
former bosses were appointed as team coordinators. On paper, ma-
nagement created a new organization, but in reality not much changed. 
The former bosses were used to doing the allocation of work and to check 
on lead times. After the change, they had to relinquish their old activities 
and to start guiding their teams. However, they clung to their old 
positions.85  
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In its evaluation of work structuring projects, the Philips works 
council found that lower managers felt threatened. When they were not 
moved to other positions, they fell back into their old role (Philips 1973). 
Reflecting on an experiment in participation, Fricke (1983: 84, 1988: 277) 
described the division between execution and conception as an 
uncrossable border, guarded by middle managers. An organization expert 
at DAF Trucks notes: 
 
"Obstacles never exist at the level of the shop floor, but higher up 
in the organization. These have to do with power and with the 
style of managing. [..] There is resistance among managers; they 
have to be retrained." 
 
However, in the long run, obstruction by middle managers is generally not 
completely fatal for change initiatives, especially not when higher 
management is committed to change and is vigilant. (It is important to 
realize that management is not monolithic).86 Higher managers have in-
struments to deal with this problem, including firing, demotion, promo-
tion or trying to fit middle managers into a consulting and training role. 
Power-related obstacles to change do not necessarily involve the 
management hierarchy.87 Even workers who happen to be invested with a 
homeopathic dose of management power are affected. A Holec manager 
said: 
 
"Man has something macho, a propensity to make his job look 
more interesting to outsiders. Someone who is experienced and 
can give others a few instructions, however dumb he might be, 
gets something out of that. Group structures threaten [..] in the 
first place what I call 'pseudo-supervisors', people who organize 
something but who have nothing to decide on, the 'first workers' 
('eerste medewerkers') and the foremen. [..] It was difficult to 
demote the first workers, a number of them became ill." 
 
In some cases a labor elite was sharing in management power and de-
fending its position. One of the obstacles that became apparent in the 
experiment with complete engine assembly at Volkswagen (early 1970's), 
was that the works council found the autonomy of the teams too far-
reaching. In its written evaluation, the works council objects against 
workers planning their work a week in advance, although the team 
members themselves agreed to this system (Granel 1979: 63). This in turn 
caused IG Metall (the metalworkers' union) to oppose far-flung autonomy. 
The reason for IG Metall to be against it, was not only that it would 
weaken the co-determination structures laid down in the law - the works 
council is the union's base inside the company - but also because semi-
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autonomous groups are not compatible with the individual piece-rate 
system. 
In the job redesign project in vacuum cleaner assembly at AEG-
Telefunken, both the management and the works council opposed the idea 
to transfer decision-making to workers (AEG-Telefunken 1983b: 74-85). 
Lack of commitment by unions is - according to an evaluation study - part 
of the explanation for the failure of a LOM project in a steel plant 
(Naschold 1992b Anhang C: 76-90). 
Protecting the vested interests of union officials and works council 
(presidents') position in the company's power structure, is not the only 
ground for union leaders and works council members to oppose change 
initiatives. A additional ground is the concern about risks like 
intensification of work and the risk for weaker workers to get pushed out 
of teams. In the Volkswagen case both were in evidence. Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that cases in which works councils and unions oppose 
initiative to change are relatively exceptional. 
 
6.3 Conclusions and further analysis 
To summarize the argument thus far: a few cases showed the maintenance 
of management power working as a constraint on consensual anti-
Tayloristic policy. This is especially evident on the level of middle 
management. But top management on the one hand, and workers who, at 
least subjectively, slightly shared in management power on the other hand, 
were not entirely free from it. There were even cases in which worker 
representatives defended their position in the power structure against 
worker autonomy. Still, one should not rule out the possibility that power-
related constraints are more significant than they seem. (Because the 
present study does not deal with organizations that are not active in the 
anti-Tayloristic field, it leaves this possibility open.)  
In the organizations that did start out to create consensual alternatives, the 
level of ambition in terms of granting power to workers tended to be not 
dramatic. 
This follows from an analysis of how, and to what extent, initiatives 
combine the following issues: alleviation of technical discipline, job 
enlargement, job enrichment, decentralization of responsibility and 
participation. (A detailed explanation of the analysis is in Appendix A). 
This analysis revealed two dimensions. The first dimension is of interest 
for the present discussion. This dimension is the scope of worker em-
powerment. At one extreme, there are efforts to give workers some 
control over their own movements, through the relaxation of technical 
disciplinary mechanisms like machine pacing. Next comes job enlarge-
ment (adding more tasks of the same order of complexity), making pos-
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sible some freedom to move around. Beyond this point, decision-making 
power becomes the focal point. First, there is decentralization of res-
ponsibility, i.e. the worker can make (some) decisions regarding his or her 
own tasks. Then, at the far end of the spectrum, there is participation. 
Through participation, the worker is involved in decision-making on 
matters that transcend his or her own tasks. 
It is remarkable that there were only two attempts, at Volvo Ud-
devalla and DAF Trucks, to take workers all the way up from the most 
basic level, alleviation of technical discipline, to participation. From all the 
cases that start out at alleviation of technical discipline, only four stretch as 
far as decentralization of responsibility or beyond. 
Furthermore, in Chapter Five we have seen that decentralization of 
responsibility often included short term planning. Decentralization of 
responsibility for long-term or even medium-term planning was absent. 
And in the area of participation, cases that included decision-making on 
investment were exceptional. 
Further exploration of power constraints in the context of consen-
sual alternatives is a Catch-22: it would require bold experiments, but 
were those experiments likely to expose power constraints, they would 
never come into existence.88 Therefore it is interesting to look into a type 
of policy that takes power as its starting point: worker mobilization. This 
is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  WORKER MOBILIZATION AS AN ANTIDOTE 
 
This chapter is devoted to worker mobilization for anti-Tayloristic change. 
Worker mobilization, or in other words, independent union action, might 
counteract the constraints imposed by the maintenance of management 
power. ("Independent action" is action outside the framework of 
consensual alternatives or joint enlightenment activities.) At the same time, 
worker mobilization would be a policy that bypasses the bridging variable 
"implementation of consensual alternatives". 
Generally, the direct cause or catalyst for independent union action 
on matters of work organization is the introduction of new technology 
(Cressey 1992: 230). Unions need an opening to get involved in the 
organization of work, and the introduction of new technology provides 
such an opening. Furthermore, for the organization concerned, the 
introduction of new technology is a decision point between Tayloristic 
and non-Tayloristic courses of development. 
 
7.1 Origins 
At the end of the 1960' and in the early 1970's, circles of trade unionists 
and intellectuals in Scandinavia grew skeptical of the consensual 
experiments. One of the them was the Norwegian computer scientist 
Kirsten Nygaard.89 Bridging the gap between his profession and his radical 
political views, he organized a study group with young trade unionists 
(who later turned out to become union leaders). This led to the creation of 
the Iron and Metal project, a systematic union attempt to exert influence 
over the organization of work. 
The reason for skepticism against consensual alternatives was the 
power question. For Nygaard, the experiments were a form of manipu-
lation, since the employers could brush the changes aside whenever they 
wanted, without asking the employees. He called the joint projects 
"harmful" and a "wet blanket". In Sweden, trade unionists criticized the 
managers' side for not wanting to transfer power to workers. As perceived 
by the unionists, the employers themselves did not want to cooperate in 
projects that detracted from their power.90 (The findings in Chapter Six do 
not contradict this perception.) As the implementation phase of joint 
management-labor projects in Sweden approached, the consensus 
between employers and workers broke down. Conflicts broke out 
between employers who focused on the level of the individual and 
emphasized productivity and solutions for personnel problems, and 
workers' representatives who attached more importance to democratiza-
tion. The unions withdrew from the coalition, with the conclusion that 
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they needed a way to exert an autonomous influence on the labor process. 
This influence would have to be modeled after representative democracy. 
Sandberg (1992: 76) describes this point of view as: "Self-deter-
mination in the daily work situation (often group work) and co-determi-
nation for such managerial questions as planning were seen as two in-
teracting parts in the process of democratization." 
Thus, dissatisfaction with the power-related limitations of consen-
sual alternatives gave rise to a strategy for independent union action. This 
strategy, that had its roots in Scandinavia but eventually spread to other 
north-western European countries, has a fundamentally multilevel 
character.  
 
7.2 Basic mechanisms for autonomous union influence 
There are two basic mechanisms for autonomous union influence.  One of 
these mechanisms is negotiation. The idea is to try and reach agreements 
with management on various levels (national, regional, industry, firm). 
In Norway, one of the results of the Iron and Metal project was the 
development of a strategy to exploit the possibilities of existing laws by 
bargaining for technology agreements. The first outcomes were a local 
data agreement in 1974 and a national agreement in 1975. 
Key elements in those agreements were information rights and 
participation of employees and unions in systems development. Unions 
were entitled to elect "data stewards". Data stewards were to have access 
to all documentation of programs and hardware. 
 
Box 7.1 Some provisions in the Norwegian Data Agreement 
"In efforts to give workers in various departments or working groups 
greater scope to take decisions in their daily work themselves, one im-
portant step is to further their understanding of and insight into the fi-
nancial position of the enterprise. 
Real influence on the part of the employees concerned should be secured 
by establishing working, project and steering groups in an enterprise, but 
outside its regular organizational structure." (From the 1975 Data 
Agreement, in Kallevig 1990: 10) 
"When the parties agree to engage in projects, real influence should be 
ensured not only for workers' elected representatives, but also for re-
presentatives of the employees directly concerned. The main organizations 
recommend that as far as possible all employees whom the projects 
directly concern should be engaged in work on them." (From the 1982 
Supplementary Agreement II, in Kallevig 1990: 19) 
 
 worker mobilization 120  
The national agreement was the framework for an increasing number of 
local agreements. A training program for data stewards got under way. 
The Norwegian example inspired unionists in Sweden, Germany, the U.K. 
and The Netherlands to start negotiations about new technology and the 
organization of work.91 
The second basic mechanism is developing alternatives for ma-
nagement schemes. This mechanism too, already flowed forth from the 
Norwegian Iron and Metal project. In this project, working parties with a 
total of 120 members and shop stewards investigated planning and control 
systems in their organizations, and developed proposals for improvement. 
A case in point is a proposal to re-organize an assembly line to make work 
less monotonous. 
This idea, too, spread to other countries and lived on. For example, 
IG Metall's official policy (in 1992) regarding the organization of work, is 
to aim at a "competition of strategies" within the firm. The intention is for 
IG Metall to produce plans that are so good that they are impossible to 
ignore. The employees must participate in the development of these plans, 
and in this way bring management under legitimation pressure. 
The two basic strategies, negotiation and creation of union alter-
natives, conflict as much as they are complementary. According to A. 
Drinkuth, Head of IG Metall's department for Automa-
tion/Technology/Humanization of Working Life, there is a current within 
IG Metall that rejects developing alternatives as “co-management”. In 
terms of official program goals, Drinkuth and his department have the 
upper hand, but "reality is different", says Drinkuth: "Many unionists say: 
'Just give me a company agreement'". 
 
7.3 Supporting activities 
Three types of activity are designed to promote union influence on job 
design: 
· knowledge creation from union viewpoints; 
· mobilization of financial resources for knowledge creation; 
· pressing for legislation that offers unions more opportunity for in-
fluencing the organization of work. 
 
7.3.1 Independent development of knowledge, primarily in relation to 
automation 
Sandberg (et al. 1992: 105) describes independent union development of 
knowledge as a way to get beyond the "un-dialectical pendulum between 
the wage-negotiation model and pure participation". This approach has its 
roots in Scandinavia. The first project of this kind, the Iron and Metal 
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project, was a joint effort by the Norwegian Iron and Metal Workers' 
Union and the state-owned Norwegian Computing Center, where Nygaard 
worked. The basic idea was to make a departure from the existing 
knowledge about the impact of computers, and to aim for knowledge 
creation from the point of view of the workers' interests. Nygaard (1979: 
95) wrote: "[..] it was felt that workers would risk brainwashing 
themselves if they tried to assimilate the existing knowledge about the 
effects of these systems as a starting platform." The first step was to write 
a textbook on "Planning, Control and Data Processing". Apart from the 
need for a text in comprehensible language, reasons for writing a new 
textbook were: 
 
"[..] the fact that planning, control and data processing systems are 
designed to further the objectives of those who are in power, and 
thus are not 'neutral' and 'objective', had to be emphasized as a 
basis for understanding" [..] "the starting point should be the 
members' own conception of their work and interests, not the 
system analyst's understanding of reality" (Nygaard 1979: 99). 
 
At first, the project developed in a pure research direction with the con-
sent of the steering committee, including the union representatives. 
However, the researchers felt that the results would not be useful for 
practical union activities. This led to a shift of emphasis, whereby results 
were defined as "actions carried out by the Iron and Metal Workers'  
Union, centrally or locally, as part of or initiated by the project" (Nygaard 
1979: 98). 
Ehn (1988) calls this type of co-operation the "Collective Resources 
Approach" in systems development. In 1975, the Iron and Me talworkers' 
Project inspired a group of Swedish researchers, among them computer 
scientists and sociologists, to start the DEMOS project. The aim was to 
support local union groups that wanted to influence the introduction of 
information technology. In this view, the local union groups would carry 
out research themselves, supported by a scientist who would, as a 
participant, invest time and experience. Sources of inspiration were 
Braverman's "Labor and Monopoly Capital, The Degradation of Work in 
the Twentieth Century" and Freire's "Pedagogy of the oppressed".   
From these Scandinavian beginnings sprang a tradition of building-
up union knowledge, carried by union staff members who maintain links 
with sympathizing researchers in universities and research institutes. In 
addition to this, (social) scientists founded consulting firms that specialize 
in supporting union activity. These firms, among which Ar-
betstagarkonsult AB in Sweden and STZ92 in The Netherlands, carry out 
research as well. 
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The specialized consultants provided a range of services to union 
clubs and works councils: 
· In The Netherlands, STZ developed a research method, that at the same 
time aimed at raising consciousness. (Bouwman 1989: 41) This method 
features discussion groups, guided by semi-structured questionnaires. 
· In Sweden, consultants help organize study circles of workers. These 
worker study circles carries on an old Scandinavian tradition, and are 
not structured as research projects. 
· Making workers (and worker representatives) aware of the design 
space, by supplying examples of anti-Tayloristic development in other 
companies and in other countries. 
· Formulating demands, designed to ensure a shift away from Taylorism. 
· Drawing up alternative plans, for example alternative lay-outs for new 
facilities. 
· Participating in joint project groups or design committees, sometimes 
going as far as speaking on the workers' behalf. 
 
7.3.2 Mobilization of resources 
Building up union knowledge involved a quest for funds. Especially social 
democratic governments have been willing to offer support. Already, the 
pioneering Norwegian Iron and Metal project received state money, and in 
1972 in Sweden, the Arbetsmiljöfonden (Work Environment Fund) was 
created. The Work Environment Fund finances both bipartite 
enlightenment projects and independent union projects. Furthermore, the 
(social democratic) government committed funds to promote co-
determination. In 1977/78, this amounted to SEK 115 million; 20 million 
was for research, 20 million for educating workers' representatives in 
supervisory boards, 75 million was divided among employers and unions 
for education and information (Auer 1983: 72). The Work Environment 
Fund financed part of the DEMOS project. 
In the German states of Nordrhein-Westfalen and Niedersachsen, 
there are "Technologie Beratungsstellen" (Technology Advisory Services) 
that are government sponsored union organizations. In The Netherlands, 
there are companies that allocate funds to works councils - the most active 
members of which tend to be union members - to enable them to hire 
consultants. Subsidies to unions for hiring consultants do exist as well.93 
 
7.3.3 Pressing for legislation that offers unions more opportunity for 
influence  
This avenue was followed most extensively in Sweden. After the failure 
of the co-operation with the employers, the Swedish trade union move-
ment started what is usually called the "work legislation offensive". In 
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pursuing this line of policy, the trade union movement benefited from the 
good access possibilities to the social democratic government. (In 1976, 
the social democrats lost the election, to regain office in 1982.) The most 
important result was the passing of a co-determination act (the "MBL") in 
1976. Its goal was to widen the terrain on which collective agreements are 
made, to include management policy, e.g. on technological or 
organizational change (Gill 1985: 152). The Co-determination Act 
provides formal rules for co-determination. Employers were obliged to 
inform trade unions and to negotiate prior to introducing major changes. 
The unions, for example, became entitled to inspect the accounts of 
companies. The Co-determination Act made it legitimate for unions to 
demand negotiations on most issues that are at stake in a company 
(Gustavsen 1984: 14). However, the right for managers to manage was not 
substantially curtailed (Bansler 1989: 94). 
The framework provided by the Co-determination Act was intended 
to be extended by further central collective agreements. This did indeed 
happen, but not as quickly as was expected. The public sector saw an 
agreement in 1979. Like the Co-determination Act, this agreement was 
general in character. It stipulated that it would have to be elaborated by 
further local agreements about rationalization, monitoring at work, 
mobility of workers, planning, career planning and availability of 
information (Christis et al. 1985: 66). 
In the Swedish public sector, a collective agreement grants the 
union a temporary veto power.94 
In the private sector, the viewpoints of workers and employers 
were wider apart. The trade union, for instance, wanted the right to veto 
plans on computerization. The employers were opposed to this. 
Employers' expert Agurén remarked that the employers were frightened, 
because the trade unions assumed to be able to derive power from the Co-
determination Act.95 
As a result of the controversies, it took longer in the private sector 
than in the public sector before central agreements were reached. It was 
1982 when the agreement for 1.3 million workers in industry appeared. 
This agreement is known as the "Agreement on Efficiency and 
Participation" or "Development Agreement". These goals were stated: 
· "The introduction of new technology should be characterized by a 
holistic perspective, i.e. by a subtle balance between the goals regarding 
business ideas, personnel, technology and work organization." 
· "Technology should be utilized to maintain and further develop the 
knowledge and skills of individual workers, to facilitate new work 
organizations with new scope for worker participation and to eliminate 
environmental risks." 
· "The development process should be characterized by the active and 
meaningful participation of workers and their unions." 
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The agreement provided that research on working condition and organi-
zation in firms could take place and that unions could hire consultants at 
employers' costs. 
Apart from central agreements and agreements per sector, agree-
ments were reached on the level of branches of industry and on the level 
of the firm. This happened, for example, at the Postgiro and at Volvo. 
 
Conclusion 
The Swedish work legislation offensive was successful in bringing about 
agreements covering work and technology. 
Scandinavia represents the top in terms of legislation that offers 
unions more opportunity for influence on the organization of work. At the 
low end of the spectrum lies the U.K..96 Germany and The Netherlands are 
in between. 
 
7.4 Impact; a bleak picture 
Studies, designed to assess the impact of autonomous union action on the 
organization of work, tend to paint a bleak picture. 
In the U.K., technology agreements that were reached in companies 
(an attempt to reach a national agreement with the employers failed) 
usually contained no provisions on performance measurement by 
computerized systems and deskilling (Gill 1985: 127). There was much 
attention for health and safety, rather than for the design of jobs and its 
impact on the quality of working life. The frequency of the appearance of 
new agreements dropped off sharply (Gill 1985: 131-133). 
In The Netherlands, thirty technology agreements were reached in 
the early 1980's. Research into these agreements led to the conclusion that 
these "contributed little for the improvement of the quality of working life 
and for the control of unions on new technologies" (Van Uitert 1990). 
Cressey (1992: 240), drawing in part on research commissioned by 
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living 
Conditions, distinguished five different regulatory mechanisms that 
unions can use: 
· no involvement; 
· information provision; 
· consultation; 
· negotiation; 
· joint decision-making (including veto powers). 
He reports that few cases involved the strong regulatory mechanisms, i.e. 
negotiation and joint decision-making. 
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Kallevig (1990) cites survey results that show that ten to fifteen per 
cent of the Norwegian union members feel that there is a clear union 
influence over the implementation and use of new technology.97 
In The Netherlands, an investigation into the influence that fifteen 
works councils had on automation, established that there was none. Ten 
of the works councils had never even received a request to provide advice 
to management on matters of information technology (Van Asch and 
Jansen 1986).  
Researchers have pointed to an array of obstacles to union/works 
council influence on the organization of work. 
 
7.5 Obstacle one: The double trap of technical change98 
In the early planning stages of technical change, the design space (the 
number of degrees of freedom) is largest. As planning goes on, the design 
options get narrower. At the start of the implementation phase, much is 
already laid down. The possibilities for union access to the decision-
making process follow a pattern that is exactly the opposite. In the early 
planning stages, unionists have no access. Often, they even get no 
information on what is going on. Typically, union access is greatest in the 
later stages, in which there is relatively little left to decide on. 
Several authors made this point. Cressey (1992: 242-244), reviewing 
an extensive range of participation research, noted that workers had little 
input in the planning phase. Both managers and workers assumed that this 
is a job for specialists only. Most worker influence was in the 
implementation phase. This influence was often formal in character. He 
concluded that there was "little real involvement in technological change 
outside of the implementation phase" (244). Research by the 
Arbetslivscentrum also showed that union involvement was least in the 
starting phase.99 
Sandberg (1992: 116) points out that in practice, information rights 
depend on the benevolence of managers, and that workers often get 
information after management had evaluated alternatives and has drafted a 
proposal.  
In The Netherlands, the co-determination law gives works councils 
a limited veto power on changes in policy regarding safety, health or well-
being at work. However, a works council of the AMRO Bank lost a court 
case regarding the investment in 110 PC's. They lost the case because it 
was an experiment. This case established that the limited veto power 
applies only to advanced stages of technical change, when there are 
definitive plans. 
Dutch stevedoring company ECT is a good example of late worker 
involvement. In 1981, the works council got involved in the design of the 
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(organization of work on the) Delta 1 terminal when it received a request 
to provide advice on a social plan for this terminal. By then, the planning 
process for this terminal was already under way for seven years. In 1988, 
when the works council, armed with the service of consultants, wanted to 
influence the design of the Delta 2 terminal, the time lag between design 
and worker influence had shrunk. Now, the works council was five years 
behind the designers. When the works council started its involvement, 
already 150 engineers were busy working on the design. 
However, the ECT Delta 2 terminal shows that, even when the 
union/works council becomes involved in a late stage, some results are 
possible (a technical solution that gave workers somewhat greater 
autonomy). Also in the VW (MWB) machine tools factory, the works 
council was late. When it started its involvement, building activities had 
already taken place, foundations for machines had already been made. 
Still, there proved to be some room for influence, leading to a shift in 
policy towards shop floor programming (IGM 1988). 
In some cases, unions managed to steer clear of the double-trap 
obstacle by getting involved early. One of these cases is the Swedish 
Postgiro. Like in many other firms the management of the Swedish 
Postgiro customarily used information technology to reduce labor costs. 
In 1970, with a possible reduction of 800 jobs in mind, management in-
troduced machine readable forms for internal use. Upon completion of the 
project in 1976, it became evident that 300 more jobs had disappeared, 
than had been expected. Furthermore, evaluations showed that the system 
gave rise to boring work for many workers (Grip en Sundström 1985: 58). 
After 1976, management continued along the lines of using new 
technology to reduce staffing and developed a plan for a paperless Giro. It 
was intended to make an electronic image from incoming forms, including 
those that carry handwritten information. After this, the forms could be 
discarded. To enter the data from the forms into the information systems, 
the stored image would be displayed on a screen from which a worker 
would read the data and key it in. 
In this period, the approach to automation was characterized by a 
search for purely technical solutions, without looking into organizational 
aspects. 
Union representatives resented the plan for a paperless Postgiro. 
They expected 800 jobs to be lost, a degradation of the quality of work 
and an unsafe situation. Active union members feared being tied to ma-
chinery, losing an overview, and machine pacing of the work. In part, 
these reactions were determined by the negative experiences from the 
previous rationalization wave. The unions established a joint body, made a 
newsletter and held meetings with members. They used the opportunities 
offered by the co-determination act to enter into negotiations with 
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management. For this purpose, the unions instituted a negotiating party of 
20 members. The unions entered the negotiations with these goals: 
· The Postgiro should start with systems development all over again. 
· Market analysis had to be done before deciding on new technology. 
· The changes should not cause a reduction of the number of jobs. 
· Customer satisfaction had to be sought after. 
· Management should provide more information. 
· A local collective agreement was needed. (This would be the first one 
in the public sector.) 
Management did not assume a negative attitude towards these demands. 
Cooperation with the unions was necessary because of the vulnerability of 
the forms factory, which was committed to processing all forms within 24 
hours. In the negotiations, the unions seemed to get their way. In 1979, an 
agreement was reached specifying new starting-points for the future 
production system of the Postgiro: improved working conditions, 
improved work contents, no reduction in jobs, development of new 
products and a high level of service. This was followed by a period of 
further negotiations, conflicts and agreements. According to Lars 
Sundström, in these days working as a consultant to the unions, the 
management was surprised by the legal implications of the agreement that 
was signed in 1979. The Co-determination Act provides that when a 
difference of opinion exists about the interpretation of an agreement, the 
union viewpoint takes precedence. When it became evident that ma-
nagement continued on the original track, the one that was rejected by the 
unions, by asking quotations from suppliers and by getting ready to test 
equipment, the unions were able to denounce this as an offense against the 
Co-determination Act. 
A group of five union members and three external consultants 
ventured to mobilize the workers by organizing study circles. In the study 
circles, participants started by explaining to each other what their work 
entailed. Hitherto, the division of labor had prevented many workers to 
know much about the work of their colleagues. Issues discussed included 
what the work should look like in the future, the market, technical 
possibilities and the demands of the unions. A total of 400 workers took 
part in these study circles. Finally, management too decided to organize a 
form of study circles for the workers. 
In this case, the union had a relatively clear management policy to 
react to. There are also cases, in which the only thing that was given at the 
outset, was that the company needed to build a new plant. From there on, 
union/works council activities had to entirely proactive. One of these 
cases is the COVECO meat processing company in Weert, The 
Netherlands. In 1983, the works council got involved even before ma-
nagement had carried out a feasibility study or had decided on a location. 
Starting with a preventive plan - avoiding the creation of monotonous 
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work - and armed with training on technological development and various 
design principles, and with the services of an external consultant, the 
works council prepared itself to judge and amend the management's 
propositions (Bouwman 1989). 
In the design process of the Skånemejerier dairy in Malmö, we see 
trade unionists in a still more pro-active role. Starting point was an action 
program of a local "Work Environment Group" comprising members of 
the local branches of the Swedish Foodworkers' Union (Livs), the 
Swedish Association of Supervisors and Foremen (SALF) and the 
Swedish Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry (SIF). 
Researchers supported this group. Before the design process started, the 
group defined well-developed aims: 
· job enrichment; 
· semi-autonomous teams; 
· a plant lay-out that would promote social contacts, avoids isolated 
workstations and that does not inhibit the expansion of work content. 
The group imagined that every morning, representatives from all teams 
would meet to discuss the production planned for the day. (Steen and 
Ullmark 1984) 
 
7.6 Obstacle two: the knowledge gap 
According to Bansler (1989: 94), the "local union strategy" did not show 
the results that had been expected. Interested scientists like Morten Kyng 
and Pelle Ehn saw the cause for this in the lack of time and experience, 
making it difficult for unions to analyze management proposals and to 
suggest alternatives. In addition, they found that the unions suffered from 
a lack of knowledge of production technology, forcing them to remain in 
a defensive position. 
One of the explanations for the failure of technology agreements in 
The Netherlands is that the unions lacked the knowledge needed to check 
whether management complied with the agreements (According to M. 
Roggen in Van Uitert 1990: 19). 
Employing external consultants does not guarantee the complete 
closure of the knowledge gap. An internal report on a support program by 
the Dutch Union for Workers in the Service Sector (Dienstenbond FNV) 
speaks critically of the research performed by the external consultant. It 
did not lead to many useful recommendations. Furthermore, the 
consultant had difficulty in coming to grips with automation projects (Van 
Uitert 1990). However, it is fair to note that understanding a large scale 
automation project is a daunting task. For example, in their endeavor to 
influence the design of ECT's Delta 2 terminal, the works council, together 
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with their consultant, had to plow through one meter of technical 
documents describing the control information system. 
But it is not an iron law that a knowledge gap between management 
and unions exists. According to Steen and Ullmark (1984: 78), the final 
lay-out of the new Skånemejerier dairy in Malmö bears a large re-
semblance to the lay-out that was proposed by the unions. The consultants 
that worked for management  and invited suppliers of equipment had 
proposed widely different solutions. In 1992, the plant manager confirmed 
that union's consultants were knowledgeable. He substantiated this by 
pointing to the fact that, since the plant began operations, nothing had to 
be changed (except one detail, the addition of a wall to protect workers in 
the loading/unloading area from wind). 
 
7.7 Obstacle three: negotiating on qualitative issues is pro-
blematic, putting the negotiated results into practice is pro-
blematic as well 
Sandberg et al. (1992: 107) wrote that union mobilization and negotiation 
on qualitative and unstructured issues is problematic. An additional 
difficulty is, that management must have the knowledge required to put 
the negotiated results into practice. Roggen (in Van Uitert 1990: 19), 
commenting on technology agreements, noted that provisions and criteria 
were stated in terms that were (too) general and open to divergent 
interpretations. 
In the early 1970's, there was a determined effort on the part of IG 
Metall in Nordwürttemberg/Nordbaden to use negotiations to reach a shift 
away from Taylorism.100 The union started with this demand: 
 
"In manufacturing industry, the working human must no longer be 
seen as a cog, a Tayloristic particle or a robot. The goal must be to 
employ him in such a way as he deserves, as a being with a mind 
and a soul, with his own creative imagination, whose creativity 
and need for communication may not be restricted to his leisure 
time." 
 
Before the negotiations, the union converted this into "core demands", that 
had a more quantitative nature: 
1) Protection against redundancy and wage guarantee for workers over the 
age of fifty; 
2) Basically, for every hour, there must be a break of six minutes; 
3) A minimum wage guarantee for piece-rate work; 
4) Work cycles shorter than five minutes must be prohibited; 
5) More co-determination for group work in assembly line work. 
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In the process of quantification, the original vision of a new reality got 
watered down. 
A conflict with the employers developed, particularly around the 
break issue and the individual wage guarantee. After a week-long strike, 
an enabling collective agreement appeared, that included provisions on 
"flow, assembly line and machine paced work": 
 
"Flow, assembly line and machine paced work are a forced se-
quence of labor steps that a workpiece must run through and that 
must be carried out by one or more people. Labor system and 
labor content are adjusted to one another in time and in space. It is 
not possible to deviate from the prescribed pace. [..] Job design in 
flow, assembly line and machine paced work must preferentially 
aim, while taking into account scientific knowledge on job design, 
to soften the harmful effect of monotony by job enlargement or 
job enrichment. This obligation for employers applies extra 
forcefully when flow, assembly line and machine paced work is 
newly planned, and in all cases in which work content is so 
degraded that the cycle time is less than 1.5 minutes. Employer and 
works council must exploit all possibilities for job enlargement 
and job enrichment. [..] Basically, existing job cycles must not be 
subdivided any further." 
 
Note that the idea of a minimum desirable cycle length remained, but that 
it became considerably shorter. 
The agreement also stipulates that workers must be able to take 
three minutes off every hour for their personal needs. According to 
Schauer et al. (1984), this implied that machine-tied and machine-paced 
work) were not allowed. 
The researchers offer a balanced report on the impact of the 
agreement. They found that managers still carried out system changes and 
mechanization projects that, in violation of the agreement, resulted in cycle 
times below 1.5 minutes. Furthermore, the breaks required by the 
agreement lowered the capacity of production line. To compensate for 
this, managers added workstations, thereby lowering cycle times. 
Nonetheless, the researchers concluded that further subdivision of cycles 
had become more difficult to implement, but that this effect was restricted 
to repetitive assembly work. Schauer et al. (1984: 231) noted that in skilled 
work, the transition to repetitive detailed work continued. 
The definition of flow, assembly line and machine paced work was 
a problem. It was open to at least six different interpretations (Schauer et 
al. 1984: 221-225). The design of jobs tends to lie outside the scope of 
formal agreements (Schauer et al. 1984: 164). Furthermore, in many 
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companies there had been no systematic attempts to list the jobs that had 
cycle times below 1.5 minutes. 
On the positive side, the researchers report that there were sporadic 
cases of job enrichment. This was achieved by works councils that 
influenced planning while referring to the agreement. Notwithstanding this 
positive note in the report, it is telling that IG Metall never ventured in this 
direction again. 
 
7.8 Obstacle four: difficulty for workers to take initiatory con-
trol 
Cressey (1992: 246) sees as a limitation on the possibilities of unions that 
the position of workers fundamentally differs from that of managers. He 
asserts that managers "can take initiatory or positive control over the 
process of innovation". 
Two cases show that it is not an iron law that only managers can 
take initiatory control. 
In 1981, a joint body was established by social scientists and 
computer scientists from Denmark and Sweden, graphic workers and 
officials from the Nordic Graphic Worker's Union, for devising an al-
ternative technology for newspaper page make-up. (Some of the re-
searchers had been active in the DEMOS project. A part of the DEMOS 
project dealt with newspaper production.) The original goal of the 
UTOPIA project was to produce a specification for a system that would 
make it possible to maintain the skills of graphic workers and to improve 
the quality of the product. The specification had to be generally applicable 
to newspaper production and, as a side effect, it had to be useful in 
negotiations. A further aim was to contribute to the training of graphic 
workers. The background for the UTOPIA project was the impending 
introduction of automated page make-up systems (in the early 1980's). In 
the U.S., a tendency could be seen that the new systems were operated by 
workers without graphic skills (journalists or semi-skilled workers). These 
systems allowed employers to make graphic workers redundant and at the 
same time caused a loss of quality in the product. 
The UTOPIA project was approached by a Swedish supplier who 
was developing a new page make-up system (Liber/TIPS). Marketing 
reasons prompted Liber/TIPS to try capturing a large share of the home 
market. This made it necessary to comply with the demands of the 
Scandinavian graphic unions. Liber/Tips and the UTOPIA group decided 
to see if they could work together to realize their ideas in a commercial 
system. This gave the UTOPIA group the opportunity to influence a 
development project worth 10 million dollars.  
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The designers distanced themselves from page make-up systems 
that take coordinates of boxes as input, in which the text is then auto-
matically fitted. Instead, they wanted to develop a way of working that is 
in principle similar to the "paper paste-up" method. This requires that the 
material can be directly manipulated on a high resolution graphic 
workstation. The page has to be displayed as realistically as possible. The 
make-up work consists of ordering and reordering the material until a 
good result is obtained. The intention was to do more than just recreating 
the old way of working. The use of computers makes it possible to 
combine the advantage of the traditional lead typesetting - firmness of 
typography - and the advantage of the paper paste-up method - flexibility. 
A problem of computer page make-up is the low resolution of even the 
best computer screens, when compared to a real newspaper page. 
Furthermore, there are no screens the size of a newspaper page. Much 
development work was devoted to creating software tools to get around 
these obstacles. "Software lenses", imitating real lenses in operation, were 
a solution for the problem of low resolution. 
Apart from specifications for the page make-up system, the 
UTOPIA group developed a specification for a scanner for images. The 
union wanted every single task to have an acceptable level of skill. 
Therefore the scanner needed to have capabilities for image processing 
and manipulation. This would mean efficiency benefits as well, because in 
the phase of page make-up, which normally is done under time pressure, 
less work would have to be done on the images. 
The technical design was complemented by a design for a work 
organization. Historical and sociological research was done. An example is 
a study on the automation of newspaper production in the U.S., in order 
to obtain a clear negative example. 
The technical design was based on what the researchers called a 
"tool perspective": 
 
"The computer support is designed as a collection of tools for the 
skilled worker to use. The tool perspective takes the work process 
as its origin rather than data or information flow. This means: not 
detailed analysis, description and formalization of qualifications, 
but development of professional education based on the skills of 
professionals; not information flow analysis and systems 
description, but specification of tools." (Bødker 1987: 261) 
 
The development method is characterized by cooperation between 
workers and professional developers. The main techniques were simu-
lation of the work on mock-up workstations and the use of a "work or-
ganization toolbox" to show possible production flows and organizational 
solutions. 
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Another case in point is the initiative of shop stewards at Lucas 
Aerospace to counter imminent redundancies by developing socially 
useful products (Wainwright and Elliot 1982). An appealing technical 
success was a prototype road-rail vehicle in the form of a converted bus. 
(Management policy, however, did not change.) Both cases, the Utopia 
project and the Lucas Plan, show at least that it is not only managers who 
can take initiatory control over new technology. 
 
7.9 Interim conclusion 
All four obstacles, the double trap of technical change, the knowledge 
gap, the difficulties pertaining to negotiations on qualitative issues and 
deprivation of initiatory control are real. Nevertheless, none of these 
obstacles is necessarily fatal for change initiatives. Furthermore, there are 
ways for unions and works councils to evade or overcome these ob-
stacles. Often, these entail extraordinary effort and favorable circum-
stances. But we have to take into account the effect of cumulation of ob-
stacles, which lowers the overall chance for success. 
 
7.10 Impact revisited 
The bleak picture derived from existing surveys may lead to the conclu-
sion that attempts by unions and works councils to gain influence over the 
organization of work were all fruitless. This is not the case. A search 101 
produced sixteen cases of local union/works council initiatives, that had 
anti-Tayloristic goals. In half of these cases, there was an effect on the 
design of jobs. However, it is clear that, in contrast with consensual 
alternatives, one is hard-pressed to find cases of autonomous union action 
that resulted in shifts away from Taylorism. 
There is a second difference between autonomous union/works 
council initiatives and consensual alternatives. Compared to consensual 
alternatives, a much larger proportion of independent union/works 
council initiatives (80 per cent against 8.4 per cent) included attempts to 
prevent further detail division of labor, separation of conception from 
execution, increasing technical discipline and the disappearance of human 
skills and expertise into automatic machinery and information systems. 
This implies the following: the superior effectiveness of consensual anti-
Tayloristic policy (consensual alternatives propelled by enlightenment) 
might lead unions to fully abandon the course of independent actions. 
However, because consensual alternatives are attempts to improve 
situations rather than to avert threats of further Taylorization, this would 
 worker mobilization 134  
rob the unions of the means to counteract further Taylorization where it 
occurs. 
The search produced five (more or less) successful cases where 
unions/works councils averted Taylorist threats. In three cases, plans for 
Tayloristic applications of information technology were canceled. 
 
a) At the Scandinavian Airline SAS, management wanted to introduce an 
expert system for aircraft maintenance. Because this would mean a risk of 
deskilling, there was union resistance. This led to the deployment of a 
database system instead of an expert system. In this way, the maintenance 
process remained entirely based on the skills of the workers, who could 
use the database to retrieve information as needed.102 (While assessing this 
case, it is important to note that in the 1980's, expert systems were still 
experimental technology.) 
 
A part of the Swedish DEMOS project took place in a railway repair shop. 
Its management wanted to introduce a computerized production planning 
system ("ISA-KLAR"). This system would give workers detailed 
instructions such as: 
 
"1) Fetch tools x and y 
2) Go by bogie 
3) Crawl into position 
4) Remove split pen 
5) Remove bolt and washer 
6) Repeat operation 3-5 for remaining 5 bolts 
7) Transport out 
Estimated time required for this job: x minutes." (Sandberg 1983: 68) 
  
As an alternative, the workers wanted to develop further the existing 
system of semi-autonomous groups. Finally, they had their way. 
(Sandberg (1983: 63)  wondered whether this resulted from the force of 
the unions or from the fact that management realized, during the process, 
that the union alternative would mean more efficient and intensive work 
than would be the case with the ISA-KLAR system.) 
 
c) At the Swedish Postgiro, an automation plan that implied far-reaching 
computer control was dropped. After mobilization and negotiation, 
management dropped this plan for a "paperless" giro. This was what the 
unions wanted; but doubts about the technical feasibility could also have 
been a reason for management to drop the plan. Later, directors informally 
remarked that the unions had saved them from a technical disaster. 
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An second important item, that was on the union's wish list, was the 
integration of bookkeeping work and the investigation of errors. This did 
not become a reality. 
 
In all three cases, there are reasons to doubt the technical feasibility 
and/or economic viability of the plans that were canceled. This makes it 
likely that, without union intervention, after a waste of money, the end 
result would have been the same. 
 
In one case, intervention by a works council led to a company decision to 
leave some discretion to straddle carrier drivers. 
 
d) At the ECT stevedoring company, there was one tangible result of the 
attempts by the works council to influence the design of the jobs on the 
Delta 2 terminal. This terminal has a fully automatic stack (storage area). 
This means that AGV's (Automated Guided Vehicles), unmanned 
computer controlled trucks, carry containers around the terminal. The 
stack is equipped with computer controlled stacking cranes. Containers 
are placed randomly in the stack. It is only at the boundaries of this 
automatic system that human operations take place. The quay cranes that 
unload containers from ships onto AGV's and vice versa, are still man-
operated. And where the system connects with road transportation, there 
is work for straddle-carrier drivers. Straddle-carriers are used to lift 
containers off AGV's and load these onto road trucks and vice versa. This 
residual work is short-cycled. Compared to a traditional stack, in which 
straddle-carriers travel greater distances, cycles are shorter. 
Originally, the plan was to use the information system to allocate 
work over the straddle-carriers. The information system would tell each 
driver exactly which container to take next. Intervention by the works 
council led to the development of a system that shows drivers which 
containers are waiting to be picked up, and what the various waiting times 
are. The drivers can, while communicating by radio, work out optimal 
solutions. Those responsible for planning and designing the labor process 
in this terminal disagreed among themselves on the desirability of full 
computer control of the straddle carrier driver's work. This helped the 
workers' side to exert influence. To make the debate more informed, 
designers arranged to simulate the alternative forms of control. Actual 
drivers, sitting at VDU's, received simulated instructions.103 (It is debatable, 
however, whether a choice between a small set of containers represents 
real autonomy.) 
A more ambitious plan from the workers' side was to include in the 
lay-out of the terminal a non-automatic, traditional stack for storing 
"reefers" (refrigerated containers) and off-standard containers. This would 
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have led to potentially longer cycle times and less monotony for the 
straddle carrier drivers. This latter plan failed. 
 
In one case, union intervention led to a company choice to retain a level 
of manual regulation. 
 
e) Three unions, the Swedish Foodworkers' Union (Livs), the Swedish 
Association of Supervisors and Foremen (SALF) and the Swedish Union 
of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry (SIF) were involved in 
de design of the Skånemejerier dairy in Malmö, which opened in 1984. 
The final design has a special feature, that sets it apart from many other 
modern dairies: the regulation of the fat content of the milk was 
deliberately not automated. Manual regulation of fat content takes place by 
means of three screws in the process department. 
Like in other cases, it is not entirely clear to what extent union in-
fluence has to be credited for this anti-Tayloristic aspect of the design. 
Union involvement started with of an action program. Subse-
quently, influencing the design process took place through participation in 
a project group. Steen and Ullmark (1984: 77) who were personally 
involved as consultants for the unions' side, note that it is difficult, in a 
joint debate, to pinpoint which substantial changes were caused by union 
influence. 
Eight years after the start of production, the manual regulation of fat 
content was still there. Apparently, this was not due to any policy to 
preserve and enhance skills. The plant manager felt that manual regulation 
was important, because otherwise operators would never leave their 
control room, and would therefore be less likely to detect leaks. Fur-
thermore, an automatic regulator would cost SEK 500.000, without leading 
to a saving of milk fat; monthly checks had established that the manual 
regulation system was optimal. 
In this case, unionists had also striven toward the introduction of 
semi-autonomous teams. But this was not realized. 
 
In one case, a union succeeded in having a system of performance 
monitoring banned. 
 
f) In The Netherlands, PTT Telecom used the computerized system that 
allocates calls to operators for measuring operator performance. The 
union successfully took PTT Telecom to court to end this practice. (Legal 
action is a third mechanism for union influence besides negotiation and 
developing alternative plans.) 
 
A category apart from these preventive actions are initiatives to create new 
structures. In this category, even initiatives that overcome or avoid the 
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four hurdles - the double trap of technical change, the knowledge gap, the 
difficulties pertaining to negotiations on qualitative issues and the 
deprivation of initiatory control - are not safe. More perils lie in their path. 
In 1984, at the Swedish Postgiro, negotiations had arrived at a 
point, where the main demands of the unions were close to being satis-
fied: 
· There was consensus that the work organization had to be changed, 
with an integration of bookkeeping and investigation of errors. This 
would mean job enrichment for the workers who enter transaction data 
in the bookkeeping department. However, managers had some doubts 
whether the workers would be able to cope with the more complex 
tasks and whether the work would not be too complex for temporary 
workers (Grip and Sundström 1985: 144). 
· The plan for a paperless giro, meaning that data would have to be read 
from electronic images of forms on computer screens, was dropped. 
However, management did not exclude looking into this technology in 
the future. 
· A different type of systems development had made its way into the 
Postgiro, in which market relations, organization, ergonomics and 
training are considered first before decisions are made about techno-
logy. System development became negotiable. Grip and Sundström 
(1985: 140) call this "dialectic system development": "Different system 
approaches are debated in negotiations and are changed during the 
process."  
Such was the situation at the time of the "Control of Frontiers" research 
project, through which the Swedish Postgiro earned its place in history as 
an internationally outstanding case of worker influence. 
But it turned out to be different. The CEO of the Postgiro and the 
director responsible for technology were replaced. The new management 
did not support the plan to integrate bookkeeping and investigation of 
errors. An argument was, that in this way, the three months backlog in 
investigation would increase. (Later it became evident that this backlog 
increased anyhow.) The trade unions were unable to have their way, 
especially because management exploited internal controversies in the 
workforce. The workers of the investigation department were less en-
thusiastic about the integration of investigation and bookkeeping. (For 
them, it did not represent job enrichment.) 
As already mentioned, the plan for the paperless giro was not im-
plemented. The change in the method of systems development was a 
lasting one. Since 1984 , 400 automation projects were carried out at the 
Postgiro, not a single one of them without participation of the unions. 
Organization and market are now considered before technology. The 
number of jobs at the Postgiro increased. 
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In this case, the limits of the Co-Determination Act were explored. 
However, this was done to such an extent, that the Swedish state advised 
semi-public firms to refrain from negotiating technology agreements.104 
Thus, this initiative suffered from some of the same obstacles that plague 
consensual alternatives, namely a contingent replacement of managers by 
more Tayloristically minded ones and job impoverishment for some as a 
side effect of job enrichment for others. Since workers' interests have to 
be in the foreground, a union driven initiative is more prone to fall over 
this latter obstacle than management driven initiatives. 
Also at the Skånemejerier dairy in Malmö, the plan to introduce 
semi-autonomous teams ran afoul of a contingent change of management. 
The new plant manager saw decentralization of responsibility as inefficient 
under conditions in which high-speed operation is required. "We must run 
one hundred per cent smooth", said the plant manager: "We operate in a 
hard time schedule. It takes too much time for the workers to take their 
own responsibility. The manager must be high speed. He must take 
responsibility for everything and push it in a hard way." He added that, 
quite differently from the train or the newspaper, the dairy is never late, 
and that Volvo with its semi-autonomous teams needed too much time to 
produce a car, leading to the transferal of production outside Sweden. 
In the COVECO meat processing plant (Weert, The Netherlands), 
semi-autonomous teams did not materialize either. The departure of the 
leading proponent on the workers' side played a role in this. 
Again, these initiatives ran into difficulties that also threaten con-
sensual alternatives. 
The UTOPIA project saw many of its recommendations embodied 
in the final design of the Liber-TIPS page make-up system (Bansler 1989). 
But the cooperation between UTOPIA and Liber failed at a planned test 
installation at a newspaper. The management of the newspaper refused to 
combine the test installation with a well defined experiment on work 
organization. The main cause for the experiment to be called off was the 
demarcation disputes between journalists and graphic workers and their 
unions (Bødker 1987: 260). 
There was a conflict between Liber and the UTOPIA group because 
Liber wanted to develop a different version of the system for the U.S. 
market, that was more adapted to a hierarchical work organization. 
Finally, none of the two versions made it to the market. For a 
relatively small firm like Liber, developing two versions was expensive. 
Furthermore, the system was made obsolete by technological develop-
ments. It was based on the architecture of a central minicomputer (VAX) 
with terminals. Meanwhile, cheap, fast workstations with their own 
processing power appeared. Converting the software to run on these 
workstations would be too much of a financial burden for Liber. 
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However, the ideas of the UTOPIA project proved to be not an 
unrealistic dream. In the U.S., desktop publishing packages became 
available, that did not differ much from the ideal of the UTOPIA project. 
According to Pelle Ehn, project leader of the UTOPIA project, even early 
versions of Pagemaker (for Apple Macintosh and MS DOS PC's) had 
already 80 per cent of the required functionality. Twenty years of 
experience in the graphic craft had gone into the development of 
Pagemaker. 
The Liber/TIPS scanner, with its image processing capabilities, did 
make it to the market. The further influence of the UTOPIA project was 
largely ideological. The project influenced collective agreements all over 
Scandinavia (Ehn 1988). Graphic workers in Scandinavia were informed 
about the UTOPIA project by the newsletter Grafiti, of which thousands 
of copies were distributed. There was also influence on the world of 
research and development. Pelle Ehn points in this respect to the Human 
Centered Technology Movement (Mike Cooley and Peter Brödner). 
However, since the UTOPIA project, this level of direct union 
involvement in the development of new technology has not occurred 
again. 
However, the core of the UTOPIA project - the page make-up 
system - did not make it to the market. It did not overcome one of the 
obstacles that also lie in the way of the technical R & D projects in en-
lightenment programs: that non-ideologically inspired companies can 
produce products that have the same functionality as the intended alter-
native product. A second obstacle - the risk of obsolescence in terms of 
the hardware platforms - is common to all software projects. 
As we have seen, union/works council initiatives to create new anti-
Tayloristic structures in the workplace are confronted by extra barriers on 
top of the double trap of technological change, the knowledge gap, the 
problems of negotiating on qualitative issues, the problem of putting the 
negotiated results into practice and the difficulty for workers to take 
initiatory control. These extra barriers are the same as the barriers that 
plague initiatives to create consensual alternatives. 
Nevertheless, the search produced three successful cases that in-
volve the creation of anti-Tayloristic structures in the workplace  
· In 1980, the union became involved in technical change at the Pullmax 
machine tools factory in Ursviken (Sweden). The reported results were: 
operators handle all CNC programming; they receive orders for a week, 
and make the detailed planning themselves (Ruskin College 1984: 1-11, 
Sandberg et al. 1992: 166-177). 
· In the machine tools factory of VW (MWB) Union/works council in-
volvement, starting in 1985, led to a shift in policy towards shop floor 
programming (IGM 1988). 
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· Reports credit the works council of the Unichema Unilever chemical 
company in Gouda for achieving job enrichment and participation for 
operators (Brouwers 1989: 4, Pot et al. 1993: 8). 
 
7.11 Conclusions 
Worker-mobilization based policies face four specific obstacles: 
· the double trap of technological change; 
· the knowledge gap; 
· negotiating on qualitative issues is problematic and putting the nego-
tiated results into practice is problematic as well; 
· difficulty for workers to take initiatory control. 
None of these obstacles is necessarily lethal for the initiative, but the 
cumulative effect makes the chances for success lower than in consensual 
alternatives. 
In addition to this, worker-mobilization based policies aimed at 
creating new structures in the workplace face the same obstacles that 
confront consensual alternatives. The implementation of new structures is 
beyond the policy makers' control (i.e. it is a bridging variable). If worker 
mobilization is to succeed in bringing about new structures, it needs the 
support of (a major section of) management. 
On the other hand, worker-mobilization based policies for pre-
venting further Taylorization need this support to a much lesser extent. 
This is also an area in which the worker mobilization based policy excels 
in comparison with consensual policy. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  COMPATIBILITY OF ANTI-TAYLORISM WITH 
EFFICIENCY  
 
This chapter focuses on efficiency, a second possible constraint on anti-
Tayloristic policy. (The first constraint examined was management power, 
in Chapter Six.) This variable is included to allow for the possibility that 
the central assumption on which both enlightenment and worker 
mobilization rest (the assumption that departing from Taylorism nowadays 
necessarily boosts efficiency), is incorrect.  
In social theory, a culturally pessimistic strand exists, in which the 
relation between efficiency and humanization is problematic. It rejects the 
assumption that humanization and efficiency go hand in hand. This 
approach is most clearly connected to Critical Theory (Alvesson 1987a, b). 
Instrumental rationality, showing up in mass production and mass 
consumption, is seen as being so dominant that change efforts directed at 
the world of work alone are generally useless. It could only make sense to 
strive after a comprehensive change of production and consumption in 
close connection, serving not only the quality of working life but also the 
environment: e.g. through a refusal to buy cars or to buy fast food. 
 
Box 8.1 Clash between efficiency and humanism 
In Critical Theory, there is a clear clash between efficiency and hu-
manization. This clash is apparent in, for example, an article entitled 
"Some implications of modern technology" that Herbert Marcuse pu-
blished in 1942. In this article, the Third Reich serves as an powerful 
example to show how extreme the clash can be. Marcuse sees modern 
industrialized society as a system, characterized by “standardized control, 
production and consumption”. In this system, autonomous, critical reason 
has lost its meaning and has been transformed into adjustment and 
“efficient compliance with the pre-given continuum of means and 
ends”.105 
At the same time, he sees this system as highly efficient.106 
He alludes to the possibility that the state, if democratically controlled, can 
conserve human and natural resources, that technology and corporations 
have tended to waste (Marcuse 194: 432). 
But also in a management-oriented text like Mintzberg (1983: 180), one 
finds the following statement: "As long as society demands cheap, mass-
produced goods and services - a great many jobs will remain pretty much 
as they are now". 
Already in Max Weber's work, the clash between efficiency and hu-
manization can be found. For Weber (in Gerth and Mills 1977: 214), the 
most efficient form of organization is the bureaucratic organization: "The 
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decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always 
been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. 
The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other 
organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes 
of production." And perfection of the bureaucracy is the opposite of 
humanization: "[Bureaucracy's] specific nature, which is welcomed by 
capitalism, develops the more perfectly the more bureaucracy is 'de-
humanized', the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official 
business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional 
elements which escape calculation." (in Gerth and Mills 1977: 216) 
 
This chapter examines the consensual alternatives for indications of effi-
ciency-related constraints. 
Because the present study is based on cases of organizations in 
which anti-Tayloristic policies are implemented, it is impossible to 
completely answer the question to what extent efficiency requirements 
constrain anti-Tayloristic change. It could always be that in some or-
ganizations, efficiency requirements completely prevent anti-Tayloristic 
ideas to take roots. 
 
8.1 A cautionary note: efficiency is a contextually dependent 
concept 
Do efficiency requirements limit the opportunities for consensual alter-
natives? 
Efficiency is an elusive, subjective concept. It is a contested terrain 
as well. In 1973, the Philips works council complained that management 
saw work structuring as a luxury item, and that it overlooked the 
economic advantages: improvement in quality, less need for spare 
workers, less overhead (Philips: 1973). In the Halmstad County Hospital, 
efficiency is a somewhat controversial point as well. In this hospital, the 
new organization of work requires more nursing staff per ward. This is 
compensated for by the fact that these nurses take over a number of tasks 
that had before been performed by others, like taking blood samples and 
transporting patients. A ban on hiring temporary help compensates for the 
increase in permanent staff numbers as well. Wards have to solve 
temporary personnel shortages by adjusting schedules or by borrowing 
from one another. To some extent, opinions diverge on whether this is 
efficient. The head of the clinic for Internal Medicine points to the 
reduction of personnel turnover, resulting from the improved quality of 
working life, as the decisive factor. This saves costs  that are incurred 
when newly-hired workers are not yet settled in their jobs. However, the 
head of another clinic is not convinced: 
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"If I am short of money, it can be that I go, in some way, back to 
the old system." 
 
In the new system, doctors do not talk primarily to the head nurse when 
they want to discuss a particular patient, but instead, have turn to the nurse 
in charge of the seven bed mini-ward to which the patient belongs. 
Doctors and nurses take opposing views on the efficiency of this 
arrangement. Nurses emphasize that information flows more efficiently 
because doctors are talking to nurses who know the patients well. Doctors 
on the other hand, emphasize that they are losing time by having to look 
for the right nurse to talk to. But a nurse who is part of management, 
notes: 
 
"Waiting takes a long time when you are impatient." 
 
The old organization of work had its efficiency problems as well. A head 
nurse explains: 
 
Often, the nurses sat in their office doing administrative work. But 
it was not quite clear what they were doing. They made telephone 
calls and claimed that they were busy, but they could hide there 
easily and say that someone else should do the work. Now that 
they are responsible they can't hide anymore." 
 
In Germany, there is a specific line of research called extended efficiency 
research ("Erweiterte Wirtschaftlichkeitsforschung"), based on the idea 
that traditional accounting methods are biased towards Tayloristic 
organization patterns. This involves taking more factors into account, in 
order to bring the long-term advantages of consensual alternatives to light. 
This includes criteria like (Reppel 1992: 57): 
· flexibility in relation to changed market demands; 
· production safety; 
· quality; 
· flexibility in manning; 
· motivation; 
· possibility for the individual to influence the work system; 
· opportunities for learning; 
· ergonomic usability. 
Where anti-Tayloristic changes are undone, this is usually not the result of 
a total collapse of the organization or near bankruptcy; it is the result of a 
management decision. Therefore, what matters most for the survival of 
organizational forms is not efficiency as an objective concept, but 
efficiency as seen by the dominant managers (i.e. contextually dependent). 
 efficiency 144  
 
8.2 Evaluations of efficiency 
Most reports on organizational changes contain authoritative statements 
about the efficiency (or equivalently: effectiveness, productivity, eco-
nomic viability, performance or "Wirtschaftlichkeit") of the new or-
ganization. The combination of these statements with assessments by 
major stakeholders (primarily managers) yields the following picture: 
In 61 per cent of the cases, major stakeholders or evaluators de-
termined that the emergent new organization was efficient. In 11 per cent, 
efficiency was in some respect problematic, but not to the extent that it 
caused a reversal of policy. In 6.5 per cent, management found the new 
way inefficient to such an extent, that it decided not to go ahead with the 
changes altogether. In 21 per cent, there was no information on efficiency 
available. Some cases showed a marked economic success: 
· A study showed that Opel Hoppmann made better profits than compa-
rable firms. Furthermore, during two recessions, workers accepted 
unpopular measures (Hoppmann and Stötzel 1981: 34-36). 
· In the IHC shipyard, there is satisfaction with the system of team-
working. IHC's Piet Wemmers stated: "At IHC we consider team-
working as something of paramount importance. We started out ten 
years ago and it clearly contributed to the success of the company." 
· The once endangered DAF components factory, where the change 
process began, bounced back into vitality. DAF did proceed to out-
source some components, but on the other hand, it started manufac-
turing several previously outsourced components, because that proved 
to be cheaper. 
· Felten & Guillaume recovered the cost of the change to production 
islands and teams in the production of metal parts in three years 
(Klingenberg and Kränzle 1987: 10). 
There is one case in which anti-Tayloristic change was apparently too 
efficient to be successful. A 1960's Industrial Democracy experiment in the 
Christiania Spigerverke wire drawing mill in Oslo introduced job rotation 
and detail planning in a workgroup. This led to a 20% productivity 
increase. The problem was that this would lead to higher wages for the 
group members, which was unacceptable for other workers. Group 
members proposed compensation in time off, but this was unacceptable 
for management. The project stopped because of this difficulty with the 
wage system (Thorsrud et al. 1976: 429-431, Bolweg 1976: 57-60). 
Several reports indicate a reduced absence through illness. An 
initiative in a U.K. mine to reduce the division of labor in the 1950's 
resulted in reduced absence and in a lower accident rate (Trist and Bam-
forth 1951: 4, Trist 1981: 30). Opel Hoppmann's absence through illness 
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rate was lower than in comparable firms (Hoppmann and Stötzel 1981: 34-
35). At tin can factory TDV, absence increased after the beginning of the 
change process, but later it decreased to half of the original level. In the 
Halmstad County Hospital, absence went down.107 The downside of 
increased efficiency can be job losses and intensification of work. 
 
Box 8.2 Job losses and intensification of work as the price for in-
creased efficiency 
Increased efficiency translates into jobless growth and job losses. For 42 
per cent of the cases, there was information available on the effect on 
employment. In 26.9 per cent of these cases, there was a reduction of 
employment. This reduction averaged on 26.7 per cent.108 
To the extent that the balancing losses associated with a Tayloristic or-
ganization of production (see Chapter Two) decrease, idle time - some-
times a welcome break - disappears. At the IHC shipyard, a personnel 
official, formerly a production worker, reports that many workers were 
reluctant to take on extra duties: "When they had no work to do in their 
field, they could just sit down on a crate." Workers at Sigma Coatings see 
it as a disadvantage, that their versatility made interruptions vanish: "When 
you can't get on with a certain job, and the boss sees it, he can send you to 
another machine to help, just like that." A workgroup leader says: "They 
used to have a party in production when there was something going 
wrong in the filling department." 
In several cases, written sources report increases in job intensity. At Felten 
& Guillaume, the workload had increased as a result of job enlargement 
and a reduction in personnel (Theerkorn 1991: 234). Berggren reports 
increased work intensity in several Volvo and Saab plants (in Sandberg et 
al. 1992: 71). 
At the Volvo Uddevalla plant (spring 1990), people were working under 
great pressure and absentee rates rose to twelve per cent. On top of this, 
teams had to produce the same number of cars at all times, regardless of 
the number of people present.109 However, job intensity did not increase in 
all cases.110 
 
Notwithstanding the many positive evaluations, in several cases there was 
evidence that decision makers and evaluators felt that the emergent new 
way of working, wholly or partially, was not optimally efficient. 
 
8.3 The Babbage principle 
Ten years of experience in the Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen, with a 
flexible manufacturing system, manned by a semi-autonomous team, did 
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not lead to diffusion within the company. The main objection was that the 
system needed highly skilled, and therefore expensive workers. Here we 
see the Babbage Principle (division of labor makes it possible to hire 
cheaper workers, see Chapter One) in action. 
 
Box 8.3 Surprising developments: Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen 
An expert referred me to Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen (ZF) as one of the 
most significant anti-Tayloristic initiatives in Germany. There was a 577 
page book on a flexible manufacturing system and corresponding 
organization of work, that had been developed at ZF, as part of the 
Humanization of Work program (Schultz-Wild et al. 1986). One of the 
features was an integration of supervision of the installation, setting up 
system components, quality control, adjustment of tools, adaptation of 
NC-programs and creation of work schedules. Among these tasks were 
not only the typical residual tasks that remain after automation, but also 
tasks that are usually split off from the operator's job and handled by 
special departments (Schultz-Wild et al. 1986: 523). Employees worked in 
groups, each group being responsible for a production island. Workers 
did not have permanent workstations, tasks were allocated by the group. 
The researchers, who followed the project over the course of ten years, 
made a clear statement as to what extent this new system departs from the 
usual way of working. They found the new system, from the point of 
view of organization of work, work content, personnel administration and 
qualification demands, to be "in sharp contrast with the tendencies that 
have for decades dominated the rationalization of production work" 
(Schultz-Wild et al. 1986: 519). 
When asked about the experience with this flexible manufacturing system, 
production manager R. Gugenheimer said: "You can forget about it right 
away". After 1985, ZF abandoned further development of the flexible 
manufacturing system. The reason were the high wages commanded by 
the highly skilled operators. This made the system uneconomical. The fact 
that the system required many robots, aggravated this problem. 
After experimenting with the flexible manufacturing system, ZF went in 
the direction of CIM (Computer Integrated Manufacturing). This was an 
attempt to use automation to compensate for the high labor costs. CIM 
required only one-third of the number of operators. 
In 1992, a CIM system for the production of gear boxes, divided up over 
several "islands", was in full use. The production of gearwheels was 
entirely automatic, including the picking up of rough pieces of steel from 
crates, inserting the workpiece and taking it out after machining. Initially, 
there had even been in use a robot for replacing defective tools. This 
robot proved too expensive to maintain and therefore was put out of 
service. It had to span distances up to fifteen meters with great precision, 
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under varying ambient temperatures. In other islands, fully automatic 
machines mounted the machined gearwheels to other parts by means of 
shrinking or laser-welding. Every island was manned by three of four 
workers. 
Final assembly of gear boxes involved somewhat more human labor. It 
took place on AGV's (Automated Guided Vehicles). In this phase, much 
happened automatically as well. For example, a machine tightened all bolts 
at the same time. A panel with lights, not unlike one in an aircraft cockpit, 
indicated if a bolt did not get the correct turning moment. The system had 
interfaces with CAD (Computer Aided Design), PPS (Production Planning 
System) and CAP (Computer Aided Production) systems. 
"The system works well", said R. Gugenheimer, "but in the beginning 
there were terrible problems. They used the same planning system as used 
in the USA for the production of cruise missiles, but nonetheless more 
than 2000 errors showed up. The CIM system is not economical. The 
capital costs are too great. Furthermore, one needs many mechatronics 
engineers to keep the system going. [In the days when this was planned] 
people thought that the future belonged to the automatic factory. An 
important example was an automatic Mazda factory. Later, it became clear 
that Mazda had too much money and that they put that into technical toys 
to see what was technically possible." 
A third era dawned when ZF engineers had the opportunity to see inside a 
Japanese gear box factory: "One man operated seven or eight machines 
and they worked like ants. In Europe you can not introduce this in one 
sweep, it has to happen step by step. The Japanese factory was only half 
automated. Robots were simple, making them easier to program." 
This experience led to a third phase at ZF: HIM (Human Integrated 
Manufacturing). The aim is to combine the "good elements from the 
Japanese way of working: the lean aspect and segmentation". The in-
tention is to organize half of the work in the form of islands, the other half 
in workshops. It is the intention that team members help one another, take 
care of small repairs and stand in for absent workers. A new wage system 
will reward mutual helping, something which the current piece-rate system 
does not do. Costs will have to go down twenty percent. "The Japanese 
make the world go crazy", says R. Gugenheimer, "Over there, work is the 
most important value, they are workaholics." 
 
At DAF Trucks, in the beginning the idea was that all team members must 
be capable of doing all the work, including CNC programming. The main 
reason for letting this idea slip away was that it was expensive. Again we 
see the Babbage Principle in action. At least in these cases, there seems to 
be a point beyond which further job enrichment is not profitable. (See Fig 
5.1.) 
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Fig. 8. 1 The Babbage principle as an obstacle to job enrichment 
 
The Babbage Principle can be an underlying factor that is not obvious at 
first sight. Change projects in mail terminals stumbled across what appears 
to be an inherent simplicity of work. Sorting mail is by itself shortcycled 
work. Automation can eliminate the handling of mail, leaving only manual 
coding of postal codes to workers. This makes the work even more short-
cycled than it had previously been. Gustavsen, Hart and Hofmaier (1988: 
23) found that this was an obstacle to change: 
 
"There has been a movement towards group based work and more 
participation oriented forms of supervision and management. It 
has also become clear that there are limits to what can be achieved 
through changes in work organization under present conditions of 
work and technological development in large mail centers. A lot of 
simple work is still present and any amount of rotation or other 
ways of redistributing tasks have their limitations in terms of the 
ability to turn this type of job into 'the good work'." 
 
This obstacle, that appears to be inherent, unavoidable simplicity, is one 
of efficiency. It would surely be technically thinkable to eliminate this 
coding job and to add some coding work to many other jobs in the postal 
service. All-round employees in post offices could, as part of their job, 
collect letters from letter boxes, and code the addresses onto machine-
readable tags or labels. Sorting mail in post terminals could then proceed 
entirely automatically. Attempts to organize the postal service in this way 
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are likely to face the Babbage Principle obstacle. This principle is so much 
internalized that radical reorganization does not often appear as an option, 
not even in scholarly texts. It simply does not pass through the 
subconscious anti-utopianism filter. 
 
8.4 Comparative technical advantages of Taylorist systems 
Volvo Kalmar abolished dock assembly because it became inefficient. The 
number of different car models was increasing, so that the stocks of 
components which had to be kept at the dock were becoming too large. 
Furthermore, the production pace had increased to such an extent that 
dock assembly-connected disruptions of the production process had more 
serious consequences (Agurén et al. 1984: 41). This is remarkable, 
because it is generally assumed that increased product variation makes 
Tayloristic systems less efficient. 
In the Mercedes-Benz plant in Bremen, there is dock assembly in 
some places. Moreover, management is committed to developing team-
working. However, regardless of this commitment, at Mercedes-Benz the 
assembly line concept remains firmly entrenched. In the process of 
revamping a hall for the production of the new C-class cars, management 
even introduced new assembly lines. The reason being that management 
sees abolishment of assembly line production as not economically viable. 
The lean production idea plays a role here. 
DAF Trucks experiments with dock assembly for the external 
completion of engines. However, assembly of the interior parts will 
continue to take place on an assembly line, because of the use of expen-
sive machinery. 
Among the work structuring projects at Philips, there was one that 
did not survive because of long learning times (Den Hertog 1975: 
111-114).  
In some cases, managers and engineers see Taylorist systems as an 
efficient starting point for future automation. This point of view impeded 
diffusion of semi-autonomous teamworking in the U.K. coal industry 
(Trist 1981). It is also present in the ongoing discussion on the merits and 
faults of the assembly line concept in the car industry (Berggren 1989: 
177). 
 
Box 8.4 Controversial Point: Is the assembly line the pinnacle of 
efficiency in the automobile industry? 
Controversy surrounds the efficiency of Volvo's innovative Uddevalla 
plant, which, together with the Kalmar plant, was closed down in 1993. As 
indicated earlier, the main driving motive for the innovative organization 
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of work was to ease recruitment difficulties through offering attractive 
jobs. Indeed, by 1990 Volvo Uddevalla had managed to recruit 900 
employees (41 per cent were women). But it should be pointed out that 
Volvo's wages were higher than those paid by other metalworking 
companies in the region. However, in terms of efficiency of production, 
the success is controversial. In 1990 the assembly of a car in this plant 
took 50 - 55 man-hours. The aim was to reduce this to 23 man-hours 
when the factory would be completely ready. There was certainly still a 
long way to go. In "The machine that changed the world", Womack, Jones 
and Roos (1990: 102) argue that with a twenty man-hours assembly time, a 
"neo-craft" based plant like Volvo Uddevalla could not compete with lean 
plants. The leanest plant in their survey managed to produce (simpler) cars 
in 13,5 man-hours, including welding and painting. But in November 
1992, a spokeswoman from the factory said that the plant was on its way 
to becoming more efficient than the assembly line based plants in 
Torslanda and Ghent. She added that she saw the Uddevalla system as a 
kind of lean production too. According to A. Sandberg (1993: 84), 
Uddevalla had in 1992 reached the level of productivity of Torslanda. 
The fact that Volvo's management decided to close down Uddevalla and 
Kalmar, and so to concentrate car production in Torslanda (Gothenburg) 
does not prove that these plants were inefficient. The background for the 
decision to close Uddevalla and Kalmar was an undisputed need to reduce 
capacity. Publicly given reasons for the choice were the savings earned by 
not transporting bodies from Gothenburg to Kalmar and Uddevalla, and 
the management, administration and facility costs caused by having three 
plants instead of just one. These reasons do not touch the Uddevalla 
production system. An additional explanation put forward by the 
spokeswoman of the Uddevalla plant, is that management and union 
power is concentrated in Torslanda, the hub of the company. Therefore it 
is understandable that jobs are saved in Torslanda and not in peripheral 
plants. In fact she argued, as did Sandberg, that the flexibility of the 
Uddevalla plant, making it possible to produce to order and allowing for 
last minute changes, would give it the edge over Torslanda.111  
Much controversy over efficiency had at its core the question, how wide 
or how narrow one should define the concept.  
The experiment with dock assembly of engines, instead of using an as-
sembly line at DAF Trucks gives rise to this question. "It is difficult to 
prove that dock assembly is as effective", says A. Coppens. "You just 
have to shop further away to get parts, and each and every part has to be 
handled twice. In order to assess whether it is as effective as the assembly 
line you would have to measure in an integral way. You would have to 
include for instance absence and wastage." 
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Since Adam Smith no one will be surprised to see series size as a variable 
in the equation that determines the comparative efficiency of Taylorist 
systems. A study on group assembly of engines at Volkswagen concluded 
that this was only efficient for a production volume of less than 300 
engines per day. VW determined that, being a mass producer, group 
assembly was not an alternative (Granel 1979: 45-46). Commenting on 
change projects in the clothing industry, management representative G. 
Paß (1981: 20) concluded that team structures had not proved themselves 
in the production of large series. 
 
8.5 Shiftwork 
When efficiency requirements dictate shiftwork, they obstruct effective 
teamworking. When a team is divided into two shifts, collective decision-
making is difficult, because at any given moment, at most only half of the 
team members are present. A partial solution might be to spend time 
together at midday. This however, leads to increased labor costs. It is 
difficult to prove that these hard costs are compensated for by more 
efficient teamworking. A second shiftwork-related complication occurred 
at Holec, where the works council is opposed to overlapping presence 
because this would decrease shiftwork pay supplements. 
An alternative to dividing teams up over shifts is to make each shift 
into a team. This is the case at the Avebe Foxhol food processing plant in 
The Netherlands. Felten & Guillaume has this arrangement as well, that 
two teams work in the same cell alternately. The problem with this 
arrangement is that the planning of a single production process can hardly 
be divided up among different teams. 
On the positive side, in some workplaces, supervisors generally 
work in the daytime only, leaving some autonomy to the late shift. (An 
example of this is Sigma Coatings in Amsterdam.) 
 
8.6 Streamlining and speedups 
Streamlining systems to the utmost and speeding them up (which occurs 
as part of systemic rationalization (Altmann et al. 1986) or lean produc-
tion), goes against decentralization of responsibility and job enrichment. 
Decentralized decision-making requires some form of decoupling between 
segments in a labor chain, for example, through buffers. Streamlining 
seeks to eliminate buffers. Speed as such makes job rotation an unlikely 
proposition. 
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This was the experience in the redesign process at the ECT Home 
Container terminal, where the speed of loading and unloading vessels had 
absolute priority over other considerations (Van Klaveren 1989: 70). 
When ECT designed its Delta 1 Terminal (which became opera-
tional in 1984), one of the aims was offering interesting jobs in semi-
autonomous teams. 
In 1986 and in 1989, the works council commissioned evaluation 
research on the quality of working life at ECT. The researchers found 
"one-sided specialization" and "monotonous work" (Van Klaveren 1989). 
The semi-autonomous teams did not function as intended. In some 
locations, workers complained about information systems that prescribe 
their actions on a step-by-step basis, making them feel like “coolies”. 
Operational workers said that they do not perform any planning, since the 
order of loading and unloading is determined by process control. An 
information system has taken over planning tasks that were formerly done 
by humans (Bouwman, Van Halem and Van Klaveren 1989: 10-19). 
In an interview, the chairman of the works council remarked: 
"These systems are no information systems, but rather command systems." 
The problem was worst in the part of ECT that works exclusively 
for one shipping company, Sea-Land. This company determines the order 
of loading and unloading, and thus most of the planning itself, feeding 
this information into the ECT systems through EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange). This precludes adding planning activities to operational 
work in the section that works for Sea-Land. One of ECT's managers 
wrote: 
 
"The lesson to be learnt from the Delta terminal is, that with all the 
good intentions that we have, we must pay heed to avoid that the 
work becomes too monotonous. The system should not too much 
dictate the individual actions of people."112 
 
According to the works council's consultants, the emphasis on loading and 
unloading ships as fast as possible was an important cause of these 
problems (Van Klaveren 1989: 70). The quay cranes are able to load sixty 
containers an hour or more into a vessel. This dictates the pace at which 
containers must be delivered at the crane, no matter where on the terminal 
they might have been stacked.113 
Due to the required speed of operations, it was customary to allo-
cate work in a hurry, without thinking about rotation. A kind of unwritten 
law crept in, allowing people to stick to their preferred jobs while leaving 
the less popular jobs, in which one is exposed to the wind and the rain, to 
temporary workers. 
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8.7 Summary 
Efficiency is not a clear-cut issue, but in most cases major stakeholders or 
evaluators were satisfied with the efficiency of the new organization. 
Several structural limitations related to efficiency surfaced. The Babbage 
Principle continues to limit job enrichment. Furthermore, among 
managers, the idea persists that the assembly line concept points the way 
to efficiency. This applies especially, but not exclusively, in the case of 
large uniform series production. Besides, managers tend to view assembly 
line production as an efficient step towards full automation. 
Shiftwork, speed-ups and streamlining of work-flows, dictates in 
the name of efficiency, damage initiatives to break with Taylorism. 
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CHAPTER NINE  GOVERNMENT ENFORCED STANDARDS FOR 
WORK ORGANIZATION: PUSHING HUMANIZATION BEYOND 
THE BOUNDS OF EFFICIENCY? 
 
It seems unrealistic to expect companies to implement anti-Tayloristic 
policies that run counter to efficiency (as seen by management). In such 
cases, enlightenment can do no more than try to instill in managers an 
enlightened view of efficiency. Furthermore, unions will generally not 
mobilize workers for a policy that impairs the vitality of the companies 
that they work for. Where anti-Tayloristic change runs counter to effi-
ciency, a last resort could be state intervention in the world of work 
through legislative action. If quality of work and efficiency do not go 
hand in hand, the only possible way to reform is by state enforced stan-
dards that hit every competitor equally. At this point there is an analogy to 
environmental policy. 
Such standards first came into existence in Norway. The Norwegian 
1977 Work Environment Act has a section on "planning the work" that 
amounts to declaring Taylorist practices unacceptable. The intention was 
to enable the Labor Inspection to get itself involved in the organization of 
work. In Norway, changes in production processes that significantly 
impact the working environment are subject to Labor Inspection approval. 
In the 1990's Sweden114 and The Netherlands followed Norway's lead. 
 
Box 9.1  Some provisions on work organization 
From the Norwegian 1977 Work Environment Act, 
Section 12, Planning the work: 
 
1. General requirements: Technology, organization of the work, working 
hours and wage systems shall be set up so that the employees are not 
exposed to undesirable physical or mental strain and so that their 
possibilities of displaying caution and observing safety measures are not 
impaired. 
Conditions shall be arranged so that employees are afforded reasonable 
opportunity for professional and personal development through their 
work. 
 
2. Arrangement of work: The individual employee's opportunity for self-
determination and professional responsibility shall be taken into 
consideration when planning and arranging the work. 
Efforts shall be made to avoid undiversified, repetitive work and work 
that is governed by machine  or conveyor belt in such a manner that the 
employees themselves are prevented from varying the speed of the work. 
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Otherwise efforts shall be made to arrange the work so as to provide 
possibilities for variation and for contact with others, for connection 
between individual job assignments, and for employees to keep them-
selves informed about production requirements and results. 
 
3. Control and planning systems: The employees and their elected re-
presentatives shall be kept informed about the systems employed for 
planning and effecting the work, and about planned changes in such 
systems. They shall be given the training necessary to enable them to learn 
these systems, and they shall take part in planning them. 
(From Gustavsen and Hunnius 1981: 198-199) 
 
From the Dutch Working Conditions Act (1990): "Monotonous and short 
cycled work, and work paced by a machine or an assembly line in such a 
way that the employee cannot control the pace, must, as far as can be 
reasonably demanded, be avoided. [..] As far as can reasonably be 
demanded, work must contribute to the craftsmanship of the worker; the 
employer must design the job in such a way, as to offer the employee 
sufficient opportunities to carry out his work according to his own insight 
[..]." 
 
The European Community Directive 90/270/ECC of May 29, 1990, 
contains clauses that imply a restriction on some computer-based disci-
plinary mechanisms: 
- The employer must plan the worker's activities in such a way that daily 
work on a display screen is periodically interrupted by breaks or changes 
of activity. 
- Systems must display information in a format and at a pace which are 
adapted to operators. 
- Without the knowledge of the users, quantitative or qualitative control 
mechanisms may not be used. 
 
The key question is, was there any success in trying to force changes on 
those employers who, for the sake of efficiency, preferred to stick to 
Taylorism? 
"With enthusiasm, the Norwegian Labor Inspection started to im-
plement the law", said trade unionist B. Willadsen (LO), "but gradually the 
labor inspection came to feel that the problem was too big for them. When 
they would tell an employer that a certain job was too monotonous, the 
employer would say 'what is monotonous work? There is no norm.'" 
Soon, attempts to use the law as in instrument to force employees to 
change the organization of work came to a complete standstill. 
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In 1995, Thoralf Qvale of the Norwegian Work Research Institute, 
who had been involved in working life reform form the 1960's onwards, 
indicated that: 
· The law did not function like a traffic code, suppressing undesirable 
behavior. It was more like a point of reference. 
· There were no cases to be found in which the law forced managers to 
change policy. 
· The law was used exclusively in the context of development programs. 
· At the time when the law was drafted, there was an informal under-
standing between employers and unions that the real meaning of the 
law was different from the literal meaning.115 
Observers pointed to several weaknesses of the coercive, standards based 
approach. Following Gustavsen and Hunnius (1981: 115-141), it is 
possible to identify three types of weaknesses: 
· Lack of clarity in the law-text. 
· Fundamental obstacles: the difficulty to prove that a given level of 
stress or monotony is harmful; the multi-causality involved in the or-
ganization of work; the long-term nature of the changes required; the 
inability of the social sciences, as opposed to the natural sciences, to 
produces threshold values that can be used as standards. 
· Dysfunctions: the use of standards runs counter to the idea that each 
and every workplace needs improvement; reliance on standards entails 
the risk that improvement efforts remain restricted to areas for which it 
is technically possible to generate standards; standards can cause 
development to freeze. "We do not want standards", said LO's Bjørn 
Willadsen, "we want local activity." 
The Norwegian legislators themselves had serious doubts about the pos-
sibility of a coercive effect on the organization of work. Therefore, they 
aimed for a second additional effect: the promotion of local activities, i.e. 
consensual alternatives or independent local union action. To this end, the 
law demands, in firms with over fifty employees, the establishment of 
working environment committees that participate in company planning 
and that monitor employee welfare (and health and safety issues). 
The idea seems to be, that if labor legislation cannot enforce certain 
principles of job design, it can at least enforce procedures that promote 
and facilitate joint management-labor initiatives to change the organization 
of work. In this way, a repressive approach - i.e. labeling certain practices 
as illegal - is supplemented by a procedural approach - putting demands 
on the procedures that companies follow when designing jobs. However, 
the repressive side of the law remained dead letter. 
In The Netherlands too, the repressive route remained untraveled. 
Dutch Working regulations require companies to obtain the services of 
Working Conditions Agencies ("Arbodiensten"), primarily to deal with 
absence through illness. These Working Conditions Agencies, in turn, are 
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required to employ organizations experts. The reason for this set-up was 
to expose companies to enlightened ideas.  
There is some evidence that standards might not only stimulate 
consensual alternatives, but could also enhance the possibilities for 
worker influence. In their attempts to influence the design of ECT's Delta 
II terminal, the works council referred to the Working Conditions Act to 
bolster their arguments. 
 
9. 1 Conclusions 
The strategy of enforcing standards pertaining to the organization of work 
was hardly put to a test. Immediately after their conception, the viewpoint 
that repressive standards on the quality of work are irrelevant got the 
upper hand. What remained alive was the notion that standards could 
improve the conditions for enlightening managers about the virtues of 
humanization of work. 
Government enforced standards on the organization of work clearly 
show that governments are not only easing the way for modernization, but 
were also trying to modify the fundamentals of the employment relation, 
by introducing the criterion of self-development of workers. 
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CHAPTER TEN  A FINAL NOTE ON ANTI-TAYLORISM 
 
When we compare the different types of policy, it is clear that consensual 
policy, i.e. consensual alternatives propelled by enlightenment, is most 
effective. In the first place, more happened in the consensual stream than 
in the other streams, and the level of success was markedly higher. 
Nevertheless, not all was well in the consensual stream. 
 
Box 10.1 A few tough challenges 
- Starting experiments to radically de-Taylorize jobs in the fast food in-
dustry. 
- Finding alternatives for those computerized control systems that strongly 
discipline workers. 
- Creating technology projects that are anti-Tayloristic, lead to marketable 
products and to real change on the level of the shop floor. 
- De-Taylorizing jobs in organizations characterized by speed-ups, sys-
temic rationalization and shift-work. 
- Mounting a frontal attack on the assembly line (note that the assembly 
line is making a comeback). 
- Building diffusion networks to enhance the social movement aspect of 
change (this presupposes that management is prepared to give the inno-
vators in their organization leeway). 
- For nations like The Netherlands and the U.K.: catching up with 
Scandinavia and Germany in institutionalizing humanization policy. 
 
The second reason for considering the consensual stream to be the main 
stream is, that the worker-mobilization based stream developed as a re-
action to the consensual stream, and later merged with the consensual 
stream. 
Thirdly, the standards-based stream did not lead to a direct impact 
on the design of jobs, but it turned out to support the consensual stream. 
A few line changes in the conceptual model (fig 10.1) reflect the 
findings. 
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Fig. 10. 1 Findings illustrated in conceptual model 
 
In the new model, there still is a direct line between worker mobilization 
and the dependent variable. However, worker mobilization only has a 
direct effect on the design of jobs in terms of prevention of further 
Taylorization. (Prevention is a weak point for mainstream anti-Tayloristic 
policy.) 
Worker mobilization based policies that aim to create new structures 
in the workplace do not necessarily fail. But they cannot succeed unless 
they transform themselves into consensual alternatives. 
For example: it will be hard for any union to match or better the 
level of mobilization shown in the Swedish Postgiro case or the level of 
technical expertise the union brought to bear on the design of the 
Skånemejerier dairy in Malmö. Still, in these two cases, the attempts to 
create semi-autonomous teams failed, because there was no consensus 
with management. 
As far as the creation of new structures in the workplace is con-
cerned, worker mobilization can contribute by shaping the right context 
for consensual alternatives to appear. Especially when management is 
divided along pro- and contra-Tayloristic lines, there are opportunities for 
this. For managers, a double uncertainty surrounds the efficiency 
question: there is no fixed definition of efficiency, and the judgment about 
the many variables involved must necessarily be subjective. This 
uncertainty opens the way for controversies among managers, and hence 
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opportunities for unions/works councils to try to tip the balance.116 Fur-
thermore, changing the conception of efficiency among managers is one 
of the enlightenment goals. 
Worker mobilization can set the scene for social-movement like 
developments in organizations (for example in the Swedish Postgiro case). 
In several instances, worker mobilization had a stimulating effect on 
the development of enlightenment programs. 
Finally, we should not forget that unions are, at least in Scandinavia 
and in Germany, strong partners in enlightenment efforts and consensual 
alternatives. Therefore, investments by unions in independent build-up of 
knowledge and expertise are safe: when worker mobilization based policy 
fails, these investments enhance mainstream policy instead. 
The direct line between government based standards and the de-
pendent variable tends to evaporate as soon as it is drawn. Explanations 
are the dominant value system and the lure of consensual policy. But still, 
standards are not irrelevant. Standards can lay down procedures that cause 
managers to be exposed to enlightened ideas. Furthermore, standards 
constitute moral signposts, upholding values other than those commanded 
by efficiency and competitiveness. Demonstrably, such values play a role 
in the genesis of consensual alternatives. In this way, standards could be 
allies of critical thought, which is frequently brushed aside by the cheerful 
imperialism of instrumental reason. 
10.1 General theory of anti-taylorism 
Cross-cutting the various strands of research on post-Taylorism, the main 
paradigm is clearly modernization. This means that moving away from 
Taylorism is seen as adapting to a progressively changing environment. 
The implication is that more flexibility and employee commitment is 
required. The ongoing development of (information) technology is seen as 
a factor that makes traditional job design obsolete. 
We can locate in this paradigm old prescriptive theories of organizational 
redesign (Theory Y, emphasizing intrinsic motivation) and new ones 
(Modern Integral Sociotechnical Theory, stressing flexibility). But also 
descriptive research on the development and spread of "New Production 
Concepts" fits in this paradigm. Even critical authors who attack 
humanistic claims about job redesign and seek to demonstrate that it is just 
economically based adaptation to fluctuations in the environment (e.g. 
Kelly 1982) stay inside the modernization paradigm. 
There are critical theories that lie outside the modernization para-
digm, but these authors tend to make assumptions that are difficult to 
accept: Ramsay (1985) sees job redesign as a response to political unrest. 
But in the period studied, upheavals have been rare. Furthermore, job 
redesign has flourished in politically quiet countries, especially in 
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Scandinavia. Then there are Marxists who do little to avoid the impression 
that they define change as cosmetic, unless it contributes to an overthrow 
of capitalism.117 Finally, there are those who stretch the concept of control 
to embrace almost everything, and thereby see anti-Tayloristic 
developments as another form of management control, period 
(Doorewaard 1989). 
While exploring the corners of anti-Tayloristic policy and its effects, 
I found several indications that confirm that anti-Tayloristic policy is 
modernization:  
a) The need for flexibility was often an impetus for introducing change in 
the organizations. 
b) Inside consensual alternatives, there was intensive redesign activity 
towards flexibility. 
c) The most visible body of theory to support redesign efforts - Modern 
Integral Sociotechnical Theory - is geared towards enhancing flexibility. 
d) Government enlightenment programs officially aimed to increase 
competitiveness of industry. 
e) Results in terms of efficiency have often been satisfactory, indicating 
that, in many cases, change did lead to a better adaptation to a turbulent 
environment, i.e. that modernization did occur. 
However, there were some findings that did not support modernization 
theory, but that were much more compatible with a view of anti-Tay-
lorism as a way of coping with the immanent characteristics of the em-
ployment relation: 
· Besides a drive for flexibility, humanistic values played a part in the 
genesis of consensual alternatives. Humanistic motives for job redesign 
are more easily seen as reactions to the unease, that the immanent 
characteristics of the employment relation cause to managers. This 
effect gets an extra impulse during periods of full employment when 
workers avoid those jobs in which the pressure of the employment 
relation appears in an unmitigated form. 
· Anti-Taylorism is not the only solution for achieving flexibility. Why 
do some managers, who want flexibility, choose the anti-Tayloristic 
route? 
· Social movement like processes can play an important part in orga-
nizational change. Since they involve taking control of the organization 
of work, they are in opposition with the characteristics of the 
employment relation. 
· Government enlightenment programs not only aim to increase industrial 
competitiveness, but they are at the same time a continuation of a long 
line of policies to protect employees from damaging aspects of the 
employment relation. 
· Particularly puzzling from the point of view of modernization is the 
occurrence of regression on a wide scale. One would expect resistance 
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to change. But when anti-Tayloristic change indeed means adapting the 
organization to turbulence in its environment, one would not expect 
regression to more Tayloristic forms to occur. Regression is more 
compatible with the view that anti-Taylorism is one of the fluctuating 
ways to cope with the immanent tensions produced by the employment 
relationship. 
· In many cases, unions (and works councils) supported anti-Tayloristic 
change, working together with management in consensual alternatives 
and enlightenment programs, and sometimes attempted to race ahead of 
management in independent union actions. Unions are not noted for 
their enthusiasm for flexibility drives; their involvement is more readily 
explained as part of their long-standing function to make the 
employment relationship more bearable for their members. 
· The introduction of the criterion of self-development of workers in 
government regulation is not compatible with the economic rationality 
of the modernization paradigm. 
The conclusion is that anti-Taylorism is not only adaptation of the or-
ganization of work to progressively changing conditions, but that it is also 
the result of a need to find new ways of coping with the immanent, 
pervasive characteristics of the employment relation. 
The duality of anti-Taylorism may go some way to explaining the 
uneasy, unstable, uncertain development of working life. When organi-
zations try to modernize, it is by no means certain that this is matched in 
the ways employees and managers are coping with the employment 
relation. Employees may happen to cope with the employment relationship 
by putting up active passivity inside Taylorist patterns. Attempts to break 
this bind might just as well increase employee resistance. Managers have 
the option to cope with the unease that emanates from the employment 
relationship by indulging in an overkill of power. The modernization 
efforts might just as well reinforce these coping behaviors. The structural 
characteristics of the employment relation continuously lead to problems 
that cannot be solved, only be coped with, in varying and often 
contradictory ways. 
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APPENDIX A   Analysis of the relations between the allevia-
tion of technical discipline, job enlargement, job enrichment, 
decentralization of responsibility and participation. 
 
The result of the (homogeneity) analysis is in Fig A.1. The size (surface) 
of the bubbles reflects the number of initiatives at a given data point. The 
total number of cases is 62. The labels (in the format "ALRDP" are the 
scores on the variables Alleviation of discipline, job enLargement, job 
enRichment, Decentralization of responsibility and Participation. Where a 
character is displayed, this means "attempted", underscores ("_")  signify 
"not attempted". 
For example: "_LRD_" means: no attempt to alleviate technical 
discipline, there was an attempt at job enlargement, job enrichment, de-
centralization of responsibility, but no attempt to introduce participation. 
 
 
Fig. A. 1 Homogeneity analysis 
 
This analysis revealed two dimensions. The first dimension (showing the 
highest eigenvalue) is of interest for the present discussion. This di-
mension is the scope of worker empowerment. At one extreme, there are 
efforts to give workers some control over their own movements through 
the relaxation of technical disciplinary mechanisms like machine pacing. 
Next comes job enlargement (adding more tasks of the same order of 
complexity), making possible some freedom of movement. Beyond this 
point, alleviation of technical discipline disappears, while decision making 
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power becomes the focal point. First there is decentralization of 
responsibility, i.e. the worker can make (some) decisions regarding his or 
her own tasks. Then, at the far end of the spectrum, there is participation. 
In participation, the scope for worker empowerment is the work process 
at large. 
The second dimension is job complexity. At any point along the 
first dimension there are cases that involve job enrichment and cases that 
do not. 
 
Technical explanation 
The consensual alternatives differed vastly in terms of what the propo-
nents were trying to achieve. To look for a pattern in this, I applied 
homogeneity analysis to the 62 consensual alternatives that had no missing 
values for alleviation of technical discipline, job enlargement, job 
enrichment, decentralization of responsibility and participation. 
Homogeneity analysis, alternatively known as multiple correspondence 
analysis, is an exploratory technique for investigating relations between 
nominal variables.  
The program HOMALS is a readily available implementation of this 
technique (SPSS inc. 1990: B49-B62, Van den Berg 1986). HOMALS can 
transform a data matrix into a plot showing similarity and dissimilarity 
between cases. The program assigns values - object scores - to cases in 
such a way, that cases with similar score patterns on the variables appear 
as close to each other as possible. Fig A.1 is a plot of these object scores 
(i.e. scores on the two dimensions) of the 62 cases. 
The object scores were the basis for Fig A.1. (This plot was mir-
rored on the X-axis to make it more readily understandable.) 
In addition to this, HOMALS calculates "category quantifications". 
A category quantification is the average of the object scores assigned by 
HOMALS to cases that belong to the category in question. For instance, 
the X-axis value of "no enrichment" is the average of all X-axis values for 
cases that have the score 0 on the variable "job enrichment". Fig A.2 is a 
scatterplot of the category quantifications. This plot was also mirrored on 
the X-axis. 
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Fig. A. 2 Category quantifications labeled with the category values 
 
In this analysis, interpretation of the dimensions (analogous to factor 
analysis) was fairly straightforward. HOMALS provides discrimination 
measures that are useful when trying to arrive at an interpretation. 
 
 
 First dimension 
(scope of worker 
empowerment) 
Second dimension 
(job complexity) 
Alleviation of discipline 0.669 0.000 
Job enlargement 0.519 0.163 
Job enrichment 0.018 0.803 
Decentralization of 
responsibility 
0.507 0.238 
Participation 0.339 0.095 
 
Job enrichment loads nearly exclusively on the second dimension, while 
the other variables load more on the first dimension. Job enrichment 
measures whether or not the changes in work organization involves an 
increase of the required skill level. Alleviation of discipline, decentrali-
zation of responsibility and participation clearly measure the power aspect 
of the changes in work organization. Job enlargement can conceptually fit 
into this dimension as well. The order along the X-axis  of the category 
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quantifications alleviation of discipline, job enlargement, decentralization 
of responsibility and participation suggests that cases can be perceived as 
located along a scale that runs from alleviation of discipline to 
participation. The eigenvalues, indicating how well the data are described, 
are 0.4105 (dimension 1, scope of worker empowerment) and 0.2599 
(dimension 2, job complexity). 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                         
1 The terms "anti-Taylorism" or "anti -Tayloristic" are used by Dankbaar (1986), 
Cressey (1987), Buitelaar, Kanters and Smits (1987:28) and Mok (1990: 149). 
2 Steijn and De Witte (1992: 299) write: "In case it is considered desirable that 
technological innovation leads to improvement of the quality of working life, the 
relevant social actors (for example state, management and workers) will have to 
develop a strategy in order to attain those effects. Because of the declining autonomy in 
the job content of large numbers of jobs, that we found, this effect does not come 
'automatically'." 
3 De Sitter (1981: 23). Brouwers, Buitelaar and Verkerk concluded in a 1988 
study that in The Netherlands 250.000 people ( around four per cent of the working 
population) performed tasks that repeat themselves within 90 seconds. 
4 Marieke de Vries, "Zusterpost 3 oost" in Aaneen, april 18 1992: 12-16. 
5 Wolfson et al. 1992: 21 and NRC Handelsblad january 14, 1992. 
6 Paul Reinshagen, "Blinde ambities. Volgens Langdon Winner moet het 
innovatieproces weer worden gepolitiseerd." in Intermediair October 26: 1988. John 
Sterlicchi, "De ultieme controle van Bigg Boss", in Telecommagazine, september 1993: 
16. 
7 Hans Moleman "Bij Ahold rijden ze de plooien uit je broek", Volkskrant 
november 29 1986, 37. 
8 Huijgen and Pot 1987. A study of the qualitative structure of employment in the 
Netherlands also indicated that there was polarization (Huijgen, Riesewijk and Conen 
1983). 
9 From the anti-Tayloristic side, one reaction to lean production is to argue 
against it. For an empirically founded critique, see Berggren (1993). A totally different 
reaction is to embrace the term "lean production" while redefining the concept. To 
project consultant professor Pornschlegel, the non-Tayloristic approach at steel grid 
factory STACO was lean production before the term existed (Lauenstein and 
Stapelmann 1992, 97). 
10 The three different theoretical perspectives relate to Alvesson's (1987) three 
paradigms: Consensus, Control and Critique. 
11 Furthermore, the application kept track of text files concerning interviews and 
data obtained from documents. Finally, it supported project management. 
12 This in one element in Kelly's more complex theory of job redesign. 
13 Productive and non-productive labor are analytical categories. In practice, 
they can be combined. 
14 cf. Baldamus 1961 
15 Volkskrant, February 5, 1996: 2 
16 Thorsrud et al. 1976, 436-438, Bolweg 1976, 65-70. The motives of 
management and the motives of the local union were very different. The workers feared 
job losses and were dissatisfied with wages. Management wanted to put an end to 
"overmanning", restore profits and improve management-labor relations. These 
opposing forces gave rise to a package deal consisting of job redesign, with a financial 
incentive for learning, a reduction through natural wastage and a productivity 
agreement. 
17 Coupled to this is: "continuous improvement (kaizen), not only in production 
but also in the office". 
Tayloristic control gives rise to bureaucracy. An example is the ECT 
stevedoring company in Rotterdam. The organization had, since 1970, become ever 
more bureaucratic, with increasing functional divisions. In its last stage of 
bureaucratization, the oldest terminal had numbered thirteen different departments, and 
some of these had as many as seven hierarchical levels. At the lowest level there were 
48 different job descriptions. Managers felt that this level of bureaucracy was 
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inefficient. The designing of a new terminal offered managers the opportunity to try and 
find less Tayloristic solutions. 
18 In 1980, Felten & Guillaume was in deep trouble. It operated at a loss and 
mother company Philips demanded a strategy to return to profitability, otherwise they 
would close down the plant. This pressure proved productive. Earlier rationalization 
measures had been the introduction of assembly lines followed by automation. But in 
the early 1980's, the possibilities for rationalization through further automation seemed 
exhausted. 
19 In contrast to the "system centered" factory, in which it is attempted to plan 
everything from a central point, Ainger put forward the vision of the "human centered" 
factory. The human centered factory is made up of different cells, or small factories 
inside the factory. The workers in the cells are responsible for planning the work that 
goes on inside the cell, allowing the central planning department to concentrate on 
meeting the customers' needs. 
20 Staco (Germany). This firm, with around 100 workers, produces steel grids. 
In this case, an important goal is to modernize the company in such a way as to avoid 
Taylorist patterns. 
21 Hoppmann and Stötzel 1981. First (in 1961) he introduced profit sharing. 
22 Turnover of 1.4 million containers in 1990. 
23 Fruytier (1986) makes the same observation. 
24 Berggren 1989: 178. Sandberg and others (1992: 96) point to full employment 
as the main factor explaining the humanization of industrial work in Sweden (in the 
short term). 
25 Berggren expected that the Uddevalla concept would only be applied to 
Volvo's factory in Belgium if the Belgian labor market develops in the same direction 
as the Swedish: less unemployment and greater participation in the labor process, and 
"increasing articulation of dissatisfaction with repetitive, Taylorized work among 
workers." (Berggren, 1990). 
26 Some types of impoverished work are conspicuously missing. I did not find 
initiatives to upgrade the work of bank tellers, fast food restaurant workers or 
supermarket checkout clerks using scanning equipment. "The best one can do is to 
distribute the pain," says Pierre van Amelsfoort, a consultant, referring to the work of 
supermarket checkout clerks. "Some processes are so much made devoid of substance, 
that there is nothing left over to organize." 
27 At Holec, teams make complete products (with one exception: there is a 
special team that performs galvanic treatment and powder coating). However, this level 
of completeness required no deep-cutting reorganization, since there are no products 
that require both sheet metal working and machining; assembling is done by the client.  
28 Responsible autonomy is a control strategy that is based on granting autonomy 
to workers. Andrew Friedman (1977) contrasts responsible autonomy to direct control. 
29 Van Klaveren (1989) warns that sociotechnically inspired consultants tend to 
underestimate this risk. 
30 Unattractive jobs are the Achilles' heel of job rotation schemes. At Staco, 
systems designers acknowledge that workers are not inclined to rotate to unattractive 
jobs. Before implementing job rotation, they redesign these unattractive jobs by adding 
organizing tasks and by providing aids to reduce physical strain. (Lauenstein and 
Stapelmann 1992: 36) 
31 Ramondt also uses the term "integral learning". 
32 In organizational discourse, this point is often implicit. Some authors make 
this point explicitly, for example Van Klaveren (1984: 45). 
33 See Van Eijnatten 1993 for an extensive review of the development of the 
sociotechnical paradigm. 
34 In itself, an expert-oriented approach does not preclude participation. Experts 
could enhance participation by making actors aware of their options. However, the 
expert-driven strand of sociotechnical systems design that culminated in the integral 
school (the Dutch Integral Organizational Renewal approach) gravitates towards 
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presenting a detailed blueprint model for change, with a fixed sequence of design steps, 
a "one best way". A "one best way" approach does contradict participation. 
35 A. van der Zwaan (1992: 242) noted that Germany "has never needed any 
kind of Modern Sociotechnical Theory". My findings corroborate this statement. 
However, Van der Zwaan states that in Germany, practice and not theory generated new 
work structures. 
36 However, it would be wrong to infer that blueprints (as often produced by 
researchers) are a necessary condition for starting a successful change project. The 
Halmstad County Hospital shows that leeway for internal change agents can be more 
important than expert-produced blueprints for change. 
37 Oral communication by dr. P. Binkelmann, research director for the 
Humanization of Working Life / Work and Technology Program. 
Researcher W. Baumgarten (1991: 40) notes that in the clothing industry, 
introducing the ideas of teamwork, job enlargement and job enrichment, was not 
sufficient to achieve a changeover for monotonous assembly line work to flexible 
teamwork. He claims that the application of scientific knowledge triggered a 
breakthrough. 
38 Oral communication by L. Buizert, manager of the Van Nelle's tobacco 
department in Rotterdam. 
39 One of the methods used in training for participation is the Metaplan method. 
This method makes use of a board on which users can attach cards with questions and 
problems. The experience in the Halmstad County Hospital was that this method made 
it possible for everyone to come forward with his or her opinion, even for those who 
were not so much inclined to speak up in meetings. 
40 Oral communication by Mr. Kieboom of Holec. 
41 Examples: Klingenberg and Kränzle (all), Joosse et al. 1990. 
42 Plans for knowledge transfer to foundries in the former DDR met with fear for 
increased competition. However, they were not canceled. 
43 Klotz 1993: 107. The project is unique in a different sense as well. It is a 
joint project of organizations in Denmark, Germany and the UK. For the UK, it seems 
the only anti-Tayloristic project of the 1980's. The survey by Cressey (1988) of 
research projects on technology, labor and organization in the UK leads to this 
conclusion. This point illustrated nicely the principle of subsidiarity. In this case, 
European funds helped accomplish something that would otherwise have been 
impossible in the UK. 
44 Keller 1992,1993. Fuchs and Hartmann 1993. Generally, one of the 
implications of CNC is the use of encapsulated machines. Encapsulation robs operators 
of the chance to use their senses to develop their skills. Addressing this issue were 
German researchers, who believed that the experience of skilled workers is an 
indispensable factor in automated production. They investigated possible ways to equip 
encapsulated machines with acoustic and visual feedback systems. The goal was to 
allow skilled operators to gain experience regarding items like speed and lubrication. 
45 The development of ACiT cost one million pounds. The program was written 
in Clipper. 
46 There are also projects that aim to develop expert systems as tools for 
learning and simulation systems to aid in participation. Notably absent is the 
development of alternatives for logistical systems that treat workers as extensions of the 
computer. 
47 This example was suggested by the secretary of the MDA program, who did 
not expect direct results for the program in terms of changes on the shop floor level. 
48 The linear, top down character of the usual methods for systems design is one 
of the factors that limit the possibilities for real participation. A branch of 
sociotechnical systems design that addresses this point, is the ETHICS (Effective 
Technical and Human Implementation of Computer-based Systems) method, formulated 
by Enid Mumford. In this method, improvement of the quality of working life is an 
explicit part of the goals. Opinions and wishes of those who are involved determine the 
 endnotes 170  
                                                                                                                  
direction of development. (Mumford and MacDonald 1989:  33) Beirne and Ramsay 
(1987b) studied several cases in which this method was applied. They could not find 
evidence of real participation by workers. In the report on the development and 
implementation of the expert system XSEL at DEC (Digital Equipment Corporation) 
(Mumford and MacDonald 1989), where Mumford had been involved for several years, 
this evidence is lacking. 
49 He warns that the political decision to exclude large companies from funding 
and to reduce company projects, make it difficult to put the software products to use that 
come out of the Work and Technology program (p. 32). 
50 Keller CNC project, PROZOS and ORGAM (the system in use at the 
Rietbergwerke). 
51 Klotz (1993: 120) cites a statement to this effect originating from the Gartner 
group. 
52 The German Planleit planning program, for instance, does not presuppose a 
fixed way of working. 
53 ACiT is relatively slow at executing scheduling algorithms, executing all the 
algorithms consecutively would take a long time (H. P.). 
54 I mentioned the existence of ACiT during several visits to companies, as well 
as in a discussion with one of the leading sociotechnical consultants in The 
Netherlands. In only one company I found a slight interest in the product. 
55 Since the LOM program emphasized communication, the question may arise 
whether it is fair to evaluate the program in terms of impact in the area of organization. 
But B. Gustavsen (1992: 69), the program's chief architect, expresses quite clearly that 
impact on organizations (and technology) is the ultimate goal: "New patterns of 
communication are, in turn, meant to lead to changes in the way the development work 
is conducted as well as in the amount of developmentally oriented work which is 
performed. New linguistic tools to emerge [..] will transform existing processes from 
being closed and repetitive to being open and innovative [..]. Successively, the 
processes are to lead to new structures. Such structures can be defined within two main 
areas: Work organization and technology." 
56 Crosstabulation of Job Enlargement by Subsidy (sixty cases): chi-square test, 
observed significance level 0.0174.  
 
 not subsidized subsidized 
No job enlargement 4 22 
Job enlargement 15 19 
 
Pearson's R is -0.30608. The crosstabulations of Alleviation of Disciple, Job 
Enrichment, Decentralization of Responsibility and Participation by Subsidy show 
observed significance levels between 1.0 and 0.6276. Nevertheless, it would be 
premature to conclude that subsidies have no effect. Cases differ widely in respect of 
time and place, type of organization and type of intervention. Controlling for these 
aspects was not possible. 
57 Bosch Werkprojekt 1. Heinrich and Bosch 1982. 
58 A side effect can be bureaucratization. In one case, the Rietbergwerke, there 
were complaints about the need to produce meters and meters of project documentation. 
On the other hand, the project agency maintained that this was not required at all. 
59 Another German program is Manufacturing Technology ("Fertig-
ungstechnik"). It is the first technology program that explicitly takes the organization of 
work into account. The project at ZF started life under the Humanization of Working 
Life program and later continued as part of Manufacturing Technology. 
60 In 1975, German research minister Matthöfer decided to initiate the 
development of a government-sponsored model for working in semi-autonomous teams, 
along the lines followed by Swedish companies like Saab en Volvo. Subsidizing 75 per 
cent of the costs, he persuaded Volkswagen's management to initiate an experiment in 
which teams assembled entire engines. 
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61 Naschold 1992a: 118, W. Fricke, quoted in Den Hertog and Schröder 1989: 
32 
62 Practically all cases were in some way touched by enlightenment activities. 
The level to which this was the case, varies. At one end of the spectrum, there was 
massive involvement of an enlightenment R & D program, at the other end of the 
spectrum, the link consisted of inspiration gained out of publications connected to the 
enlightenment movement. 
63 Other possible remedies for lack of flexibility within the framework of 
Taylorism are sophisticated but centralized planning systems, the use of subcontractors 
and modular design of products. 
64 An example from the Swedish LOM program is job rotation in the department 
for internal transportation of the Tomteboda post terminal. (Naschold 1992b Anhang C: 
108-125, Gustavsen, Hart and Hofmaier 1988) 
65 Functionality tests on the car were not carried out by the members of the 
assembly teams. This was decided upon because testing requires special knowledge. 
Finished cars were tested on a roller bank at a central point in each mini-factory. 
66 Skarpelis 1993. In the Vereins- und Westbank in Hamburg, teams may, in 
consultation with management, experiment with alternative working methods. (Brater 
1993: 8) 
67 Job enrichment by adding management tasks implies decentralization of 
responsibility. On the other hand, the reverse is not necessarily true. There are cases in 
which it is clear that autonomy increases, while it is unclear whether complexity 
increases as well. Therefore it is useful to have decentralization of responsibility as a 
separate concept.  
68 Gulowsen (1972) presents a slightly more elaborate taxonomy and maintains 
that the items constitute a Guttmann scale. (There is one dimension) 
69 In the LOM project in the clinic for internal medicine of St. Göran Hospital in 
Stockholm, nursing teams became fully responsible for a fixed group of patients. 
(Naschold 1992b, Anhang C: 143) 
70 One of the explanations for the Volkswagen's discontinuation of complete 
engine assembly in the early 1970's is that management lost control over the labor 
process. 
71 In 1983, Professor Hasenritter of the Fachhochschule für öffentliche 
Verwaltung (School for Public Administration) began, together with his student Jochem 
Müller, to develop a dialogue-based supporting system for social security officers. 
Jochem Müller was a computer enthusiast who had worked as a social security officer 
in the Bremen area. The project resulted in a program, running on a home computer, that 
was totally inadequate. This small project led to a large project funded, in part, by a 
grant of 4,5 million DM from the Ministry for Research and Technology.  Before this 
large project, the social security service of Bremen used batch processing. This system 
caused delays - sometimes several days - between data entry and output of results. One 
of the goals of the project was to get rid of the system of batch processing. Another goal 
was to make the job of the social security officer more complete. This meant that one 
officer had to be capable of performing all tasks, from registration of data to payment of 
benefits. 
72 Information sheet "Die Stiftung von Opel Hoppmann", october 1990 
73 Other firms have parallel democratic structures as well. At Volvo Uddevalla, 
the spokesmen used to take part in production meetings at the factory level. 
74  
Issue Number of cases Percentage of total (62 cases) 
Prevention of increasing 
technical discipline 
2 
 
3.2 
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Counteracting the 
disappearance of human 
skills and  expertise into 
automatic machinery and 
information systems 
3 4.8 
 
75 An example is chemical factory Unichema (Unilever) in Gouda. (Elshof and 
Wetzel 1992, Brouwers, Vaas and Pot 1987) 
76 The five issues were not present in equal numbers: 
 
Issue Number of 
cases 
Percentage of total  
(62 cases) 
Alleviation of technical discipline 18 29 
Job enlargement 40 64.5 
Job enrichment 41 66.1 
Decentralization of responsibility 36 58.1 
Participation 21 33.9 
 
77 IHC had comparable problems: "There were problems in groups. Some group 
coordinators were not tolerated by their group members, which means that some will 
say to a coordinator 'you are not my boss'". At Van Nelle, one of the coordinators was, 
in the words of the manager, "fanatical". On the average, he was present for nine hours 
a day. He would tell a coworker, who had nothing to do, to take a mop and start 
cleaning something. But he announced that he did no longer like to work in this way, 
because he had almost been lynched by his colleagues, and that he suffered from being 
accused of playing the boss' friend. 
78 Temporary workers participate in department meetings, albeit without the 
right to vote. At Holec Hengelo, the aim is to work with as few temporary workers as 
possible. "It is not efficient when there are always new workers who have to get settled 
in their jobs", explains a Holec manager "Furthermore, in a team everybody has to be 
equal. In a soccer team you would not have seven temporary players." 
79 Taylorization within teams is not universal. The experience of A. Coppens of 
DAF Trucks is, that teams push out workers who take a too authoritarian stance: "It 
happens that we must transfer the best man out of a team". 
80 There are also contingent opportunities that can be exploited. An example is 
STACO. In the early 1980's, the works manager left the firm rather suddenly, without 
training his successor. Therefore the new works manager was not able to do the entire 
planning right away. As a stop-gap measure, management told workers to come to the 
office when they were finished with a job. There they had to pick and choose one of the 
pending orders by themselves, taking into account the type of order and the delivery 
time. This proved so effective that it became the standard way of working, later 
supplemented by horizontal coordination.  
IHC in Kinderdijk (The Netherlands) is a case in point in which a project on 
decentralization of responsibility, job enlargement and job enrichment turned out to fit 
in with a strategy of labor reduction. IHC mainly produces fully equipped, custom built 
dredging ships and (parts for) dredging equipment. The plant includes a shipyard and a 
machine factory. In the early 1980's, IHC's personnel manager found that the jobs that 
the firm offered were no longer attractive for the  increasingly qualified workers who 
were being hired. His discussions with top management resulted in a declaration of 
intent: rearranging of product groups, the launching of a project "Other Forms of 
Working" with delegation of responsibility to the lowest possible level, job 
enlargement and job enrichment. IHC established contacts with sociotechnical action 
researchers. A graduate student completed a pilot project, and this provided the push to 
continue on the course towards change. In the early 1980's there was a recession, and in 
1986 IHC Kinderdijk found itself without any work. An unwieldy organization made it 
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difficult to obtain orders. A reorganization took place. The selection criterion was: 
suitability for the project "Other Forms of Working". Workers  who were often ill, who 
were often late or considered not motivated, lost their jobs. Workers with one-sided 
abilities, who were  capable of only one job like operating one  particular crane, went 
as well. Migrants with insufficient  knowledge of Dutch had to go (not all migrants 
though). For supervisors and foremen, there were three options: demotion to their 
previous position in production work, promotion to the ranks of management if they 
were very good, or discharge. A second reorganization in 1987, on the basis of 
seniority, brought more redundancies. Altogether, the workforce was  halved. In 1988 
orders increased. This, together with the redundancies caused an increased pressure on 
the organization that left supervisors no choice but to decentralize responsibility.  
81 Gustavsen and Hunnius 1981: 58-62. They say that the number of direct 
replications was low. There was diffusion of means, particularly job rotation and wage 
systems. Sandberg and others (1992: 21) wrote: "Successful experiments were 
conducted at several Norwegian workplaces, but the expected diffusion did not take 
place." Janerus (1992: 26-27) indicates that in Sweden, innovations that had proved to 
be economically viable, did not diffuse as expected. 
82 Research manager W. Büntgen remarked that the power questions are not 
often dealt with in written reports. 
Of course, power holders are also workers who worry about their job security. 
Power is essentially a multifaceted phenomenon: a) an attribute of positions in the 
power structure, b) an item that surfaces when analyzing decision-making processes, c) 
"mobilization of bias" or non-decisions, i.e. the exercise of power by avoiding that 
certain issues appear on the agenda, d)  power in the context of latent conflict (Lukes 
1974). 
Armed with a multi-dimensional view of power, it is often possible to see 
power constraints in actions that observers generally label as implementation errors. 
The Philips Works Council provided a list, including: not enough communication with 
other departments; too great an emphasis on productivity; sometimes a too central 
position of the supervisor; doubt among workers and lower staffers about management's 
real intentions; promised pay scale raises did not come or came late;  projects remained 
in the preparation phase for too long, leading to diminishing interest; solutions from 
workers did not always meet with adequate reactions; management sees meetings of 
production workers as a waste of time; too often amateurish guidance; not enough 
participation.  
At Holec, a problem occurred in the creation of teams in the tool-making shop. 
It turned out that the tool-making shop used to function as a team of thirty people, in 
which there was mutual helping. When they were divided up over several teams the 
kept helping one another across team borders. Top-down implementation failed to take 
informal team structures into account. 
83 On the other hand, it is clear that there are senior managers who welcome and 
initiate changes that give workers more autonomy and more influence over the labor 
process at large. CEO Ekhart of tin can factory TDV noted: "You come to work in a 
company as a manager and you see that people have to keep their mouth shut. People 
are being thought for, instead of that they think for themselves. People do not only have 
hands, they have minds as well. If you say this, you must follow it up with action. It 
means that you must share a little power and splendor. It also means that as a manager 
you are not the only big shot in the company, but that the entire company consists of big 
shots." (quoted in: R. Huiskamp (ed) 1993: 12) In Chapter Two, we have seen several 
other examples of firms where senior managers welcomed anti-Tayloristic change: 
Volvo, Sigma Coatings, Rietbergwerke, Staco, Opel Hoppmann. 
84 In the Halmstad County Hospital, there was no evidence of head nurses 
feeling threatened. They were no longer involved in direct patient care. But the changes 
in the organization of work brought education and inspiration as new tasks. 
Furthermore, due to decentralization of financial responsibility, they had taken up 
budgeting. 
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85 Oral communication by IHC's Mr. P. Wemmers 
86 J. Bloem, plant manager of Sigma Coatings in Amsterdam, is vigilant about 
attempts by middle management to acquire more power "You have to disapprove of it 
strongly when someone wants to play the boss over something and wants to create a 
special department for something." 
87 Not only managers risk losing ground, workers in staff departments run the 
same risk. At TDV (tin can manufacturing), people from quality control tried to prevent 
that production workers would take over their work. A solution was to transfer quality 
people to the sales department. The plant manager of Sigma Coatings in Amsterdam 
says: "Most of the problems we have are with the outside world [i.e. the corporation] 
like staff departments that claim to have a supporting role, but who want you to work in 
their way. For example, one department tries to keep track of absence through illness, 
something that we do for ourselves. They fear  becoming redundant. If I were in the 
same position, I would do the same thing. [..] In a recession, that is a good place to 
prune. We ask someone who calls himself 'company controller': 'what is your 
contribution?'. If we consider that unsatisfactory we do not use his services." 
In the LOM project on team nursing in the clinic for internal medicine in St. 
Göran Hospital in Stockholm, doctors resisted the changes. (Naschold 1992b, Anhang 
C, 147) 
88 In-depth interviews with managers might be useful. 
89 In his professional work, he was simulating production, military and transport 
organizations. To facilitate this, he co-invented the computer language SIMULA, the 
first object oriented language. (More than two decades later, object orientation was to 
become the hot new paradigm in programming.) However, Nygaard felt that his 
technical work did not fit in well with his political convictions. 
90 Sandberg (1992: 75) wrote: "SAF's policy was to secure the existing power 
structure in the companies and in society at large, while allowing for changes in the 
day-to-day job situation on the individual." 
91 Examples from Sweden and from Germany follow further down in the main 
text. In the UK, the TUC (Trades Union Congress) aimed in the beginning of the 1980's 
to regulate the introduction of new technology through "New Technology Agreements". 
The check-list that these agreements were supposed to comply with included an anti-
Tayloristic item: "Control over work: union influence over systems design and 
programming; no computer-gathered information to be used in work performance 
measurement"(Gill 1985: 123-124). 
A Dutch example: in 1985, the FNV transportation union tried to achieve a 
technology agreement in the port of Rotterdam. The plan was that the agreement should 
include provisions dealing with the quality of working life, against redundancies and 
against the use of information systems for the registration of the performance of 
individual workers. (Computable 26 Sept. 1986) 
92 Stichting voor Technologie en Zeggenschap (Foundation for Technology and 
Control). 
93 K. van Uitert (1990) describes a support program that ran from 1985 till 
1989, subsidized by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. This allowed the union to hire one researcher/consultant.  
94 Sandberg et al. (1992: 50) wrote: "If collective co-determination agreements 
have been reached on [..] hiring, firing, organizing production the labor side enjoys [..] 
priority of interpretation until the dispute has been settled. (The normal progression 
moves from local negotiations to central negotiations and, finally, for questions that 
could set a precedent, to the Labor Court.)" 
95 Statement made by S. Agurén during symposium "The Swedish model, 
suitable for import?" in Groningen November 1988. See Buitendam, Dumas and 
Glebbeek 1990. 
96 The UK is not among the countries where one finds "legal interventions 
directed to "securing greater worker participation in enterprise decision-making." 
(Cressey 1992: 250). 
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97 Kallevig's working paper does not give any details about the survey, like 
sample size. The following results are relevant:  
"Does the union make use of their lawful rights to obtain information and 
participation in the designing processes of data-systems? " 11% in large degree, 50% in 
small degree, 36% not at all (p. 24); "How often is implementation of new technology 
and its consequences being discussed in the union?" 17% never, 76% sometimes, 7% 
often (p. 25); "Is implementation and use of new technology in your workplace covered 
by local agreement between management and local union?” 15% yes, 78% no, 8% 
uncertain (p. 27). 
98 W. Buitelaar used this metaphor in a presentation.  
99 The Arbetslivscentrum investigated union participation in strategic decisions 
in Swedish industry. 521 companies were selected which, during a period of two years, 
had underwent strategic changes (reorganization, computerization, personnel 
reductions, introduction of new production lines or new technology, merger, a move to 
a new location). In ten per cent of the companies, managers indicated that the local 
unions were involved in the starting phase. In 68 per cent of the cases, managers 
indicated that unions were involved in the decision-making process. In 42 per cent of 
the companies, managers said that the local unions were involved in the implementation 
phase. Interviews with union representatives resulted in higher scores for these 
questions, respectively  24, 94 en 59 per cent.  
Another researcher claimed that, following the "Development Agreement" 
emphasis shifted towards the level of the individual worker and the autonomous team. 
As a result of this, co-determination grew almost synonymous with increasing 
productivity and product quality. (This would imply that the participation aspect 
became less important. H.P.) Source: "Whatever happened to Swedish co-
determination?", in European Industrial Relations Review, Oct. 1989: 12-13. The two 
original research reports, to which this review article refers, are: Levinson, K., 
Fackliga aktörer i strategisk förändring inom koncerner - mederkan och inflytande, 
Stockholm, Arbetslivscentrum, and H. Hart en S.H. Hörte, Medbestämmandets 
Stagnation - Medbestämmandets utveckling 1978-85, Göteborg 1989, Ar-
betsvetenskpliga Kollegiet. 
100 This account is based on Schauer et al. (1984) 
101 This search involved the following sources: 
1) reports based on research that was designed to bring successful cases to 
light, followed by inquiries about promising cases. Carrying the fierce title "The 
Control of Frontiers. Workers and New Technology; Disclosure and Use of Company 
Information" in 1984 a comparative study appeared based on 20 case studies from 
Sweden, the FRG, The Netherlands, Italy and the U.K. These cases were selected 
according to the criterion of best practice", i.e., "major influence of the worker 
representatives on the technical and social changes and, at least, stronger than average 
trade union organization and better than average access to company information (Levie 
and Moore 1984a, 2)". In two cases, the researchers reported worker influence on the 
organization of work. Both cases were located in Sweden. In the design process of a 
new dairy, factory worker influence caused more space for manual intervention to be 
created than in some heavily automated dairy factories. (Levie and Moore 1984b, 44). 
With respect to the Swedish Postgiro, it is reported that the unions succeeded in 
changing the direction of the automation process, from (labor) cost reduction to 
improvement of services and job security (Levie and Moore 1984b, 34). In the early 
1990's, I made inquiries about these two promising cases. 
In The Netherlands, researchers from the Research Institute for Technology and 
Democracy (STZ) produced ten case studies of "influence projects", in which: "unions 
and/or works council have autonomously formulated demands, directed at technology 
and related changes in the organization [..]; they made systematic, often protracted 
attempts to realize these 'social demands [..];  there was some measure of success: by 
improving (certain aspects of) the quality of working life, by a greater influence on the 
decision-making in company or institution  and/or by strengthening the union work." 
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Additionally, an internal research report from the Dienstenbond FNV (union for the 
service sector) proved to be useful. 
2) Searching the scientific literature for cues (see bibliography). 
3) Inquiries at the Swedish Center for Working Life, Arbetstagarkonsult AB in 
Stockholm and STZ in Amsterdam (consulting firms that are specialized in working for 
unions), the University of Arhus, and IG Metall in Frankfurt. 
4)Participation in (inter)national conferences, including the STZ anniversary 
symposium and five Labor Process Conferences in the UK. 
102 Information from video documentary "Computers in Context" by California 
Newsreel. 
103 The system was scheduled for introduction in the summer of 1995. 
104 Oral communication by L. Sundström. 
105 Marcuse (1942: 419) wrote: "Individualistic rationality has developed into 
efficient compliance with the pre-given continuum of means and ends. The latter 
absorbs the liberating efforts of thought, and the various functions of reason converge 
upon the unconditional maintenance of the apparatus."  
"Rationality is being transformed from a critical force into one of adjustment 
and compliance. Autonomy of reason loses its meaning in the same measure as the 
thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by the technical requirements of the 
apparatus which they have created. Reason has found its resting place in the system of 
standardized control, production and consumption. There it reigns through the laws and 
mechanisms which insure the efficiency, expediency and coherence of the system." 
(Marcuse 1943: 422) 
106 "The system of life created by modern industry is one of the highest 
expediency, convenience and efficiency" (Marcuse 1943: 421) 
107 A movement away from Taylorism is not the only factor that can explain a 
reduction of absence through illness. In the Halmstad County Hospital, there is more 
attention for the problem. When somebody reports ill, the head nurse calls. 
By 1990, Volvo Uddevalla had not solved the absence through illness problems. 
In the spring of 1990, the plant suffered an absentee rate of twelve percent. 
108 Kelly (1982) reported a mean job reduction of 25 per cent. 
109 The metalworkers' union wanted to see a different system introduced, with 
the production standard applied as an average, so that sick leaves may lead to a 
temporary decline in a team's production pace, to be compensated for later when the 
entire team is present. For the moment, the spokesman could ask for help from another 
team in case of sick leaves. In spite of that, there were complaints about a too high 
work pressure and the associated social pressure. 
110 An example is the Unichema (Unilever) chemical factory in Gouda. (Pot and 
others 1993, Brouwers 1989) 
111 Sandberg 1993. The spokeswoman said that ninety per cent of the cars that 
Uddevalla produced were made for specific customers. 
112 J. van Berkel, "Technologie-overeenkomst als informatieplatform" in: 
Computable 31 Oct. 1986: 26 
113 This was part of the design principles for the terminal as reproduced in 
Bosselaar 1986 and in Van Delden and Stam 1986. Beedenbender (1990) indicated that 
productivity in maritime transportation can be most improved in the area of yard 
operations.  
114 Since 1991, Sweden has legislation that corresponds with Section 12 
(Gustavsen 1992: 26). 
115 Personal memorandum by J. J. Ramondt 
116 Mueller et al. (1986: 138) investigated the various viewpoints of those 
involved with production automation inside a company and concluded: "Information 
gathered from a variety of sources has shown very clearly that not only are there major 
differences between management, unions and shopfloor operators in their beliefs about 
new technology, but a diversity exists within each group. This means that subgroups 
within  management and on the shopfloor can have views different from other members 
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of their group but similar to subgroups in a different group. In the most notable example, 
few attitudinal differences exist between (a) managers who believe in operator control 
over technology, (b) unions who advocate operator control, (c) operators who have had 
experience on AMT. At variance with this consensus, and for different reasons, are 
managers who believe in specialist control and manual-unskilled operators who 
believe that the new technology means lower quality and efficiency, more boredom, 
less autonomy and more job losses. The evidence dispels the notion that the belief 
systems of management, unions and workers each represent a unitary, homogeneous 
position." 
117 Zimbalist (1975: 58) wrote: "[..] work humanization either is confined to 
cosmetic modifications in the organization of work or it has the potential to lead to 
fundamental changes which challenge capitalist control, over the production process. 
[..] Work humanization, insofar as it is significant at all, is an unstable proposition. It 
must go either forward or backward." 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Trends als Lean Production en McDonaldization duiden erop dat het Taylorisme  
een hardnekkig verschijnsel is. Bovendien blijkt dat informatietechnologie vaak 
zodanig wordt gebruikt, dat daarmee Tayloristische patronen worden versterkt. 
Er bestaat echter een tegenbeweging. 
Er is veel geschreven over verschillende vormen van anti-Tayloristisch 
beleid. De daaruit voortvloeiende veranderingen op het niveau van de werkvloer 
zijn tot dusver nauwelijks systematisch geanalyseerd.  Voorts bestaat er veel 
verwarring over wat nu de drijvende krachten achter dit beleid zijn. In dit boek 
wordt een poging ondernomen deze kloof te dichten door 150 cases te analyseren 
 van anti-Tayloristische initiatieven. Deze cases hebben betrekking op 
organisaties in Duitsland, Nederland, Scandinavië en Engeland.  
De hoofdstroom bestaat uit consensus-gerichte  initiatieven van ma-
nagement en werknemers (vakbond of OR) om alternatieve organisatievormen te 
creëren. In deze initiatieven vinden we een drie-eenheid van processen: 
1) (Her)ontwerp van structuren. 
2) Top-down strategieën om werknemers in de nieuwe structuren in te passen. 
3) Spontane, sociale bewegings-achtige processen. 
Consensus-gerichte alternatieven zijn ondersteund door onderzoekers, die terwijl 
ze onderzoek en advieswerk combineren, expertise verzamelen over het 
veranderen van de organisatie van het werk, en die weer aan organisaties 
beschikbaar stellen. Ze leverden produktieve bijdragen aan verandering. Mis-
lukkingen waren er echter ook. 
Er zijn drie verschillende benaderingen te onderscheiden: participatief 
ontwerpen, integraal sociotechnisch systeemontwerp en humanisering van de 
arbeid. In de praktijk leiden deze benaderingen tot  gelijkwaardige resultaten. In 
Scandinavië en Duitsland bestaan door de overheid gefinancierde onderzoeks- en 
ontwikkelingsprogramma’s, die mogelijke alternatieven voor het Taylorisme 
verkennen en tot doel hebben, managers voor te lichten over alternatieven. (Ook 
was de Europese Unie  actief op dit terrein.)   
De diffusie van succesvolle alternatieven is een zwak punt. Van oorsprong 
was de basismethode hiervoor om succesvolle cases als model in de 
schijnwerpers te plaatsen.  Meer en meer wordt deze methode vervangen door 
een netwerkbenadering van diffusie. 
De onderzoeks- en ontwikkelingsprogramma’s omvatten projecten met het 
doel technologieën te ontwikkelen die niet Taylorisme-bevorderend zijn en die 
verandering in organisaties kunnen ondersteunen. Het bleek mogelijk om dit 
soort technologie te ontwikkelen, maar het bleek problematisch om ze succesvol 
op de markt te brengen. 
Consensus-gerichte alternatieven vertonen duidelijke successen op de 
terreinen: vermindering van technische disciplinering (bijvoorbeeld het 
ontkoppelen van werknemers van het tempo van de lopende band), taakver-
breding, taakverrijking, decentralisatie van verantwoordelijkheid en participatie. 
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Heronderzoek van klassieke cases bracht aan het licht dat er echter vaak regressie 
naar meer Tayloristische vormen optreedt. 
In het boek worden twee typen beperkingen verkend: het vasthouden door 
managers aan hun macht, als een doel op zich, en de relatieve efficiëntie van 
Tayloristische oplossingen. Beide beknotten de mogelijkheden voor verandering. 
Onafhankelijke vakbondsactie zou een mogelijkheid kunnen zijn om het 
vasthouden aan de macht door managers te compenseren. Vakbonds-initiatieven 
(en OR-initiatieven) lopen echter tegen specifieke barrières aan. Deze hebben te 
maken met toegang tot informatie en tot besluitvormingsprocessen, timing, 
problemen die inherent zijn aan het onderhandelen over kwalitatieve zaken en 
het probleem dat vakbonden hebben om het initiatief te nemen. En zelfs als deze 
vakbonds-specifieke obstakels gepasseerd zijn, liggen er nog de  algemene 
obstakels die betrekking hebben op alle anti-Tayloristische initiatieven. 
De Scandinavische landen en Nederland kennen wetgeving gericht tegen 
een degraderend ontwerp van arbeidsplaatsen. Dit kan worden gezien als pogen 
de grens te doorbreken, die efficiëntie-vereisten  aan het humaniseringsstreven 
stellen. Het bleek evenwel, dat het voldoen aan de standaarden niet echt werd 
opgelegd. 
Het dominante perspectief met betrekking tot anti-Taylorisme is mo-
dernisering, dit wil zeggen dat het gezien wordt als een manier om organisaties 
beter aan te passen aan hun in toenemende mate veranderende omgeving. Zelfs 
een aantal van diegenen, die kritisch schrijven over het herontwerpen van ar-
beidsplaatsen, past in dit paradigma. 
Modernisering is in veel opzichten een adequaat perspectief. Echter, een 
aantal aspecten van het anti-Taylorisme, zoals de morele dimensie, het veelvuldig 
voorkomen van regressie, het element van werknemers-bescherming in 
overheids- en vakbondsbeleid, is strijdig met de moderniseringsvisie. Dit leidt tot 
de conclusie dat anti-Taylorisme niet alleen een aanpassing is van de organisatie 
aan steeds snellere veranderingen in de omgeving, maar dat het ook een gevolg is 
van een noodzaak om nieuwe manieren te vinden om te leven met de blijvende, 
alles doortrekkende eigenschappen van de loonarbeidsverhouding. 
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